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ABSTRACT
The housing allowance experiment, a ten-year, $160 million experi-
ment conducted by the U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
to test the concept of housing vouchers, is a window on the housing beha-
vior of the elderly. The housing allowance is a cash transfer, very
much like a negative income tax, that provides a subsidy to participa-
ting families on the basis of income and household size. Housing
allowances were designed to let poor and moderate income families choose
their own housing in the marketplace by boosting their purchasing power
with a cash grant. They could use the housing allowance either to
alleviate high housing costs by helping them to afford their pre-program
housing, or to subsidize a different, better housing unit.
The goal of this dissertation is to see what light the data
collected for this experiment can shed on the dynamics of housing
choice by the elderly. What has this experience taught us about how the
elderly make housing decisions? The potential of housing allowances to
help with the housing problems of the elderly is also assessed.
The housing allowances acted as a cushion, a "safety net" if you
will, one element in a package of support that the elderly compiled for
survival in old age. Although housing allowances were potential
additions to the economic resources of the elderly, they were not
evaluated in strictly economic terms. Social factors mediated the
response of elderly families to the economic stimulus of the allowances.
The resources of individuals and families are derived from three ma-
jor institutions: the kinship (social) system, the market, and the state
and can be either monetary or nonmonetary in nature. Not only do very
few elderly people derive their entire financial, psychological and so-
cial subsistence from a single source, but the nature of the resource
from each source varies, and can take the form of money, goods, or
services. As in financial investment, the key is a diversified port-
folio. In this monograph the diversified portfolio is called a
"resource package." The role of friends and family as "mediating
structures" in housing decisions has been largely overlooked in the
analysis of this experiment, and deserves a closer look.
The results of the housing allowance experiment are examined in
light of the concept of resource packaging. Network analysis, a
relatively new method in the social sciences, provides a useful analytic
perspective. This paper examines the role of social networks at various
stages in the experiment, particularly the influence of social ties on
both the decision to move and on the assistance provided during a move.
Social networks provided families with instrumental assistance in
meeting the requirements of the experiment, furnished non-market housing
that made the proferred subsidy relatively unnecessary, or placed
obstacles in the way of meeting the program's requirements. In some
cases, such as discrimination on the basis of race, social factors
inhibited participation and prevented families from getting help they
needed.
Members of minority groups, who were more likely to live in residen-
tially segregated neighborhoods where the quality of housing was low,
could not find housing to meet the program's requirements, and did not
get the allowance in proportion to their eligibility.
But other groups among the elderly, the single, the female, and
whites, were quite successful in using the housing allowances to improve
their housing conditions.
Although the aged derive economic support from many sources, the
population eligible for EHAP still cannot house itself without depleting
their low-income budgets. Despite a comprehensive old-age support
system, the major housing problem of the aged in the experiment was not
primarily the quality of housing (although bad housing was a problem for
some), nor on the suitability of that housing to physical and spatial
needs that change with age, but on housing cost burdens that were more
onerous for the elderly than for young families both before and after re-
ceiving the allowance.
Thesis Supervisor: Bernard J. Frieden, Professor of Urban Studies
"We talk about old people in a sort of lump, you know, 'what are we to
do with the old people?' You can't really do anything about anybody
in a lump -- blacks in a lump, old people in a lump, Chicanos in a
lump.
May Sarton, 1981
"I believe that the most important fundamental principle which should
guide the planning of services for the old is concerned with the
enlargement, or at least the preservation, of the individual's sense
of freedom and self-respect."
Richard M. Titmuss, 1968
"...Whatever made you decide to get a Ph.D.?" "Grandchildren," Polly
said. "Three chuckling little boys, one gurgling little girl, all
under three. It was either hours and hours of baby-sitting, to say
nothing of having the little darlings cavalierly dumped on us at the
slightest excuse, or I had to get a job that would be absolutely
respected. Winthrop has encouraged me. 'Polly,' he said, 'if we are
not to find ourselves changing diapers every blessed weekend, you had
better find something demanding to say you're doing.' The children,
of course, are furious, but I am now a teaching assistant, very, very
busy, thank you..."
Amanda Cross, 1970
6The author's grandparents, Abraham J. Walter, age 89, and
Pauline S. Walter, age 83, with one of their four great-grandchildren,
age 2.
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INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
The goal of this dissertation is to see what light the data collec-
ted for the Experimental Housing Allowance Program (EHAP), a multi-year
experiment testing the concept of housing vouchers, can shed on the dyna-
mics of housing choices by the elderly. What has this decade-long expe-
rience taught us about how the elderly make housing decisions? This in-
troductory chapter discusses the purpose of the dissertation, and ex-
plains the housing allowance experiment, which can be seen as a window
on the housing behavior of the elderly.
A housing allowance is a cash transfer, very much like a negative
income tax, that provides a subsidy to participating families on the ba-
sis of income and household size. Housing allowances were designed to
let poor and moderate income families choose their own housing in the
private marketplace by boosting their purchasing power with a cash
grant. They could use the allowance either to alleviate excessive hous-
ing costs by helping to them afford their pre-program housing, or to sub-
sidize a different housing unit where housing was better.
The housing allowances acted as a cushion, a "safety net" if you
will, one element in a package of support (described in Chapter 2) that
the elderly compiled for survival in old age. Although housing allow-
ances acted as potential additions to the economic resources of the el-
derly, they were not evaluated in strictly economic terms. The role of
friends and family as "mediating structures" (Berger and Neuhaus, 1977)
in housing decisions has been largely overlooked in the analysis of this
experiment, and deserves a closer look. That is the task of this dis-
sertation.
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Social factors mediated the response of elderly families to the eco-
nomic stimulus of the housing allowances. Social networks provided
families with instrumental assistance in meeting the requirements of the
experiment, furnished non-market housing that made the proferred subsidy
relatively unnecessary, or placed obstacles in the way of meeting the
allowance program's requirements. In some cases, such as discrimination
on the basis of race, social factors inhibited participation and preven-
ted some families from getting the help that they needed. Some members
of minority groups, who were more likely to live in residentially segre-
gated neighborhoods where the quality of housing was low, could not find
housing to meet the program's requirements, and did not get the allow-
ance.
This thesis began with a search for an explanation of unexpectedly
low participation rates as indicated in Table 1. Although conventional
wisdom considers the elderly a particularly needy group, initial indi-
cations were that they did not participate in this program to the same
extent as other needy groups (iee also Frieden, 1980, pp. 23):
Table 1: Percentage of eligibles who qua
Demand Sup
Renters
ELDERLY 15 31
Welfare 40 50
Working poor 31 34
Sex of head of
household:
Male 27 25
Female 31 50
Minority 27 46
Non-Minority 30 36
All participants
Source: Adapted from Struyk and Bendick, 1981,
lified for a payment:
ply
Homeowners
20
30
28
16
30
35
21
pp. 86-87.
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But disaggregation of the eldelry population into demographic and
social groups indicates that some segments of the elderly population
have higher rates of participation than originally thought.
Chapter 1 presents an overview of the social aspects of housing
choice with respect to the observed outcomes of the experiment. Social
ties, more localized for low-income than for high-income populations had
varying effects on different kinds of families and at different times du-
ring the experiment.
Although the aged derive economic support from many sources, the
population eligible for EHAP still cannot house itself without excessive-
ly depleting their budgets. Despite a comprehensive old-age support sys-
tem, described in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 concludes that the major housing
problem of the aged in the experiment centers is not primarily the qua-
lity of their housing, although for about a fifth of the elderly popula-
tion housing quality is less than adequate, but housing cost burdens
that were more onerous for the elderly than for young families both be-
fore and after receiving the allowance.
Chapter 4 examines the role of social networks at various stages in
the experiment, and Chapter 5 examines the influence of social ties on
both the decision to move and on the assistance provided during a move.
Resource packaging
The resources of individuals and families are derived from three ma-
jor institutions: the kinship (social) system, the market, and the state
(Rein and Rainwater, 1981), and can be either monetary or nonmonetary in
nature. Not only do very few elderly people derive their entire finan-
cial, psychological and social subsistence from a single source, but the
nature of the resource from each source varies, and can take the form of
21
money, goods, or services. As in financial investment, the key is a di-
versified portfolio. In this monograph the diversified portfolio is
called a "resource package."
The results of the housing allowance experiment are examined in
light of this concept of resource packaging. Network analysis, a rela-
tively new method in the social sciences, provides a useful analytic per-
spective. "In the atomistic perspectives typically assumed by economics
and psychology, individual actors are depicted as making choices and act-
ing without regard to the behavior of other actors. Whether analyzed as
purposive action based on rational calculations of utility maximization,
or as drive-reduction motivation based on causal antecedents, such indi-
vidualistic explanations generally ignore the social contexts within
which the social actor is embedded. In contrast, . . . [thel - - -
first essential insight [of network analysis). . . is that any actor ty-
pically participates in a social system involving many other actors, who
are significant reference points in one another's decisions. . . "
(Knoke and Kuklinski (1982: pp. 9). This thesis analyzes the behavior
of the elderly in the housing allowance experiment in the context of
their social networks.
The housing decisions of the low income population are made in the
context of the entire way that they live. Their economic, social, and
physical resources are brought to bear on their daily problems, and the
solutions they find for themselves have roots in and consequences for
each of those spheres.
The most astonishing finding of the research on families and social
networks of the past twenty years is not that so much has changed, but
that so much has remained the same. Although coresidence between elder-
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ly parents and their adult children has declined dramatically, a pheno-
menon discussed in Chapter 2 of this dissertation, social networks have
largely retained their importance in housing decisions, at least for the
low income elderly population. Poor people need the resources that
other people can provide, without monetary cost, to help them through
their lives. Mauss (1970, written in 1925) first alerted us to so-
called primitive societies whose economic and social systems were based
on exchanges of goods within the culture. Through these exchanges so-
cial systems flourished. This monograph proposes a model of frequent ex-
changes among family members and friends that contribute to both the
social and economic support systems of the elderly, while allowing the
elderly to live independent and autonomous lives.
The behavior of the elderly in the housing allowance demand experi-
ment illustrates the importance of social ties on housing decisions.
The evidence of the demand experiment suggests that the offer, promise,
or possibility of a housing allowance does not substitute for neighbors
or friends but supplements them. Those who have families and friends
rely on them; those who do not, are more likely to try to qualify for
the allowance because they have fewer sources of help. Poor people wel-
come the allowance if it supplements their survival package, but refuse
the help if the package is jeopardized by the proffered help. The offer
of an allowance, if its receipt is contingent on moving, presents some
danger to survival because moving can reduce local social networks,
which are more salient for the poor than for the middle class (Chapter
1). It is unlikely that poor people will refuse financial help unless
that help has some negative connotation (such as the stigma of receiving
welfare) or the cost of getting that help is greater than the potential
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benefit that can be derived, such as assistance that is tied to leaving
a long-term home. In the housing allowance experiment, the elderly
found that the high economic and social cost of moving largely ruled out
residential mobility as the preferred solution to their housing prob-
lems. Although the program did not require that people move, and in
fact was one of the first federal housing programs that did not require
moving to a new home as a condition for receiving the allowance, the
fact that, in the treatment groups studied in this thesis, an allowance
was paid only if the participant's housing met a minimum standard set
according to national health and housing codes, meant that it was pri-
marily those old people living in relatively good housing who could qua-
lify for the allowance payment.
Elderly people with robust resource packages are less in need of
the housing allowance subsidy than are those who have lower levels of re-
sources. Those whose social networks are less robust make good use of
the housing allowance. Although these elderly individuals need money,
to compensate for very low incomes, they also need the help that only
other people can give them. If they can qualify for the housing allow-
ance payment in their pre-program housing, they do that; if they need to
have more help than the housing allowance agency offered, and they do
not have family or friends around who can help them, they do not quali-
fy. The low-resource elderly need programs that provide them with some
of the resources that they lack.
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The Housing Allowance Experiment
In 1970, Congress mandated that the U. S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development conduct an experiment to determine whether a program
of direct cash grants to eligible families was a feasible alternative to
housing production programs initiated during the New Deal, accelerated
in the late 1960s, and suspended by President Nixon in 1973 (Meyerson,
Terrett and Wheaton, 1962; Friedmann, 1968; Mandelker, 1973; Keith,
1973; Musgrave, 1973; Weicher, 1973; Hartman, 1975; Frieden, 1980). De-
sign work on the housing allowance experiment, known as the Experimental
Housing Allowance Program (EHAP), started in 1972, and the last payments
will be paid to beneficiaries in 1984; the total estimated cost of the
experiment is $160 million (HUD, 1980). The potential benefits of this
approach are laid out in Solomon (1974); the success of housing allow-
ances in serving a cross-section of low and moderate income families is
summarized in Frieden (1980).
Prior to this experiment, the government had tried mainly supply-
side solutions to the housing problems of poor people. The housing al-
lowance, a demand-side solution, was designed to "[empower] consumers to
pursue their own interests in the marketplace" (Downs and Bradbury,
1981: p. 398). Fixed-location public housing projects had been criti-
cized as inefficient and unfair, possibly the cause rather than the cure
of housing problems (see Wurster, 1966; Peattie, 1971; Taggart, 1970;
Frieden, 1971; Starr, 1971; Wallace, 1972; Aaron, 1972; and Solomon,
1974, to name just a few critics of public and other subsidized housing
schemes). With respect to the elderly in particular, there was a feel-
ing that "new rental structures built primarily in urban areas are not
responsive to large segments of the elderly who do not wish to move, do
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not wish to give up ownership status, or do not reside in urban areas"
(Welfeld and Struyk, 1978).
The theory underlying housing allowances is that what poor people
need most of all is money (Ryan, 1971). Housing allowances are distin-
guished from unrestricted cash subsidies of the type tested in the Seat-
tle and Denver Income Maintenance Experiments (see Hannan, Tuma and
Groeneveld, 1978 for description) by the housing-related requirements at-
tached to the receipt of the subsidy. In each of the three components
of the experiment (see below), eligible families were enrolled in the
program and offered a housing allowance to supplement their income. The
allowance payment was based on current family income and household size,
and was paid if they already lived in or could find housing that was
judged acceptable to the program's administrators. The acceptability of
housing was determined by an inspection of the premises, in accordance
with generally accepted standards of health and safety (although in some
treatment groups in the demand experiment there was no requirement to
live in good housing). Payments were mailed monthly to participating
families; the only limitation was that the payment could not be greater
than actual gross housing costs, including utilities. Some efforts were
made to assist participants by giving them services such as legal infor-
mation, housing information, and housing quality inspections (considered
a service in the administrative agency experiment), but most partici-
pants did not avail themselves of the optional services offered.
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THE DEMAND EXPERIMENT
EHAP had three components. The "Housing Allowance Demand Experi-
ment," conducted among 3600 randomly selected low income families in
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania and Phoenix, Arizona, attempted to discover how
housing allowances affect the housing choices of recipient families.
These 3600 families were divided among 25 treatment groups (see Table 2)
and controls. Each treatment group had slightly different criteria for
qualifying for a payment, and slightly different ways of calculating the
payment; several treatment groups had no criteria at all.
Two different formulas for calculating payments were tested, inclu-
ding variations in the amount of the payment with respect to income and
requirements that had to be met before the allowance was paid; there
were also two control groups. Randomized assignment to treatment groups
and inclusion of controls made the demand experiment the only component
of EHAP that was really an experiment. The other two components, the
supply experiment and administrative agency experiment, were more in the
nature of field trials or demonstration projects.
The formula used for determining payments in the supply experiment,
the administrative agency experiment (see below), and the minimum rent
and minimum standards treatments groups in the demand experiment, was
the so-called "housing gap formula." Payments under this formula were
calculated as the difference between an estimated fair market rent and a
percentage of a family's income. In symbols, it was:
H = C* - .25Y where
H = the housing allowance payment;
C* = the estimated cost of modest standard housing in the program
site (estimated by panels of local experts and/or local
marketwide surveys of rents);
Y = the household's net income
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Table 2
ALLOWANCE PLANS TESTED
HOUSING GAP: (P = C - bY, where C is a multiple of C*)
HOUSING REQUIREMENTS
Minimum Minimum Rent Minimum Rent No
b VALUE C LEVEL Standards Low - 0.7C* High - 0.9C* Requirement
b - 0.15
b - 0.25
b - 0.35
Plan 10
I S S
1.2C*
0.8C*
C *
Plan 1 Plan 4 Plan 7
C* Plan 2 Plan 5 Plan8 12
Plan 3 Plan 6 Plan 9
I S a
Plan 11
I
Symbols: b = Rate at which the allowance decreases as the income increases.
C* a Basic payment level (varied by family size and also by site).
PERCENT OF RENT (P = aR):
a = 0.6 a = 0.5 a = 0.4 a = 0.3 a = 0.2
Plan 13 Plans 14 - 16 Plans 17 - 19 Plans 20 - 22 Plan 23
CONTROL: With Housing
Information
Without Housing
Information
Plan 24 Plan 25
Source: Kennedy and MacMillan (1980)
C*
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There were several variations in the demand experiment on this for-
mula. One goal of the experiment was to test whether the size of the
payment with respect to household income would affect the response of
the household, so families were paid an allowance based on either 80 per-
cent, 100 percent, or 120 percent of the C* (estimated cost of adequate
housing) level. Similarly, the tax rate on household income, the .25
standard, representing the expectation that families should spend a quar-
?rter of their net income for rent, was varied, and ranged from 15 per-
cent to 35 percent of net household income.
Qualifying for a payment
To discover the extent to which housing allowances would actually
be used to improve the quality of housing of the low-income partici-
pants, and to find out if setting housing standards rather than just gi-
ving families more money and letting them choose their own housing ac-
tually resulted in better housing for the low-income families, several
treatment groups in the demand experiment had to meet an "earmarking re-
quirement" before they could receive a housing allowance payment. Two
kinds of requirements are examined in this report, a minimum standards
and a minimum rent requirement. These requirements were used to disco-
ver if requiring that the allowance be spent on housing had any effect
on how it was actually used, and to see which form of housing allowance
would result in the greatest improvement in housing conditions for the
participating families.
The "minimum rent" requirement was designed to test the proposition
that paying a rent of a pre-determined level improved the quality of the
housing that families lived in. This requirement was relatively easy to
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verify, especially as compared to minimum standards (explained below),
since rents are verifiable by mail transactions. Two minimum rent le-
vels were tested in the experiment, a low minimum rent of 70 percent of
the estimated cost of modest standard housing, and a high minimum rent
*
of 90 percent of C . In this treatment group, families had to spend a
certain amount for their housing, subject to no further test of quality.
If they spent this amount for housing they would receive the allowance
without further ado.
The minimum standards requirement was a bit more complicated. In
this treatment group, the housing allowance payment was also calculated
according to the "housing gap" formula, but the family could not receive
the payment unless the dwelling unit they chose (either their present re-
sidence or a new unit) passed a housing inspection and met a pre-estab-
lished set of criteria. The "minimum standards" criteria were, accord-
ing to the evaluation contractors (Rand Corporation and Abt Associates)
based on nationally accepted housing and health codes, and were enforced
by trained housing evaluators who inspected the current or prospective
homes of participating families to see if they met these criteria. An
inspection by housing evaluators before issuing a subsidy was also a fea-
ture of both the supply and administrative agency experiments, and is
currently used in the ongoing Section 8 leased housing program.
Before a family in the minimum standards treatment group (or any
family in the supply experiment or the administrative agency experiment)
could receive payments, they had to arrange to have their prospective or
current unit inspected. If it passed the inspection, the family could
begin receiving payments immediately. If the unit failed the inspec-
tion, the household could either try to make the necessary repairs to
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bring the home up to the necessary standards, or they could try to move
to another unit that could pass muster.
This report combines the minimum standards and minimum rent treat-
ment groups into one group for analysis. The rationale for this is two-
fold. First and most importantly, the sample sizes are so small that,
when looking at elderly participants still active after two years, cell
sizes had to be increased. This was done by combining the groups. Se-
cond, the minimum rent requirement is based on the theory that high
rents buy higher quality units, and the minimum standards requirement
also has as its goal ensuring that participating families live in good
housing. Although some evidence from the demand experiment indicates
that the minimum rent requirement had a greater effect on the price of
housing than on its quality, meeting either the minimum rent or the mini-
mum standard earmarking requirements meant, at least in theory, that a
participating family lived in at least minimally adequate housing.
Percent of Rent
In the "percent of rent" treatment groups, participants received a
pre-determined percent of their gross rent as a subsidy, regardless of
the quality of their housing or of their income. This part of the expe-
riment was intended to test the effect of income on housing consumption
absent a housing consumption requirement such as an inspection or mini-
mum rent standards. Analysis of these treatment groups is beyond the
scope of this study because, as Downs and Bradbury said in a summary of
discussion of this question at a conference, "both Henry Aaron and
HUD's representatives claimed that Congress would never pass a percent
of rent form of allowance because it was too susceptible to collusive
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fraud by tenants and landlords. Landlords could agree to raise tenants'
rents without improving their housing substantially, which would in-
crease their own incomes and enable tenants to collect larger allowance
payments. Even if such fraud were not widespread, the possibility of at
least a few horrible examples would make such an approach politically
unpalatable" (Downs and Bradbury, 1981, pp. 393).
Control Group
The fourth major type of treatment group in the demand experiment
were the control groups. These families, separated randomly from fami-
lies in other treatment groups, received a token monthly payment of $10
in exchange for completing and returning forms to the housing allowance
agency every month. One control group received housing information, the
other did not. Data collection for families in this group was the same
as for families who were eligible to receive allowances; the only differ-
ence was that no allowance was provided.
Differences between Pittsburgh and Phoenix
Participants in Pittsburgh and Phoenix behaved quite differently
from each other, and differences between the cities accounts for a good
deal of variation in response to the housing allowance. Because the
same allowance had different effects in cities with disparate population
mixes, a national program design must take account of the fact that a
uniform national program will be implemented differently in different
kinds of cities. What is location specific, and which responses can be
generalized to the whole aged population?
Two main areas of contrast between the two cities of the demand ex-
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periment correspond to major concerns of this monograph, housing con-
ditions and available resources, both monetary and nonmonetary. Table 3
(below) shows some of the ways that the housing markets of the cities in
the demand experiment varied, and can help us understand dissimilarities
in the behavior of the elderly in the two cities.
One major disparity between the cities is ethnic composition; most
of the minorities in Pittsburgh are black, and most of the minorities in
Phoenix are hispanic. A second difference is that Pittsburgh is an old,
industrial, declining city in the northeast, and Phoenix is a young,
growing Sunbelt city. People who have recently moved to a relatively
young city are less likely to have arrived with their entire social net-
works in tow.
Phoenix (Maricopa County)
Phoenix is a growing Sunbelt city, characterized by high inmi-
gration, intra-county migration, and rapid population, employment, and
housing stock growth. Between 1950 and 1979, the city of Phoenix grew
by more than 600 percent, and Maricopa County (the metropolitan area) by
300 percent (Western Savings and Loan, 1980). The income levels were
relatively high at baseline, and there was a relatively large hispanic
population (15%). These characteristics make it an almost ideal place
to test the effect of housing allowances in a growing area.
Pittsburgh (Allegheny County)
Pittsburgh, in contrast to Phoenix, is a declining northeastern
frostbelt city, with a high concentration of black households in the cen-
ter city, negative population growth, aging and deteriorating housing
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stock, low growth in employment opportunities. This city is a good exam-
ple of a declining city, and gives us an opportunity to test how housing
allowances work in an area of decline.
Table 3: The Pittsburgh and Phoenix
housing markets, 1974
Pittsburgh Phoenix
Population, 1970 2.4 million .97 million
1970 housing vacancy
rate 6.0% 7.4%
1960-1970 population
growth rate -0.2% 45.8%
Minority population
Black 7.1% 3.4%
Hispanic 1.9% 13.7%
Cost of housing1  low high
Proportion of
housing built before
1940 55.0% 9.2%
Intracounty
mobility 5ate,
1965-1970 26.4% 38.6%
Source: Goedert, 1978.
1 Relative costs of housing (low, medium, high) were derived by ranking
and dividing into three equal parts the 1970 median rent figures for
all SMSAs with populations over 500,000.
2 Intracounty mobility rate is the number of households that remained
in the same county between 1965 and 1970, but moved to a different
residence, divided by the total number of persons that remained in
the same county over this period.
Families in Phoenix had higher average incomes than did families in
Pittsburgh. Table 4 presents information on the relative average
incomes in the two cities.
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TABLE 4
Average Incomes, Pittsburgh, Phoenix
and United States, 1974
Whites
Men
Pittsburgh SMSA
Under 25 $ 4,308
25-44 13,307
45-64 15,729
65 and
over 9,484
Total 12,034
Phoenix SMSA
Under 25 3,901
25-44 12,486
45-64 14,934
65 and
over 8,313
Total 10,904
Total United States
Under 25 4,005
25-44 12,182
45-64 14,514
65 and
over 8,204
Total 10,548
Blacks
Women Men
2,875
5,677
6,252
3,355
4,957
2,620
5,525
6,891
3,918
4,896
2,656
5,320
6,457
4,177
4,769
$3, 659
8,870
10,683
3,482
7,795
3,234
7,639
8,917
6,505
All Races
Women Men
$2,484
4,972
5,047
467
4,024
2,087
8,276
3,864
3,613
5,023
3,087 2,304
7,914 5,098
8,604 5,254
4,281 2,788
6,400 4,199
Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human
Women
$ 9,253 $ 2,840
13,004 5,613
15,497 6,179
9,152 3,256
11,776 4,885
3,823 2,538
12,148 5,574
14,718 6,746
8,031 3,910
10,536 4,802
3,872 2,601
11,644 5,287
13,975 6,329
7,846 4,038
10,058 4,689
Services, 1980a
Housing conditions in Phoenix are, in general, better than in Pitts-
burgh. The housing there is newer (9 percent was built before 1940, com-
pared to 55 percent in Pittsburgh), but it costs more. Underlying mobi-
lity rates are higher in Phoenix (over 40 percent of all participants in
Pittsburgh, but 65.6 percent in Phoenix, moved during the course of the
two-year experiment; 17.9 percent (in Pittsburgh) and 29 percent (in
Phoenix) of households headed by an individual age 75 and over, moved
during the two year period) meaning that, to the extent that people who
Total
$ 3,631
10,982
12,189
6,868
9,205
3,226
9,534
11,790
6,791
8,201
3,316
9,268
10,964
6,505
7,904
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move are more likely to qualify for the allowance payment, families in
Phoenix are probably more likely to meet any requirements for families
to live in housing of a minimum standard than are families in Pitts-
burgh. This prediction is borne out in the data; more families who
moved qualified for a payment (59.6 percent in Pittsburgh, 66.9 percent
in Phoenix), than families who did not move (42 percent in Pittsburgh,
38.5 percent in Phoenix). Differences between the cities will become
apparent in the analysis below.
THE SUPPLY EXPERIMENT
In contrast to the cities of the demand experiment, where only 3600
families in two cities were hand-picked to participate in the experi-
ment, the "Housing Assistance Supply Experiment" was run market-wide in
Green Bay (Brown County) Wisconsin and South Bend (St. Joseph County)
Indiana. A total of almost 10,000 families received a payment at some
time between 1975 and 1980, (U. S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development, 1980, pp. 88) in this component designed to discover the
effects of housing allowances on entire housing markets.
To reach this goal, all families in the two cities, both renters
and owners, that met the income and household composition criteria set
by HUD could apply to the program. This is the only component of EHAP
that allowed homeowners to participate. If they were eligible, and if
their housing was of good quality as measured by a set of nationally ac-
cepted housing and health codes, they qualified for a payment. If cur-
rent housing was not acceptable according to the standards, they could
either bring their homes into compliance with the program's requirements
by repairing it, or move to a new home.
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The supply experiment sites were chosen by HUD for their contrast-
ing characteristics on two dimensions, population growth rate of central
cities and percentage black population in the central cities (Goedert,
1978). In addition, both cities had to be relatively small (less than
350,000 population), so that a full-scale demonstration would be finan-
cially feasible. Between 1960 and 1970, Green Bay had a central city
population growth rate of 39.6 percent, compared to a 5.2 percent
decline in population in central South Bend. Central South Bend was
14.1 percent black, and the urbanized area 8.3 percent black, compared
to Green Bay which was virtually all white (0.1 percent black in the
central city, 0.3 percent in the urbanized area) (above from Goedert,
1978, pp. 17 and 29).
This dissertation uses published data from the supply experiment
wheneven possible. The raw data from the experiment's computer tapes
could not be used because data became available too late to be included
in this analysis. Data from this experiment are used to enlarge or en-
hance findings from the demand experiment, and when that data base does
not provide adequate information.
THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY EXPERIMENT
The third major component of EHAP was the "Administrative Agency
Experiment," conducted in eight cities (Bismarck, North Dakota; Durham,
North Carolina; Jacksonville, Florida; San Bernardino, California;
Salem, Oregon; Peoria, Illinois; Springfield, Massachusetts; Tulsa, Okla-
homa) and designed to test different administrative mechanisms and types
of administering agencies (see Goedert, 1978 for a description of the
cities in the experiment, and HUD, 1980 and Bendick and Squire, 1981 for
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a general description of the experiment).
A limited number of families were allowed to enroll in this compo-
nent of EHAP. The agencies involved were allowed to design their own
program within the bounds of rather loose criteria set by HUD that had
to do with statutory regulations regarding the provision of housing
assistance to poor families. For example, all agencies in EHAP required
that landlords stipulate in some way that they would not discriminate on
the basis of race, handicap, or national origin, although the enforce-
ment of that nondiscrimination clause was left to the discretion of the
local administering agency. Similarly, all landlords and tenants had to
sign a rental agreement that included notification of evictions, but the
exact wording of the agreement was left to local option.
This thesis uses data from published reports of the administrative
agency experiment, as well as case study material gathered by the author
during her employment at the Jacksonville site of this experiment.
Illustrative material from Jacksonville is used when first-hand know-
ledge can illuminate particular points.
OVERVIEW
This dissertation describes a resource package with three compo-
nenets, and studies how both the economic support system and available
social networks affected the behavior of the elderly in the housing al-
lowance experiment.
Chapter 1 provides an overview of the role of social networks both
with respect to the changing American family, and with respect to hous-
ing. Although the context and content of those exchanges have altered
over the years, family structures remain to carry the aged through old
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age.
Throughout history, the elderly have depended on their families to
shelter them in old age. Chapter 2 describes the shift from dependence
on private charity for economic assistance in old age, to state assump-
tion of responsibility for the care of the indigent elderly. But, not
all are equally well served, and minorities and women continue to have
relatively low economic resources.
Chapter 3 summarizes the housing conditions of the elderly, and
concludes that for about half of the elderly the major housing problem
is not physical condition but excessive cost, although about 20 percent
of very old people live in substandard housing.
Chapters 4 and 5 examine the extent to which the elderly in the
housing allowance experiment considered their social support systems
when making housing decisions in the experiment, and the extent to which
they depend on donations from friends or relatives to help them repair
their homes or to move. Chapter 4 looks at the data base of the demand
experiment at each stage of participation (application, eligibility, en-
rollment, and meeting the earmarking requirements) to see how social
ties interacted with program decisions to hinder or help the elderly in
their quest for financial assistance from the federal government. Pub-
lished evidence from the supply experiment and administrative agency ex-
periment are used to look at how well the elderly were informed of the
existence of the program and helped to apply for it.
Chapter 5 looks at just the searching, repairing, and moving compo-
nents of participation in the housing allowance experiment. The data of
the demand experiment is analyzed in the light of other aspects of the
resource package of elderly families.
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The dissertation concludes that the elderly package their monetary
and nonmonetary resources for survival, and make housing decisions and
program participation decisions on how the program would affect their
whole survival package, not only on the possible effect on the economic
or social components considered separately.
Recommendations are made to improve the ability of housing allow-
ances to serve the needs of the elderly. Because the housing allowance
program is a hybrid between an income and a housing program, it offers
an income solution to housing problems. If the goal of the program is
to solve the housing cost problem of many poor families, then the re-
quirement that families in the program live in housing of a particularly
quality should be eliminated.
But if the poor housing conditions of some of the population, espe-
cially the very poor, the very old, and minorities, are to be improved,
the housing allowance program as administered cannnot do the job alone.
Although many families improved the quality of their housing by repair-
ing it or moving to new and better homes, for the most part the elderly
remained in their pre-program housing, which either did or did not
qualify. The evidence suggests that those homes that were repaired were
quite close to meeting the housing standards (H.TJ.D., 1980), so the hous-
ing improvements induced by the program were minor (Coleman, 1982). The
imposition of housing standards served to satisfy the needs of HUD more
than the needs of the families involved.
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CHAPTER 1: RESOURCE PACKAGING: HOW FAMILIES SURVIVE
1.1 Introduction: The Package
Although the literature of the housing allowance experiment does
not focus on the social aspects of the participant's housing decisions
(see Struyk and Bendick, 1980, and Bradbury and Downs, 1981, for exam-
ples of the way the experiment was analyzed), social factors come into
play at each stage in the process of qualifying for a housing allowance
payment, and have a different effect at each stage.
This monograph examines where in the process of qualifying for a
housing allowance friends, relatives, and other members of personal net-
works made a difference in the behavior of elderly families participa-
ting in the housing allowance experiment, and in what direction the in-
fluence operated. "Network analysis" as understood by sociologists and
anthropologists has usually been used to "uncover the social structure
of a total system" (Knoke and Kuklinski, 1982, pp.15), a goal that would
stretch the housing allowance experiment data beyond its limits. In-
stead, this work examines networks in a new way, by looking at the so-
cial aspects of what is usually thought of as an economic decision.
This chapter first defines the resource package, and then examines
the literature to see how other researchers have defined social ties,
and how they have found them to influence decision-making, particularly
the housing decision. The rest of the dissertation examines the evi-
dence of a mediating role for social ties in the housing decisions of
the elderly in the housing allowance experiment.
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1.2 Social Networks and the Resource Package
All poor families package their incomes, what Stack (1973) called
"strategies for survival." When money income is low, needy families use
their social networks and barter for goods and services with other low-
income families, usually kin, to obtain what they need to survive, im-
plying that human beings available to help can be counted as part of as-
set structures. It is possible that those elderly who are married, or
who have children, siblings or friends, are less needy than elderly peo-
ple with the same monetary income, or even the same household size, but
without an assistance network. Although this argument can become "Big
Brother-ish," with telephone calls and social visits counted along with
Social Security and pension payments to determine eligibility for assis-
tance from public programs, the fact is that economic resources do not
adequately represent all resources available to help the elderly. The
evidence of the housing allowance experiment supports the notion that
old people think about these nonmonetary resources when deciding whe-
ther, and how, they will participate in public programs like ERAP.
While rational in an economic sense (they did not make decisions
that decreased their economic resources), the housing decisions of elder-
ly-headed households included noneconomic components. When making these
decisions, the elderly looked to family and friends, and to the nature
of their relationship with their landlords. This research is a first
step in studying the mediating role of social factors in housing deci-
sions.
Mediating structures, family, church, and neighborhood, "[stand] be-
tween the individual in his (sic) private life and the large institu-
tions of public life", the state, large capitalist enterprises, big la-
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bor, and educational and professional bureaucracies (Berger and Neuhaus,
1977: p.2), and provide a theoretical basis for linking the family with
the state.
According to Maddox (1979) the availability of a supportive social
network is one of the defining elements of functional capacity in the
aged, yet we know very little about the way this social network func-
tions, or what circumstances affect the way it functions. Contrary to
what had been previously thought, we know that elderly derive signif-
icant social and material assistance from kin and friends, and that the
type of assistance offered by each varies (Shanas and Streib, 1965;
Sussman, 1965; Shanas, et. al. 1968; Maddox, 1979). As Schorr (quoted
in Rein and Rainwater, 1981: pp. 21) said, "the demise of filial rela-
tionships and responsibilities has regularly been reported and their
survival regularly discovered." But we do not have a good idea of the
way these networks of friends and family work, nor the way the changing
American family and the changing demographic structure and population
pyramid of the country will affect these networks or housing conditions.
Three institutions (market, state, and kinship/social structure)
distribute economic resources (Rein and Rainwater, 1981), but are not in-
dependent of each other, and are interrelated and interact. At the most
basic level, marital status, a major aspect of the kinship system, af-
fects the economic resources provided by both the market and the state,
and the economic system affects the family. ". . . In the nature of mo-
dern industrial society no government, however firm its wish, can avoid
having policies that profoundly influence family relationships. . . -
It can choose to have purposeful or concealed policies, but it will, no
matter its intention, have a family policy (Moynihan, 1968: pp. vi-
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vii)." Although the federal social welfare system affects virtually
every family in the country, we presently understand very little of the
extent or nature of this governmental influence on family life, or the
influence of family ties on participation in governmental programs. Our
system of programs has dealt with individuals, not families, even though
families provide the major economic and social support for individuals
in every sphere of life, public and private (Penick, 1980).
Private pensions and Social Security often pay different amounts to
couples than to single people; the size of the payment in the housing
allowance experiment depended on the household size of the participating
household. Larger household sizes after retirement imply that there are
more people available both to earn or bring in money. Larger households
are more likely to have greater economic resources, provided by both the
market and the state, than smaller households, especially if some house-
hold members are men who typically earn more than women earn when work-
ing, and whose higher salaries during the working years provide higher
retirement incomes.
Gender also affects the distribution of economic resources; women
draw much less money than men do from both the market while working and
from the state after retirement. Income in one sector affects later in-
come in another; payments by the state to the elderly after retirement
(or after age 70 regardless of employment) depends on previous income
within the market system.
Since the housing allowance program was an experiment, HUD was able
to get waivers from most other federal agencies to ensure that the allow-
ance was not counted as income by any other federal or state means-test-
ed program, with the exception of the food stamp program. In an ongoing
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program, these waivers would probably not be available, and the net bene-
fit of housing allowances subsidies to the recipient families would be
mitigated by commensurate decrease in other federal benefits. The Food
Stamp program was the only federal program which counted housing allow-
ances as income, and food stamp benefits were decreased if families also
received a housing allowance. The net benefit to participants also eli-
gible for Food Stamps was less than the face value of the housing allow-
ances. For example, in the administrative agency experiment, one family
of four that had been receiving a net food stamp benefit of $123 before
joining E.H.A.P., had that benefit decreased to $77 after qualifying for
an $86 housing allowance subsidy. Their net gain from the $86 was $40,
because the value of their food stamps was decreased by $46 (Wolfe and
Hamilton, 1977, pp. 346-349).
Other interactive effects are possible. It is widely speculated
that the increase in economic resources over the decade of the 70s led
to high levels of household formation, as formerly dependent people,
both young and old, could, with rising incomes, afford to form their own
households. This was fueled by large reductions in the proportion of
the elderly living below the poverty level, especially after Social Se-
curity was indexed to the rate of inflation. This is an example of the
state affecting the household structure. The results of the Seattle and
Denver Income Maintenance Experiments (known as SIME/DIME) that show
increased marital dissolution rates as a result of increased economic in-
dependence among women is another example (Hannan, Tuma and Groeneveld,
1978).
Resources available to the elderly from their personal networks do
not carry a price tag and are nonmonetary in nature (though the benefit
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derived could be assigned a value). This chapter explores these nonmone-
tized components of the social network.
1.2.1 Monetary Aspects of the Resource Package
Section 1.2 outlines how the elderly package their social and finan-
cial resources in a way that is highly rational. This section shows how
monetary incomes come from a variety of sources that are combined into a
package to provide an adequate level of living. The monetary component
of the resource package includes financial resources earned or granted
to the elderly from either the state or the market sector of the econo-
my, and is discussed at length in Chapter 2. For the purposes of this
thesis, all monetary income, whether from the market or from the state,
is treated similarly (cf. Rein and Rainwater, 1981: p.25).
The market sector provides monetary income to the young when they
are in the labor force, and to the elderly both if they continue to work
during the "retirement" years, and in the form of pensions after retire-
ment. The aged derive financial assistance from Social Security, pen-
sions, savings, income-producing assets, and both monetary and nonmone-
tary help from social networks. The amount of monetary income available
to the aged after leaving the labor force is determined by market for-
ces. Because retirement benefits in both private and public pension
plans are calculated as a percent of pre-retirement income, income in
retirement depends directly on previous levels of income earned during
the working years.
The state is the provider of last resort, and furnishing resources
and services not otherwise available to citizens from either the private
market or the social support system. These include, but are not limited
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to, Social Security, Supplemental Security Income, Home Care services,
and publicly funded senior citizen centers.
1.3 Who Are the Members of the Social Network
The idea of the family is "one of the great forces of our time,"
(Aries, 1962), and since the 1960s, the structure of state aid to the el-
derly has been aimed at recreating or reproducing the family and communi-
ty assistance network, providing services that mimic or reproduce ser-
vices formerly thought to have been provided by families. Meals deli-
vered to the home replace children, mostly daughters, who cook; home
maintenance services replace live-in or visiting children who perform
routine maintenance chores for their parents and in-laws; governments
fund non-profit social and charitable groups who then build elderly hous-
ing projects, and the communities created there replace coresident multi-
generational families (although that ideal form was not nearly as common
as had been thought; see Laslett, 1971) in providing social contact and
assistance.
The nonmonetary component of the personal support system, also
called the "personal network," or "personal community" (Wellman, 1981)
or "convoy," (Cobb, 1979), consists of kin and non-kinsmen, such as
friends, neighbors, acquaintances, and colleagues, and provides both sub-
stantive and sociable assistance to people. It is called "nonmonetary"
in this work because there is usually no price attached directly to the
resource provided, although long-term exchange of resources has probably
occurred (Stueve and Lein, 1979). The nature of the assistance provided
by families has changed over the past decades, and the state has repro-
duced many functions formerly performed by families, especially with re-
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spect to provision of economic resources and some social assistance, spe-
cifically, home care, meals-on-wheels, and so forth.
Although by far the most visible and important for many people, the
kinship system is just one aspect of the social network. Many elderly
receive significant assistance from kin, but many do not; 20 percent of
today's elderly do not even have children (Maddox, 1979), and the propor-
tion of people with few or no children will, if anything, increase as a
proportion of the elderly especially after the low-fertility baby boom
generation reaches old age (see below).
Network analysis treats the content of ties as flows of resources,
and changes categorical analysis of support into the study of the struc-
tural patterns of supportive resources within a social environment
(Kahn, 1979: 84; Wellman, 1981). These environments can include spou-
ses, children, siblings, short or long-term friends, visiting nurses or
homemakers, bartenders, social workers, delivery people, neighbors, ac-
quaintances, ministers or rabbis, former co-workers, and any other kind
of person encountered during a lifetime and remaining within a circle of
active sociability or contact. The literature suggests that the most im-
portant people in this convoy are, first, kin and second, long-term
friends (Fallding, 1961; Babchuck and Bates, 1963; Litwak, 1980).
The kinship system, which can include people who anthropologists
call "fictive kin," persons not related by blood or marriage but con-
sidered "family" through ties of friendship or affection, provides many
sources as well as types of assistance. An example of this is an Uncle
Joe, who went to school with Dad and spends every Thanksgiving and
Christmas with a family, but is not related by blood to anybody in the
household. Fictive kin and long-term friends provide different sorts of
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assistance than do recent acquaintances, who in turn offer different
help from the kind normally expected from children, siblings, and
spouses.
There are class differences in family assistance patterns. Help
patterns in white collar families flow from parents to children during
the parent's old age, while in blue collar families the flow of assis-
tance is from children to parents (Shanas et. al., 1968).
Caregiving adult children most often are in late middle age and
early old age, and are, by almost every account, women. These middle
aged women, who provide most of the help given their aging husbands and
aged parents, have been entering the workforce rapidly; today almost 60
percent of married women between the ages of 45 and 54 work, and 41 per-
cent of married women between 55-64 work; a higher proportion of unmar-
ried women in these age ranges are in the labor force. Most of these wo-
men work for economic reasons; they are called, by Brody, the "woman in
the middle" and are living in a way exactly opposite to the myth of the
"empty nest." "The net result is that the middle generation [woman] is
confronted with multiple, often competing, responsibilities to spouses,
parents, children, grandchildren, and -- increasingly -- to work. . . .
The evidence is that these middle generation people want to help their
older family members. . . survive. . . in a state of well-being . . .
[and] the elderly want above all not to 'be a burden' to their children"
(Select Committee on Aging, 1981, p.11).
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1.3.1 The Population Factor
What are the main trends that will be affecting the relative needs
of the young-old and old-old in the future? People will be much healthi-
er for longer proportions of their lives, and there will be many more
very old people in the population, since the fastest growing segment of
our population is over the age of 75 (Table 1.1). We will have more old-
er people, with fewer adult children, living in very small households,
(but often in large homes), growing older in place. Most of these peo-
ple will be relatively healthy, but there will be large numbers of very
old and very frail individuals wishing to remain independent as long as
they possibly can.
Planning for future elderly should be on the basis of the character-
istics of the current non-elderly, not of the current elderly, because
of fundamental differences between cohorts (Maddox,1979). Tomorrow's
elderly will be more educated, in better health, and more secure econo-
mically because of higher lifetime earnings, a general increase in the
standard of living over the past several decades, and improved and ex-
panded Social Security and pensions.
Masnick and Bane (1980) distinguish three different generations
that are currently affecting traditional family and household structure,
what Alonso (1980) calls the "population factor". As these three dis-
tinct generations move through the next forty years, they will have pro-
foundly different experiences as they enter and experience old age.
The older generation, born in 1920 and before and age 60 or over in
1980, were adults during the Depression. Many were immigrants or sons
and daughters of immigrants; they married late, had small families, and
in old age many live alone. Already aged, their experience is quite dif-
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Table 1.1
PROPORTION OF POPULATION AT VARIOUS AGES, 1960 TO 1979
IN PERCENTS
Percentage
change,
Age 1960 1965 1970 1975 1979 1960-1979
Males
65-69 3.3 3.1 3.2 3.5 3.6 9.1
70-74 2.5 2.5 2.3 2.4 2.6 4.0
75-79 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.6 6.7
80 and 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 33.3
over
Millions of
men, aged 65
or over 7.5 7.9 8.3 8.7 9.5 26.7
Females
65-69 3.7 3.6 3.7 4.1 4.3 16.2
70-74 2.8 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.4 21.4
75-79 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.2 2.3 21.0
80 and 1.6 1.9 2.3 2.7 3.0 87.5
over
Millions of
women,
aged 65
or over 9.0 10.2 11.5 12.4 13.6 51.1
Source: 1980 Statistical Abstract of the United States, page 34,
Number 38.
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ferent from that of cohorts that will enter old age in the near future.
Although structurally they may be thought of as similar to the third,
younger generation in their later marriages, high incidence of living
alone (through widowhood in this case) and bearing of small families,
their immigrant origins, lower lifetime earnings and lower levels of edu-
cation indicate that their experience is different from generations that
will follow.
The middle generation, born between 1920 and 1940 and age 40 to 59
in 1980, married early and had many children; they bought large cars and
houses, the women began entering the work force late in life, and many
are divorced. This relatively small cohort will come to old age at
around the turn of the twenty-first century with many children but few
siblings, and with women who have worked, but usually in a low-paying
job beginning in late life that will not provide a generous pension. A
relatively high number of divorced and widowed people will live alone,
but not until a quite advanced age.
The younger generation, the "baby boom" babies, were under age 40
in 1980. They have begun to settle in central cities and small towns;
many of the women have delayed, some permanently, marriage and child-
bearing; and both men and women are better educated than earlier genera-
tions. By the time this baby boom generation begins to reach old age,
after about 2010, they will be highly educated, less married, and have
fewer children but more siblings than did their parents. The women in
this generation will have worked longer and in better jobs than did
women of any previous generation and will have better retirement incomes
than women have had in the past, although their lower average wage level
ensures that their retirement incomes will continue to be lower than
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those of men of comparable age and work histories. People of this gene-
ration will have been in more kinds of living arrangements than those of
previous generations, including more experience in living alone or in
much smaller households. They will have a longer and healthier life
span than any generation in history. In addition, there will be many
more old people around in the future (the absolute number of elderly in
the population has nearly doubled since 1950, and will double again by
the middle of the next century, see Figure 1.1)
1.4 Social Resources Available to the Elderly
There are no good estimates of the dollar amount contributed by fa-
miles to the support of their elderly kin; indeed, one of the points of
this dissertation is that exchange among families and friends is nonmone-
tized by nature, and it would be hard to estimate the financial value of
dinner invitations or such social functions as invitations to attend
grandchildren's graduations or birthday parties. Instrumental help for
the elderly, such as grocery shopping, driving people around, and home
maintenance are, however, services that would have to be bought with
scarce dollar resources if network members were not available to perform
them, because "we rely, rightly or wrongly, on the family bonds of affec-
tion and obligation to make up for the shortcomings in society's provi-
sions for the well-being of our older citizens" (Treas, 1975). When
those bonds of affection and obligation do not exist, then the alterna-
tive can be institutionalization, but when the necessary services can be
provided to an elderly person at home, public institutions can serve
others who do not have those helpers.
Although there is evidence that personal relationships can make
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Figure 1.1
GROWTH IN NUMBER OF PERSONS
AGED 65 AND OVER, 1950-2025
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people happy and even healthy (Lowenthal and Haven, 1968; Collier and
Oliver, 1979; Wellman, 1981) by buffering the pathological effects of
stressful life situations and transitions (Cobb, 1979), "one need not be
a clinician to recognize that family members and friends do not always
merit the appellation 'support system'" (Gottlieb, 1981: pp. 30). Dif-
ferences in the size, density, composition, and stability of personal
communities have implications for the quality, diversity, and reliabili-
ty of available support. Wellman (1981) distinguishes between a "sup-
port system" that provides only positive kinds of aid, and a network of
interpersonal ties that can be understood through social network ana-
lysis. With this distinction one avoids considering only supportive
ties and also the assumption that these form a single, integrated struc-
ture.
Crystal (1981) differentiates the type of help performed by those
assisting the elderly, and critiques the literature of elderly networks
on this basis. The recent literature hailing the survival of the exten-
ded family as a source of aid is based on evidence of sociable interac-
tion, not on evidence of the kind of day-to-day help that extended fami-
lies used to provide routinely, such as financial aid, personal care of
the sick and infirm, sharing a home, and other forms of major assistance
that have been recently assumed by public sources.
Any analysis of helping patterns must therefore take into account
the type of assistance being analyzed. There are at least four types of
helping behavior (adapted from Froland et. al., 1981: p. 32): (1) care-
taking, or provision of material assistance and services; (2) friend-
ship, providing mainly emotional support; (3) problem-solving, involv-
ing direct advice or referral to others who can solve the problem; and,
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(4) joint action, which involves cooperative communal activity or advo-
cacy, organizing, or planning. Crystal found that there have been real
changes over the past decade or so in the kinds of support families, and
the elderly themselves, believe it is appropriate to expect with regard
to helping and sharing behaviors. Research that in the past concentra-
ted on sociable interactions found evidence of continued contact between
older people and their children, but the instrumental behaviors thought
appropriate, and those actually carried out, have changed over time.
Crystal (1981) looks at the way that the relationships of the el-
derly and their families has been researched, and his analysis finds se-
vere shortcomings. "Recitations of how frequently the elderly live with-
in visiting distance of their children, visit with them, talk to them on
the phone, do not establish that intergenerational help patterns have
not been affected by social change. Such recitations usually emphasize
'sociable' contacts; but . . . sociable contact isolated from the inti-
macy and interdependence of everyday living may be 'bounded.' For that
matter, it is sometimes these very boundaries that permit maintenance of
a sociable relationship between generations even when there are underly-
ing stresses and differences which would rapidly surface in any more
intimate exchange" (from unpaged copy of unpublished dissertation).
1.4.1 Family lost, family found, family transformed
The following literature review investigates transformations both
in the way sociologists think about families and family networks, and in
the actual structure of the American family. Understanding the data of
the housing allowance experiment with respect to the role of social net-
works will be easier if we understand the nature of these networks and
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how they have developed and changed over time.
Urban sociologists (Fischer, 1976; Wellman and Leighton, 1979; Well-
man, 1981) argue that personal networks have replaced local communities
as the principal source of interpersonal support. However, Crystal
(1981) summarized some major trends in the conceptualization of the mo-
dern family, and suggests that just as the pioneering sociologists were
premature in pronouncing the death of extended family ties, those who
thought they had settled the question in favor of a continued, although
modified, extended kinship network surviving in our post-industrial
society were also wide of the mark.
The early sociologists (Durkheim, 1964, orig. 1893; Parsons, 19
and Burgess et.al., 1963) were inaccurate for two reasons. First, the
ideal-type extended family never existed in significant numbers (Las-
lett, 1971; Bane, 1976; Fischer, 1978) largely because there were never
enough elderly people alive in the population to provide the third gene-
ration necessary for a three-generation household. Second, even when
families began to have more than two generations of members alive at the
same time, economic and social structures had changed so that households
were most often nuclear in form, although significant exchange and sup-
port networks over space and time continued, facilitated by advancing
technology (Litwak, 1969; Sussman, 1965; Shanas and Streib, 1965; Shanas
et.al. 1968).
There is evidence that the elderly prefer to live independently
from, but still geographically near, their children. During the 1960s,
Shanas et.al. found that 28 percent of elderly lived in the same house-
hold as their children, and only 16 percent lived more than one hour's
distance from their nearest child. Two out of three (65 percent) had
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seen at least one child "today or yesterday." Only six percent of mar-
ried elderly persons lived a day or more away from their nearest child,
with an additional 13 percent living between one hour and one day away
by their usual means of transportation.
The rediscovery of family is analogous to changes in the concept of
community over the past half century. In both cases, both form and func-
tion have changed significantly becuase of communication and transporta-
tion advances, but neither has disappeared. Early writers who studied
community life in post- World War I Chicago (Park, et. al. 1925; Wirth,
1938; Zorbaugh, 1929 and others) analyzed what Wellman (1977) called
"the community lost," with disorganization and disorder the rule. Dur-
ing this period of rapid industrialization the negative effects of indus-
trialism were emphasized (Durkheim, 1964; Toennies, 1963, orig. 11887;
Simmel, 1964, orig. 1905). The outlook was bleak for both family and
community. By mid-century, Whyte (1943), Gans (1962) and others found
that slums, contrary to what had been previously emphasized, were indeed
the locus of social organization, albeit an organization of society sig-
nificantly different from that found in the homes and communities of
middle-class researchers. This discovery of organization Wellman called
the "community found."
At about the same time, researchers on the elderly discovered con-
tinued, significant interactions between the elderly and their children
and siblings (Sussman, 1965; Shanas, 1968); by analogy to Wellman, this
is the "family found." There has been a significant change over the
past several decades in the tasks performed by and types of exchanges
found within kinship networks. Although contact has not disappeared,
the content of the exchange and the social norms associated with these
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exchanges have been transformed. Webber (1963, 1968) and Wellman
(1977) found that although community still exists, and people form pri-
mary relationships with significant others, the physical aspect of commu-
nity has so changed as a result of communication and transportation ad-
vances that it deserves a new name, what Webber (1963) called "community
without propinquity." This community without propinquity gives rise to
long-distance sociability, called "intimacy at a distance" (Shanas, et.
al., 1968), that best characterizes how the aged now relate to their fa-
milies.
1.4.2 Assistance for the Elderly
In addition to structural changes in social networks due to communi-
cation and technological changes, the help needed by the elderly shifts
as they age. Litwak and Kulis (1980) suggest that a change from socia-
ble to more substantial helping behaviors are a function of age, health
and marital status. The needs of those in good health and still living
in their marital dyad revolve around a need for sociability, and thus
for peer support. But as people age and become frailer, they rely much
more substantially on the kind of long-term committed care that only kin
or medical professionals have generally been able to provide.
The kinship network provides, long-distance, one element of socia-
bility for the elderly when they are still relatively young and healthy,
but cannot provide the kind of support needed during the latter, frailer
stages of life when more demanding kinds of care become necessary.
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1.5 Family Transformed: The Peer Community
At least in the short run, public policy in this country is moving
towards less public assistance to all needy, including the needy aged,
and the "aged's welfare will not improve significantly until the elderly
are allowed to do more to help themselves" (Viscusi, 1979: p.7). This
includes organizing and strengthening their own support networks that
are non-monetized, to help them maintain their functional capacity as
long as possible by depending on in-kind, personal services rather than
premature and possibly unnecessary dependence on public assistance and
insurance schemes.
The aged compensate and substitute for family members. In one study
(Shanas, et. al. 1968), the never married maintained closer relation-
ships with brothers and sisters than those who had married; the child-
less resumed closer associations with siblings on the death of a spouse,
but not as close as single people; the widowed had closer contacts with
married children than did the married; and parent-child relationships
tended to be closer, as measured by living arrangements and frequency of
contact, in small families than in large (Shanas et. al.,1968). But
many aged people have no local family members, and might prefer to
substitute other kinds of people for the "missing" family members, such
as substituting peers for family.
Litwak and Kulis (1980) suggest that the needs of the "young-old,"
(Neugarten, 1974) those older people still in good health and still li-
ving with their spouse revolve around a need for sociability, and thus
for peer support. For most, peers are the most important and potentially
satisfying resource for socialization and help, and the development of
"age-dense" housing for the elderly offers the opportunity to recon-
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struct peer networks "which can go remarkably far towards compensating
for previous role losses" (Crystal, 1981).
The "old-old," over about age 75, are more likely to be frail and
are in greater need of long-term committed care that only kin or medical
professionals have generally been willing or able to provide. The fa-
mily remains most important in meeting the psychological and emotional
needs of the elderly, and is of critical importance to the frail or im-
paired elderly. Because home care is less expensive than institutional
care it should be encouraged whenever possible; however, families alone
cannot meet all needs of their aged members.
1.5.1 The Role Of Peers: Sociability, Stability, Integration
Social integration and not social isolation of older persons is the
rule rather than the exception (Shanas, et. al., 1968; Maddox 1979).
This integration is usually with other peers on a day to day basis, and
with family more sporadically but more intimately. Older people tend to
live in areas with many other older people since they tend to age in
place rather than move from their homes as they age (See Chapter 5).
The need for closeness to some "family" member appears well established,
but what happens when elderly people are removed from their homes and
former contexts, and live in artificially created communities? A look
at today's elderly living in peer communities can help us to understand
some of the functions that these communities serve, as well as serve as
a preview of the shape of things to come.
A decade and a half ago Townsend (1968) pointed out that older peo-
ple tend to find themselves nearer one of two extremes, experiencing ei-
ther the seclusion of the spinster or widow without children or other
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close relatives, or at the pinnacle of a pyramidal family structure of
four generations. The resources available to people in these different
situations are quite distinct, and the kinds of networks implied by
these structural positions are also different.
But there are changes imminent in the structure of the American
family that will mean a voluntary or involuntary shift towards peer
groups for support. What are these changes?
1.5.2 Peer Communities
According to Rose (1976), an aging subculture is developing, and
older Americans are in the process of changing from a category into a
group, and eventually into a subculture of aging, but that process is
still under way and is "far from comprehensive in content or in coverage
of older people" (p.42). Rosow (1974) attributes this lack of a subcul-
ture of aging to weak norms for the aged and lack of appropriate roles
and norms for socializing old people to old age. But there are several
studies that trace community formation under a variety of circumstances;
in publicly-funded elderly housing (Hochschild, 1973; Ross, 1977); in a
retirement community (Lemon, Bengtson, and Peterson, 1976); in a slum
single room occupancy (SRO) hotel (Stephens, 1976), and in a Senior Citi-
zen Center in California (Myerhoff, 1978).
Hochschild (1973) defined the basic problem of the old as their iso-
lation from society due to a decline in work force participation, the de-
velopment of age stratification causing the old to spend most of their
time in the company of other old people, and the relative weakening of
kinship ties, leading the old to seek supplementary friendships outside
the family. The stronger kinship system of the past, she asserts, pre-
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vented strong social ties among the elderly, but these ties are now en-
couraged and permitted to flourish in the newly established communities
of elderly people. The choice, Hochschild says, will soon be between
isolation or social involvement with other old people, and elderly com-
munities such as the one she studied can be instrumental in recreating
lost social ties.
However, Ross (1977) found no evidence that living with age peers
was, for the group she studied, associated with decreases in either the
desired or actual contact with children. She suggests that satisfying
felationships with peers and security about financial and physical needs
make relationships with children more relaxed and mutually satisfying.
She concludes that cross-generation kin relations, although highly sig-
nificant, are no more sufficient to old people than to anyone else.
Ross cites surveys of the decision to move to a retirement communi-
ty, and that found this choice motivated not by climate or geography,
but by the search for independence and security without sacrificing
closeness to family, friends, and familiar life space. "One of the
greatest losses for many old people is the loss of choice. The ideal
housing situation for the aged would consequently provide variety and
the possibility of choosing" (p. 198).
In a group of Holocaust survivors and other migrants from Eastern
Europe living in an urban beach neighborhood in California, the peer
community functioned to preserve their culture (Myerhoff, 1978). This
is best revealed in the response of an eighty nine year old woman, asked
why she does not want to live with the daughter who has invited her: "No
one to talk to. Nobody talks Yiddish. Here I have lived for thirty-one
years. I have my friends. . . Always there are people to talk to on the
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benches" (p. 2). In this community, a senior citizens center makes it
possible for hundreds of these elderly immigrants to live alone despite
physical and economic problems, by providing hot daily meals and cultu-
ral and social, religious and secular events, creating "an entire,
though miniature, society" (Myerhoff, 1978: p.8).
In Myerhoff's opinion, the major reason for the separation of pa-
rents and children was the cultural and generational differences between
the immigrant parents and their largely assimilated children. When such
intergenerational cultural barriers do not exist perhaps interaction is
facilitated.
1.5.3 The Future of Peer Supports
Tomorrow's elderly will have many peers but fewer children or other
family members in their personal communities than do today's elderly.
Some exchanges, especially sociability and friendship, are most appropri-
ately conducted with people of one's own age; those who maintain active
friendships through old age are the most satisfied with their lives (Le-
mon, Bengtson and Peterson, 1976). But some aid is required from those
more physically able, and generally younger, such as aid with shopping,
chores, home maintenance, and the like. Non-familial assistance of all
kinds, and across generations, will be required, not just the substitu-
tion and replacement of family members with non-family members, anala-
gous to Shanas et. al.'s (1968) findings on substitution within the fa-
mily.
The stage is set for including peer networks in the concept of "me-
diating structures." It may be more difficult to attain the necessary
kind of commitment from friends than from family, but that depends on
64
when the buildup of peer supports begins.
Although the "community without propinquity" (Webber, 1964) is
important, and a growing reality, the help that the elderly need is
often more than a weekly telephone call or even occasional visits.
1.5.4 Class Differences In Spatial Distribution
Both friendship patterns and family types are affected by social
class. "The description of the isolated nuclear American family system,
if valid, is most suited to the white, urban, middle class segment of
American society" (Sussman and Burchinal, 1968: pp.2 4 8 ). Except among
the working classes, the family is no longer a physically contiguous
phenomenon; the networks of lower-income families are more likely to be
spatially concentrated than are the networks of the middle class (Bott,
1957; other cites). Working class and minority families are more likely
to have localized extended family networks than are white, middle class
families. The major activities that link the extended kin family net-
work are mutual aid and social activities, including the exchange of
services, gifts, advice and financial assistance (Sussman and Burchinal,
1968: p. 250).
This means that nonmonetary resources are differentially available
to social class members. The social ties of members of the working
class have a greater local focus than do middle class families, and the
working class is far more dependent than middle class people on neigh-
bors as a source of friendships and social life (Rosow, 1968: p. 383).
For slum dwellers, the primary focus in housing standards seems to be on
the house as a shelter from both external and internal threat (Rain-
water, 1973: p. 182). Although housing is fixed in both social and phy-
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sical neighborhoods, it must meet other human needs than just the need
for shelter. These needs include, but are not limited to, personal secu-
rity, information, access to jobs, credit, friends, and public services
(Gorham and Glazer, 1976).
Most families in the housing allowance experiment were in blue-
collar occupations (76.9 percent of working households in Pittsburgh,
81.6 percent in Phoenix), and were therefore relatively likely to have
important local social networks that affected their housing decision-
making. Although many of the participants in the experiment were not
working, there is no way of knowing the proportion of those coded as
"not working" who were unemployed, retired, or on welfare. This cate-
gory is therefore not useful for analysis.
The active local social life of the working class centers on the
place of residence, while that of the middle class covers a larger
sphere with less focus on the immediate environment (Rosow, 1968, pp.
386). Most poor people do not have the financial resources to move
around in space, and try to meet most or all of their economic and so-
cial needs in the vicinity of, or within easy or inexpensive access to,
their homes. It follows, therefore, that the poorest participants in
the experiment are more likely to depend on local associations than more
well-to-do participants. On the whole, the lowest income groups in the
experiment were women, minorities, single people, the old-old, and fami-
lies in Pittsburgh, and these groups should show evidence of high depen-
dence on their local social ties.
For example, married people were found to be significantly less de-
pendent on local associations than were the maritally unattached (Rosow,
1968: pp. 385), meaning that single people in the experiment are likely
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to be more dependent on local social ties than were married partici-
pants.
1.6 What Are "The Social Aspects" Of Housing Decisions?
Failure to understand that housing is at least as much as social as
an economic decision has had an adverse effect on policy and planning
decisions throughout the history of urban and housing policy and plan-
ning. Housing choices are made within the boundaries of economic con-
straints, but within those "budget constraints" there are many potential
choices; these choices are made largely on the basis of social factors.
One of the major premises on which the ecological theory (Park,
1916; Park, Burgess, and McKenzie, 1925; Wirth, 1938) rested was that
locational decisions were primarily based on an economic calculus.
Firey (1946), using the examples of Boston's Beacon Hill and North End,
described urban phenomena that could not be embraced in a strictly
economic analysis. "Locational activities are not only economizing
agents but may also bear sentiments which can significantly influence
the locational process. . . . It is the dynamic force of spatially
referred sentiments, rather than considerations of rent, which explains
why certain families have chosen to live on Beacon Hill in preference to
other in-town districts having equally accessible location and even
superior housing conditions" (Firey, 1970, p. 516-520). Even the North
End, a slum area, was found to have a "symbolic retentive power [and]
symbolic quality" (Firey, 1970: pp. 525), as Whyte (1943) also demon-
strated.
This theme was further elaborated in a landmark study of Boston's
West End residents (Gans, 1962), for whom local space served as a locus
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for social relationships (Fried and Gleicher, 1970); the neighbor rela-
tionship was one of the most important ties in the West End, and a criti-
cal link between the individual or family, and the larger community.
The West End slum provided satisfaction to its residents on the basis of
the social relationships that existed within it, not because of its
physical or economic features. Two major components of the high level
of residential satisfaction found there were, first, the fact that the
area contained a "vast and interlocking set of social networks" (Fried
and Gleicher, 1970, p. 742), and second, that the whole area was con-
sidered an extension of home and consequently conferred a sense of be-
longing on the residents. Fried and Gleicher (1970: p. 743) ask, "If
the local spatial area and an orientation toward localism provide the
core of social organization and integration. . . and if. . . social or-
ganization and integration are primary factors in providing a base for
effective social functioning, what are the consequences of dislocating
people from their local areas?" Fried (1963: p. 156) concluded that a
sense of spatial identity is fundamental to human functioning.
The concept of spatially referred sentiments cannot be used to sepa-
rate the effect of location itself from the effect of localized social
ties. While there is probably some retentive power invested in neighbor-
hood alone, having to do with location and familiarity as well as such
neighborhood factors as crime, cleanliness, and housing quality, the li-
terature has not succeeded in separating these factors from the content
of the social ties developed in that neighborhood. By analyzing social
factors as a component of the total resources available to the elderly,
the research reported here will attempt to separate social networks from
familiarity with neighborhood in analyzing the housing choices of the
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elderly in the housing allowance experiment.
The West End is admittedly an extreme case. Very few people of any
age or ethnicity live in anything like the concentration or intimacy of
the "urban villagers" before urban renewal came to Boston. But the exis-
tence of areas in the city characterized by strong social ties, especial-
ly areas where racial and ethnic minorities live, has been demonstrated
by a number of community studies (Liebow, 1967; Suttles, 1968; Hannerz,
1969), and more recently in the neighborhood revitalization movement,
(Jacobs, 1961; Keller, 1968; Ahlbrandt and Brophy, 1975; Goetze, 1976;
Cincotta and Naparstek, 1976, Clay, 1979; Auger, 1979).
Some past failures of U. S. housing programs have been caused by a
misapprehension of the role of social forces in housing. Public housing
projects that received architectural awards for innovative design, and
which were projected to be economically feasible were found to be disas-
ters when occupied. Pruitt-Igoe in St. Louis springs immediately to
mind (Rainwater, 1970). In addition, the social structure of neighbor-
hoods was disturbed when new projects were built, and local opposition
to siting a low-income housing project in the middle-class neighborhood
of Forest Hills, New York (Cuomo, 1974) made national headlines. Such
protests, along with the budgetary problems of the housing production
programs (HUD, 1973), signalled the approaching end of a strictly
supply-oriented housing strategy for low income families, and exacer-
bated the need to find a better way. That new approach was housing
allowances.
The national housing policy includes a goal of a "suitable living
environment," for every American family, including the the social en-
vironment of the elderly. The social aspects of housing decisions have
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to do with the way that the social environment, as defined below, is ta-
ken into account when housing decisions are made. According to Lawton
(1977, p. 277) "the most salient single aspect of the older person's
living environment aside from his (sic) personal habitat is the resour-
ces available to him within accessible distance, whether they be life-
sustaining facilities such as shops, medical care and police protection,
or life-enriching facilities, such as family, friends, cultural opportu-
nities, or a senior center." However, some have noted that, for many
elderly people, help from family is life-sustaining as well as life-en-
hancing (Maddox, 1979; Litwak, 1980). Social space is determined by phy-
sical distance, salience, and barriers to mobility: "Some resources of
particular salience, such as medical care and children become utilized
by extra expenditure of energy, while those of low salience are not uti-
lized despite easy physical access" (Lawton, 1977, p. 280). Physical
distance is not the most important variable; what is more important is
"salience," the degree to which the item is important or central to the
aged person.
The argument about the role of social relationships in the housing
decisions of the elderly rests partly on the extent to which these rela-
tionships exist in space as well as in networks. If contact is indepen-
dent of location, such as through letters or telephone calls, it does
not matter where the supportive behavior comes from. But, if the assis-
tance must be local, such as help with grocery shopping or daily cooking
or cleaning, it is obvious that location matters. Different kinds of
help requires a different distance from the one being helped (Litwak,
1980).
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1.6.1 The Housing Allowance Experiment and the Housing Market
The theoretical model on which the housing allowance experiment was
based is that of the neoclassically functioning housing market (Rain-
water, 1981; Solomon and Vandell, 1982). The success of this market
approach in meeting the needs of the elderly as a specially designated
needy group within the poor population at large (see Chapter 3 of the
dissertation) depends on the extent to which aged consumers can and do
pursue their interests in the marketplace and qualify to receive a
subsidy payment, and how well they are housed as a consequence.
The neoclassical model of the housing market emphasizes the con-
cepts of markets, competition, static equilibrium, and allocation of re-
sources by price (see also Olson, 1969 and Leftwich, 1976). All actors
in the housing market are assumed to be economically rational; producers
attempt to maximize profit with no subsidiary goal, and consumers at-
tempt to maximize utility subject to budget constraints and market oppor-
tunities. This model analyzes behavior in terms of rational choices
made by tenants and landlords, based on purely economic calculations.
Within these economic decisions, "utility" is maximized. Since the
concept of utility is considered unmeasurable, information pertaining to
the social component of economic decisions is usually not collected,
meaning that the components of "utility" cannot be discovered through
usual econometric methods.
In addition, housing decisions are not always based on conscious
explicit choices, and often options are foreclosed without the consent
of either or both parties. This way of understanding behavior is not
helpful to an understanding of the complexity of housing choice beha-
vior, because noneconomic factors come into play at all stages and are
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important influences on the ultimate outcomes.
In the neoclassical formulation relationships between landlords and
tenants are assumed to be at "arms length" and businesslike. The market
uses formal leases and contractual obligations as a matter of course,
and discrimination on any basis other than as a route to profit maximi-
zation is not considered to exist. This model tends to minimize the imp-
ortance of market "imperfections" and failures, such as redlining or
racial discrimination, and the hard-to-quantify social aspects of hous-
ing choice.
But the housing choices of the elderly in the housing allowance ex-
periment beem to be based on a set of considerations that resemble Ber-
ger and Piore's (1980: pp. 2-4) description of dualism: "various seg-
ments of society [organized] around different rules, processes, and in-
stitutions that produce different systems of incentives and disincen-
tives to which individuals respond. . . . We can account . . . for indi-
vidual behavior by looking at the incentives and constraints that pre-
vail in given social groups and by assuming great human plasticity and a
wide range of individual possibilities. . . . " In the housing allow-
ance experiment, the system of incentives and disincentives included
greater than anticipated reliance on social aspects of housing, i.e. non-
monetary considerations affected housing decisions in the experiment.
The allowance provides evidence that the organization of incen-
tives, disincentives, and constraints varies between age groups, as well
as over time within lifetimes. Social ties had varied effects at dif-
ferent ages, and diverse age groups behaved quite differently even when
their objective situations were about the same.
However, the influence of social ties on the decisions of the el-
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derly can be examined at each step in the process of qualifying for a
housing allowance payment. Figure 1.2 illustrates the whole process of
qualifying for a housing allowance payment, and shows that there were
many decision and action points for families in the program.
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Figure 1.2: DEMAND EXPERIMENT SUPPLY AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY
EXPERIMENTS
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1.7 Conclusion
The housing allowance experiment was designed to help poor people
with their housing costs, based on the interaction of the economy and
the state. Eligibility in the housing allowance program was defined on
the basis of monetary income to households, which for many elderly peo-
ple comes from the state. The role of the third institution, the kin-
ship/social system, was largely ignored in the design and analysis of
E.H.A.P., except as the household structure affected eligibility (single
people were not eligible unless they were age 62 or over, or disabled or
handicapped) or payment size (larger families received larger subsi-
dies).
Other than definitionally, the kinship system was not explicitly
considered as a source of assistance. The potential of social networks
to affect the housing choices of the participants was not understood,
so the questions that could have been asked to discover these influences
were not asked. Also, the roles of friends and of family in helping the
participants to qualify for payments were not distinguished, although
families and friends perform different functions for the elderly (Litwak
and Kulis, 1980). Because no questions were asked to discover nuances
in the relationships between participants in the housing allowance pro-
gram and their friends and family, much of the evidence in this thesis
is more suggestive than it had to be.
Family structures have changed significantly over the past several
decades, from localized entities to a set of networks distributed in
space and time. The surface manifestation of this phenomenon, suburbani-
zation, was noted, and incorrectly misinterpreted to mean that the fa-
mily had disappeared. The rediscovery of continued maintenance of fami-
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ly networks of communication and caring, was also misinterpreted to mean
that only the form, not the substance, had changed. In addition, in re-
cent years peers have become more important in the community and social
life of older people, and have substituted for family members.
The importance of social factors in housing decisions is delinea-
ted, with respect to housing programs and theories of the recent past.
The next chapter describes the rise of the economic support system, and
how the elderly have packaged their economic supports.
76
CHAPTER 2: THE ECONOMIC SUPPORT SYSTEM
2.1 Introduction
This chapter traces the historical roots of the economic support
system, emphasizing the interplay between private and public sector
commitment to the aged. Since "reality starts with history" (Titmuss,
1968, pp. 93), it is important to examine the origins of Social Security
and other income and service programs for the elderly in order to under-
stand that the economic supports of the elderly have always come from a
variety of sources.
The economic support system built up over the past hundred years
has served to provide a new level of economic independence to the
elderly. The major consequence of this system for the lives of aged
persons is the provision, for the first time in history, of a level of
living high enough to permit most of the elderly who so wish, to live
independently, illustrated by the dramatic recent increase in the
proportion of elderly, especially elderly widows, living alone (Figure
2.1).
We must begin to understand the pivotal role of Social Security and
other economic supports in the housing situation of today's elderly.
What is the origin of Social Security, officially know as Old Age,
Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI), and of other private and
public income programs for our older citizens in our social welfare sys-
tem? What role have Social Security and other programs played in the
living arrangements and housing choices of elderly people in this
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Figure 2.1
TRENDS IN LIVING ARRANGEMENTS OF PERSONS 65 YEARS OLD AND
OLDER, 1960-1979
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country over the past several decades?
How did older persons survive in the past? Most worked until they
died. There was no social institution called "retirement," let alone
pensions or income supports outside of employment, until the late nine-
teenth century (Graebner, 1980). A dictionary published in 1828 lists
the word "retirement," but does not suggest that it is peculiarly appli-
cable to the elderly (Achenbaum, 1978). Those elderly who were no longer
self-supporting, particularly widows, were taken in by their children or
other relatives and the most unfortunate, with no family or friends to
live with until they ended their days, were moved, sometimes involuntar-
ily, to places of last resort, almshouses or poorhouses (Fischer, 1978;
Achenbaum, 1978).
The old in the United States have always been supported by a combi-
nation of formal and informal, private and public systems. The history
of economic supports for the elderly, especially the source of their in-
comes, has been largely a story of movement from less formal to more
formal care arrangements, and from mostly private to mostly public, or
at least publicly guaranteed, supports, as the distinction between
public and private has, in many spheres, blurred.
The motivating force behind these changes has been public response
to real needs, expressed through political efforts that have gained in
influence over time. When the old were few in number and the public
sector small and limited in scope, the elderly survived by working and
by being cared for by children or other relatives. Only when individual
and familial effort failed or was not available, and retirement and unem-
ployment became prevalent among the aged, did the public sector step in.
The number of elderly people had vastly increased in the early part of
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the century, and the formal and informal sectors dramatically and visi-
bly failed to achieve even minimal levels of support for many of these
older citizens.
During the Great Depression, the clamor for reform rose to a deaf-
ening level and the public sector (at the federal level) gradually
placed a floor under the incomes of the elderly. Over the next forty
years, economic security was achieved with the Social Security Act of
1935, as amended; management of the private sector through such laws as
minimum standards for nursing homes and the 1974 Employees' Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA) regulating private pensions; and supple-
mental services furnished through an "aging network" developed after the
1965 passage of the Older Americans Act (Estes, 1979). However, ulti-
mate ownership of most private services remains in private hands.
Throughout the history of this country, up to and even including
today, the major source of income and assistance to the elderly has been
the private sector, lodged in the informal sector assistance of family
and friends and in the work effort of the elderly themselves. It is
only within the last half-century of this country's history that the
aged have received the bulk of their incomes from the public sector,
through Social Security and other income and service programs targeted
to the aged. At the same time, the informal network of family and
friends has changed in function within the lives of the elderly, remain-
ing a very important source of social and emotional well-being, and occa-
sional source of economic aid (see Chapter 1). Those elderly who have
no family or friends to rely on use publicly funded service programs
more extensively than those who do have informal support networks avail-
able (Branch, Callahan and Jette, 1981), even though income support pro-
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grams are used by elderly both with and without informal support sys-
tems.
This chapter first traces the development of the formal support sys-
tem for the elderly from the Colonial era through the reforms of the
Progressive Era and the New Deal. Next, it moves to an analytic de-
scription of the present day formal sector support system for elderly
persons.
This story has several themes. First, older people were, for most
of the history of this country, treated no differently from other poor
people. It is only relatively recently that aged Americans have been
differentiated from other needy persons and placed in a special cate-
gory. Second, the support of the elderly has become the responsibility
of an uneasy mixture of public and private enterprise; this mix is de-
scribed and evaluated. Last, the gains made by the elderly in terms of
their economic status are assessed. Although progress has been signifi-
cant, there is still a good deal of poverty and need within the aged pop-
ulation, especially with respect to housing (see Chapter 3).
2.1.1 Most of the Elderly Supported Themselves
For the first three hundred years of this country's existence the
vast majority of older people supported themselves within the private
sector by working their whole lives. Statistics are available only for
1870 and later, and show that in 1870, 81% of males over age 65 were
gainfully employed; by 1900, this proportion had dropped to 68%, and to
48.4% in 1950 (Fischer, 1978, pp.142). Achenbaum (1978) cites different
statistics from Fischer and found that the proportion of white males
over 65 gainfully employed did not change significantly during the nine-
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teenth century, with about 70% employed in 1840 and 72% in 1890. The
employment rate of women over 65 has traditionally been very low, ho-
vering around 10% for several decades (Achenbaum, 197R).
For the one-third of elderly men and nearly all elderly women not
in the labor force during the first two centuries of the Republic, the
family was, by law, the primary source of "consolation and assistance"
(Achenbaum, 1978, pp. 75). By 1860 eighteen of the country's thirty-
three states had passed laws making family members legally responsible
for the care of their dependent kin, and thirty-two such laws had been
enacted before 1914 (Achenbaum, 1978).
There are no good national data on how successful these laws were
in forcing families to care for their aged relatives. Using coresidence
as an indicator of support, evidence on the state level shows that, for
Massachusetts in 1895, although families were required by law to assist
all dependent relatives, most elderly men remained independent and most
elderly women were dependent on their relatives. Table 2.1 shows house-
hold headship by age and gender; statistics gathered at that time as-
sumed that any male in the household was the head, meaning that sex is
confounded with being the head of the household:
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Relationship to head
50-59
TABLE 2.1
of household, by age, Massachusetts, 1895,
native born only
>60
Male
Head 83.4% 79.5%
Parent or
in-law 1.1 8.4
All other
relatives 4.7 3.2
Boarder/lodger/
guest 8.4 6.3
Inmate/patient 1.4 1.8
Servant/hired
man/other 1.0 0.8
Female
Head 18.7 28.7
Wife 57.2 32.9
Parent or
in-law 4.7 20.9
All other
relatives 10.3 9.0
Boarder/lodger/
guest 4.8 4.9
Inmate/patient 0.8 1.6
Servant/house-
keeper/other 3.5 2.0
Source: Derived from Achenbaum
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The proportion of males heading their own household declined over
the age groups, while the proportion of women heading their own house-
hold increased as they were widowed and became defined as household
heads. The proportion of both males and females living as parents or
parents-in-law within a household increased substantially with age,
while the proportion living with other relatives and with non-relatives
remained rather stable and surprisingly low at this time. Among the
very oldest persons, those over age 80, the vast majority of males head-
ed their own households (62.4%), whereas the majority of females over
age 80 (51%) lived neither as head nor spouse of head, but as the
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mother, mother-in-law, or other relative of the head of the household.
The story here is, for men, one of independence maintained until quite
late in life, with most very old men living as the heads of their own
households, while most older women were eventually taken into the home
of a relative if they reached the age of 80.
2.2 The Public Sector
2.2.1 The Colonial Experience
Throughout the history of the American colonies, extending to the
middle of the 1930s, public care of all poorer members of society rested
on the principle of local responsibility as established by the Elizabe-
than Poor Law of 1601, the model for colonial treatment of indigent
citizens. This early poor law for the first time recognized the "exist-
ence of involuntary unemployment and of need, and firmly established the
individual's right to public assistance" (Trattner, 1974). Older per-
sons, if poor, were treated no differently from any other poor person;
differential treatment for older Americans did not appear on the public
policy agenda until the middle of the nineteenth century (Fischer, 1978;
Trattner, 1974).
The earliest public assistance for the poor was financed and admini-
stered on the local level. In Colonial America, church parishes assumed
responsibility for the destitute and carried out this responsibility
through a tax levied on every householder in the parish, collected under
the supervision of church wardens and a small number of "substantial
householders" (Trattner, 1980). The overseers of the care for the indi-
gent were, however, civil, not clerical, authorities. Parents were made
legally liable for the support of their children and grandchildren, and
84
children liable for the care of their needy parents and grandparents.
Any vagrant who refused to work could be committed to a house of correc-
tion, whipped, branded, put in pillories, stoned, or put to death.
The most common seventeenth century practice for those who were
clearly unable to work such as the very young, the very old, and the
infirm, was to place them in private homes at public expense. Payment
made to the host family was either a fixed sum or a sum determined at a
public auction. In the case of caretakers determined at auction, the
needy became wards of the lowest bidders. Those poor who were capable
of taking care of themselves, such as widows with decent lodging and
good health, or fathers who were temporarily disabled, were supported in
their own homes. Only when the poor had no relations, or were sick or
feeble and beyond the competence of home care, was a neighbor reimbursed
for assuming the responsibility (Trattner, 1974; Rothman, 1971). Those
few almshouses that existed were primarily for lodging residents who
were incapable of taking care of themselves, who did not have relatives
to assume the responsibility, and whose care would have greatly incon-
venienced a neighbor (Rothman, 1971). Still no distinction was drawn
between the elderly and the non-elderly, only between those who could be
taken care of privately with some public financial assistance (known as
"outdoor relief"), and those who could only be taken care of in a
public instituion (known as "indoor relief") regardless of age.
Only local residents were cared for in this manner. No stranger
was allowed to become a ward of the town in colonial times, and geogra-
phical mobility was severely circumscribed by complicated statutes to
prevent strangers from becoming public burdens; according to Rothman
(1971) "poor relief was a local system, with towns liable for their own
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but not for others."
2.2.2 The Early Republic
With the rise of industrialism a mobile labor force became neces-
sary and restrictions on local aid diminished. Rothman contends that in
the colonial era there was no stigma attached to poverty and the bibli-
cal attitude that "ye have the poor always with you" (Matthew, 26:11)
prevailed, although only neighbors and fellow townspeople were cared for
by public authorities. By the middle of the nineteenth century, this
attitude had changed; one New York investigation asserted, for example,
that the aged and sick, although not dissolute, were foolish and impru-
dent, and had not saved for a rainy day. They "should have accumulated
funds against the contingencies of disease and incapacity" (Rothman,
1971, p.16 4 ). Reformers pointed out that this was difficult if not im-
possible for the average working person, but that gets ahead of this
story.
2.2.3 Institutionalization
Beginning in the Jacksonian era, the preferred public solution to
the problems of poverty, crime, delinquency and insanity became the in-
stitution, and prisons, poorhouses, workhouses and orphan asylums grew
up at this time; Rothman (1971) calls this the "age of the asylum."
Throughout the nineteenth century public assistance remained the respon-
sibility of the locality and was largely confined to institutional care
for the young, the old, and the physically or mentally infirm (Trattner,
1974; Rothman, 1971), still with no distinction made among categories of
inmates. The drawbacks of these institutions became apparent to reform-
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ers in the course of the nineteenth century, and although institutionali-
zation never became the sole method of caring for the poor, it did do-
minate the public response to poverty. Residence requirements for assis-
tance weakened over time and local officials became reluctant to press
relatives to support their poorer kinfolk. Within institutions there
was no classification of inmates, resulting in the aged, the feeble, the
insane, children, alcoholics, and expectant unwed mothers living cheek-
by-jowl. "The poor took their place alongside the criminal, the insane,
and the delinquent, as fit subjects for a custodial operation. The pub-
lic policy was to incarcerate all these groups, and the decision would
not be quickly or easily changed" (Rothman, 1971, pp. 294).
Although the proportion of the population over the age of 60 living
in an almshouse even as late as 1910 did not exceed about two percent
(Achenbaum, 1978, p. 81), the elderly constituted nearly half of the in-
mates of these institutions. The proportion of residents of almshouses
over the age of 60 on January 1, 1910, were as shown in Table 2.2:
TABLE 2.2
Proportion of all almshouse paupers over 60
Of Native born whites
Male 45.3%
Female 43.6
Of Foreign born whites
Male 69.5
Female 71.4
Of Blacks, Native Americans,
Asians
Male 46.4
Female 46.0
Source: Derived from Achenbaum (1978) p. 81.
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2.2.4 The Progressive Era: Old Age Security
As America became increasingly industrialized, new methods gradual-
ly replaced the asylum as the dominant public method of dealing with so-
cial problems. "When American industrial output surpassed that of every
other nation, when the city population outnumbered the rural, and when
immigrants flocked to the new world and its factories, then citizens be-
gan to substitute foster homes and adoption procedures for the orphan
asylums, to experiment with probation and parole systems that would
avoid or curtail imprisonment, to organize pension and social security
plans that would replace the almshouse [emphasis added], and to begin to
operate out-patient centers in order to avoid hospitalizing the insane"
(Rothman, 1971, pp.xvii).
There were never very many elderly persons alive to endure the fate
described in Sections 2.2.1, 2.2.2, and 2.2.3. Throughout the Colonial
period the proportion of elderly in the population never went above
about two percent (see Figure 2.2), but the population began to grow ol-
der after about 1810 primarily because of a declining birth rate. In
1750 only one out of five persons live to reach the age of seventy;
this proportion increased steadily so that by 1970, four out of five per-
sons born lived to reach that age (Fischer, 1978).
The obvious failings of the almshouse/poorhouse system, together
with the increasing number and proportion of older persons in the popu-
lation, all coming at a time of major social reforms (Hofstadter, 1955)
led to a new interest in the problems of aging. The aged population
began to be seen as a special case worthy of special treatment. The
first public commission on aging in the country was formed in Massachu-
setts in 1909, and it conducted the first major survey of the economic
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condition of the aged in 1910. The first federal old age pension bill
passed in 1909; the first state old age pension system began in Arizona
in 1915; the medical specialty of geriatrics was invented in 1909, and
the first textbook on geriatrics was published in 1914 (Fischer, 1978).
But, as in so many cases, old attitudes died hard. One hundred
forty-four old age pension bills were introduced in the Massachusetts
legislature between 1903 and 1929, and not one passed. What passed was
a law making it a criminal offense for a child with means to fail to sup-
port an aged parent (Fischer, 1978).
The reformers of the Progressive era had many social welfare re-
forms on their agenda, and the subject of old age pensions loomed large.
As early as 1912 the Progressive Party platform had urged the adoption
of old-age pensions (Schlesinger, 1959). During the l920s the aged
emerged as a "key issue in social politics" (Lubove, 1968, p. 1 1 4 ) and
built a bridge between the early social insurance movement and the so-
cial insurance reforms of the New Deal. Lubove attributes the elevation
of the aged to a special status in the social insurance movement to the
increasing proportion of the population over the age of 65 (Figure 2.2)
at the same time that the capacity of the aged for supporting themselves
was decreasing. He maintains that the industrialization of the preceed-
ing half-century and concomitant changes in family structure had "relega-
ted them to marginal status in the modern industrial society" (Lubove,
1968, p. 115). The aged no longer could rely on the "institutional buf-
fers" (what Berger and Neuhaus, 1977 call "mediating structures") that
had protected them against dependency in preindustrial America, and vol-
untary thrift and insurance was impractical. I. M. Rubinow pointed out
in 1913 (quoted in Lubove) that insuring against dependency in old age
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was different from insuring against such other risks as accidents or dis-
ease since aging is not an abnormal but a normal stage of life. Medical
advances and social successes in extending the life span would exacer-
bate the problems that were beginning to manifest themselves. "Since
old age was a long-term rather than a transitory condition, the amount
of saving required was greater than most workers could afford. There
was no way of knowing the amount of savings required because of the un-
certain duration of old age. . . . The remoteness of the risk tended to
discourage saving and . . . special saving for old age would only be pos-
sible through a persistent, systematic, and obstinate disregard of the
needs of the workingman's family, which would make the preaching of such
special savings a decidedly immoral force'" (Lubove, 1978, pp. 115-116).
Although there was a great deal of resistance to the idea of old
age pensions, prior to and during the period of this debate the United
States was operating the largest public pension system in the world,
spending over five billion dollars between 1865 and 1914 on veteran's
benefits. By 1905 nearly a million veterans (not including veterans of
the Army of the Confederacy whose benefits came from their individual
states) were receiving pensions, accounting in some years for more than
forty percent of the total federal budget (Fischer, 1978, pp. 169-170).
Forty years after the end of the Civil War these pensions were de facto
old age assistance.
Public employees were attempting to gain pension rights. Firefight-
ers and police in big cities led the fight for public employee pensions,
campaigning in New York, Boston, Chicago, St. Louis, Detroit, and other
cities (Fogelson, 1982). Arguments were based on an analogy between
uniformed public servants and military recipients of pensions, an
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established class of the deserving aged. Pensions for uniformed public
employees were successfully established during the latter half of the
nineteenth century, beginning in New York in 1857, and by the 1880s and
1890s "civilian" employees such as teachers, street cleaners, and la-
borers were hot on their heels, arguing that the attire of city employ-
ees should not determine their long-term welfare.
As the high cost of the pensions for the uniformed public employees
became increasingly apparent, the movement for expansion of coverage to
non-uniformed employees faltered during the 1920s (see Fogelson, 1982,
p. 36), but the establishment by Congress of a federal civil servant re-
tirement system in 1920 lent the movement greater force. The pains of
the Depression, and the reforms initiated then (public employees were ex-
cluded from coverage by the Social Security Act of 1935), gave a final
impetus to complete coverage of public employees by pension plans, and
by the late 1930s almost all big cities provided pensions for both uni-
formed and non-uniformed municipal employees.
But a survey of the elderly in Greenwich Village in 1915 found them
"consumed by fear"; fear of poverty, of illness, of becoming a burden on
their children, of being left alone, of having to go on relief, and of
being sent to an institution on Blackwell's Island. It was concluded at
that time that "the problem of old age was primarily a problem of pover-
ty" (Fischer, 1978, pp. 162). How did society respond to this growing
need?
At first, the public sector responded on a piecemeal, state-by-
state basis. Two reports released during the 1920s on the dependent
elderly illustrated the conditions under which they lived when confined
to almshouses. The Committee on Economic Security (1937), established
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by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt during the New Deal, cites a sur-
vey of American almshouses conducted by the American Association for
Labor Legislation, and fraternal orders (led by the Eagles), which found
that "unfit food, filth, and unhealthful discomfort characterized most
of them . . . [with]. . . feeble-minded, diseased, and defective inmates
. . . frequently housed with the dependent aged" (p. 156). The second
report, a financial survey of almshouses by the Federal Department of
Labor, found that the cost of maintaining older people in these institu-
tions was very high, primarily because of inefficient overhead. We were
paying a great deal to keep our dependent elderly confined in squalid,
unhealthy institutions. Some say we still are.
These two reports, combined with a number of private initiatives
and popular movements, precipitated action across the country. States
had formed commissions as early as 1903 to investigate the question of
old age dependency, and although the results were quite divergent, one
theme emerged. According to the Committee on Economic Security (1937),
even though the recommendations of these state commissions ranged from
suggesting health insurance as a solution to the problems of old age, to
opposition to any state action at all, to supporting old age grants,
after 1921 all state commissions that studied the question concluded
that it was the responsibility of the state to provide for its dependent
aged if no children or relatives were able to do so.
In 1915 Arizona became the first state to pass a law (later de-
clared unconstitutional) that abolished almshouses and instead establi-
shed old-age assistance and aid to dependent children. In the same
year the territory of Alaska passed a law to assist its aged pioneers,
but it was not until 1923 that Montana and other states began to pass
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measures called "old-age pensions," "old-age assistance," "old-age re-
lief," and "old-age security." Pressed by the economic collapse, by the
middle of 1931 18 states had passed such measures; by 1935, 28 states
and two Territories joined their ranks. Most of these laws restricted
benefits to long-term state residents (up to fifteen years of residence
were required) with low assets and no financially competent relatives;
benefits were meager and ranged from $15 to $30 a month. All states,
Arizona and Hawaii, excluded old people with financially competent chil-
dren or relatives from state assistance. This exclusion was based on
the theory that if the state relieved the children of responsibility for
their parents, family ties would be loosened and one of our most "highly
valued institutions" would be endangered (Committee on Economic Securi-
ty, 1937, pp. 156-159). The age limit for assistance was 65 in a majori-
ty of the states, but fourteen states set the minimum age for receipt of
old age assistance at 70. Only one state, Alaska, set the age as low as
60, and that was only for women.
In 1930 there were 2.5 million persons of eligible age in the 28
states and two territories (Alaska and Hawaii) that had old age assis-
tance acts in 1934. At the end of 1934 there were 236,000 recipients of
old age benefits, 9.6 percent of the eligible population, receiving an
average monthly grant of $14.68 (Committee on Economic Security, 1937,
p.16 4).
2.2.5 Private Sector Pensions
Retirement was not necessary as an institution as long as there
were very small numbers of elderly persons in the population, and those
aged who were alive were self-sustaining or cared for by their families.
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Once the number and proportion of older people began to rise, and their
labor force participation to decline, it became important for both the
public and private sector to shape the appropriate response to their
problems. In 1840 about 70 percent of white males over the age of sixty-
five were employed; this proportion stayed about the same for the next
fifty years (Graebner, 1980). This means that throughout the nineteenth
century about one elderly white male out of three was not in the labor
force.
During the nineteenth century the concept of retirement, and the
corrollary need for pensions for those no longer in the labor force, be-
gan to develop. "The history of retirement reflects the changing metho-
dologies of American capitalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centu-
ries. Voluntary retirement . . . was appropriate to small-scale, precor-
porate business units. . . .For business, [forced] retirement meant re-
duced unemployment, lower rates of turnover, a younger, more efficient,
and more conservative work force; for labor, it was in part a way of
transferring work from one generation to another in industries with a
surplus of workers" (Graebner, p. 13).
The Committee on Economic Security (1937) reported that industriali-
zation had placed a greater burden on older workers than on younger, and
that the "burden of unemployment has fallen with great severity on
'older' workers" (p. 143). This Committee found "undeniable evidence of
the progressive use of maximum hiring-age limits in industry [that] cut
off employment opportunities of men [sic] who find themselves competing
in the labor market in middle life" (p.14 4).
The private sector responded to this challenge by introducing pen-
sion plans. According to Corpus (1980: p.12), the "story of the begin-
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nings of old age pensions in private industry is a story of the creation
of needs where none had existed, the interpretation of felt needs as so-
cial problems, and the response to those needs--interpreted by and met
as interests in the social order."
The American Express Company started its retirement system in 1975,
and was the first large private corporation with a retirement plan. Pen-
sioners received half their salary after the age of sixty (Fischer,
1978; Graebner, 1980). In 1910 only sixty of the several hundred thou-
sand corporations in the country offered a retirement plan to its employ-
ees, and those plans that existed were not guaranteed legally nor re-
quired to be adequately financed or protected (Achenbaum, 1978; Lubove,
1968). Railroads, public utilities, banks, metal industries, and the
larger industrial corporations accounted for the bulk of the sixty plans
in effect.
In the decade after 1910 approximately twenty-one new retirement
plans were established each year; during the Roaring Twenties about
forty-five plans were created per year. Although during this era pen-
sion plans were concentrated in larger industrial firms, the proportion
of workers in private pension plans reached only fifteen percent by
1932, when only about five percent of retirees were receiving pension
payments. (above from Graebner, 1980, pp. 133). In a study published
in 1926, Abraham Epstein, a major figure in the fight for Social Secu-
rity, found that of 370 pension plans in operation, 282 were discretion-
ary, with moral rather than legal obligations on the employers to pay
the pension (Lubove, 1968; see also Corpus, 1980, for analysis of the
origin of pensions in American corporations).
Labor unions began to establish pension plans a quarter of a cen-
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tury after the industries founded theirs. The first trade union pension
plan was begun by the Pattern Makers' League of North America in 1900;
over the next decade pensions were established for such skilled workers
as printers, carpenters, machinists, and gas and steam fitters. At that
time, only ten percent of the American work force were members of trade
unions (Graebner, 1980).
Also during this period, private institutions began to house and
assist the elderly. Sponsored by charities, these were largely organ-
ized on the basis of common membership in such groups as fraternal or-
ders and ethnic or national groups. Private asylums specifically for
the old flourished between the years 1865 and 1914 (Achenbaum, 1978),
but in 1910, according to Graebner (1980), less than five percent of the
country's elderly lived in old age homes, the majority of which had been
established by fraternal and religious groups.
2.3 Public Response to Private Failure: The New Deal
Although the 1920s had been a period of unprecedented prosperity,
some portents of the depression to come had already shown themselves.
In the summer of 1928 private welfare agencies noted that the number of
persons asking for financial assistance because of unemployment was
rising, even though unemployment usually decreased during the summer
(Schottland, 1963). Housing construction decreased; business invento-
ries more than tripled; and then, in October, 1929, the stock market
crashed. The biggest implication of the "Great Crash" (Galbraith, 1961)
for the development of a national pension system was that unemployment,
the major national problem, was especially severe among the elderly.
Scores of banks failures presented the clearest case yet for the notion
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that individual thrift and foresight was not sufficient to prepare for
old age, and that some measures must be taken to assist those who,
through no fault of their own, were now left unemployed, unemployable,
and destitute. Voluntary agencies exhausted their resources early in
the Depression, and lower levels of tax revenues, because fewer people
were working and paying taxes, meant that municipal and state govern-
ments had meager funds to relieve their needy citizens. The need was
clear, and clearly visible.
As a two-term Governor of New York, Franklin Delano Roosevelt had
presided over the passage of an Old Age Pension Law there. He had also
called an emergency session of the state legislature that produced, in
1931, the first state unemployment relief act in the country (Trattner,
1974). FDR campaigned in 1932 on the Democratic Party platform of
federal participation in relief programs, public works, and unemployment
insurance, and he saw his election as a mandate to use the powers of the
federal government to relieve the plight of the poor (Schottland, 1963).
The depression had worsened the poverty experienced by many of the coun-
try's older citizens, and a series of popular and politically powerful
mass movements placed the issue of pensions for the aged high on the
list of priorities for the New Deal.
In January of 1934 Dr. Francis Townsend, a California public health
official who had lost his job at age 67, set up an organization called
"Old Age Revolving Pensions Ltd." Dr. Townsend proposed paying a pen-
sion of $200 a month to every citizen over the age of 60 except habitual
criminals, on the condition that s/he retire from gainful work and pro-
mise to spend the money within one month (Leuchtenburg, 1963). The
nominal aim of this movement was to end joblessness by freeing up jobs
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for younger workers, and to combat deflation by producing demand for
goods and services; not incidentally, this plan would significantly aid
elderly citizens. By September of 1934 Dr. Townsend required a staff of
ninety-five to handle his mail. There were twelve hundred local Town-
send clubs by the end of 1934 (Leuchtenburg, 1963), and by 1936 there
were twelve hundred Townsend clubs in California alone (Fischer, 1978).
In January, 1935, an Oregon Congressman was quoted in Time magazine as
saying, "About 120 people in my district have signed a Townsend peti-
tion. When I first heard of this I laughed at it. Then I got the smile
off my face. . . . If we don't pass it this session we'll have to meet
it when we get back home" (quoted in Leuchtenburg, 1963, p. 106). An-
other Oregon legislator was recalled from office for refusing to vote to
recommend that Congress endorse the Townsend Plan. Dr. Townsend claimed
that he had twenty-five million signatures on his petitions, and even
critics conceded he had at least ten million signatures.
Why was there so much support for relief for the elderly among the
largely middle class Townsendites? The Depression had clearly worsened
the economic condition of the elderly in spite of the enactment of state
old age pension programs during the preceeding decade. In 1937 less
than five percent of the country's elderly actually received a pension
and more than fifty percent were unemployed (Fischer, 197R, p. 176).
The elderly were largely dependent; of the 7.8 million Americans over
the age of 65, 65 percent were wholly or partly dependent on others (45
percent on friends and relatives, 18 percent on federal programs). Only
35 percent were self supporting, with 28 percent living on income from
wages, savings and investments, 1.4 percent on federal pensions, 0.8 per-
cent on state and local pensions, and 2.2 percent on private pensions
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(Fischer, 1978, p. 176).
The Townsend movement was not the only one that impelled the Roose-
velt administration to search for a solution to the problems of old age
dependency. The novelist Upton Sinclair organized an "End Poverty in Ca-
lifornia" (EPIC) movement that proposed to accomplish this.lofty goal by
a variety of measures, including an old age pension of $50 a month. Sin-
clair was politically powerful enough to win the Democratic nomination
for Governor in California in 1934. Two brothers named Allen organized
a Ham and Eggs movement whose slogan was "Thirty dollars every Thursday"
for every person over age 50 and out of work, and this Ham and Eggs move-
ment claimed 300,000 dues paying members before it "collapsed in a cloud
of scandal" (Fischer, 1978, p. 179).
Perhaps most threatening to President Roosevelt was Senator Huey
Long's "share the wealth" movement. In a poll taken by the Democratic
National Committee, Senator Long's strength was found to be so great
that he was predicted to be able to draw enough votes away from Demo-
crats to elect a Republican President in 1936 (Altmeyer, 1968, p. 10).
Altmeyer, a staff member of the Committee on Economic Security and an
early Social Security Commissioner, said that "the pressure of these
movements, particularly the Townsend movement, was unquestionably help-
ful in securing Congressional approval of the President's program" (p.
10). FDR's Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins said, "without the
Townsend plan, it is possible that the old-age insurance system would
not have received the attention which it did at the hands of Congress"
(foreward to Witte, 1962).
The American social insurance movement was, according to Fischer
(1978) a "mixed bag of American progressives and Russian socialists,
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serious scholars and California cranks, union leaders and enlightened
capitalists, Ham and Eggers and the Fraternal Order of Eagles" (p. 182).
In the midst of this nationwide agitation for some kind of old age
pension scheme, spurred on by the poverty of the depression and the per-
ceived political strength of the leaders of these movements, President
Roosevelt appointed the Committee on Economic Security in June of 1934
to prepare appropriate legislation. The drafting of the Social Security
Act was supervised by the Secretary of Labor, Frances Perkins, the first
female ever to serve in a President's Cabinet. Before she accepted her
appointment as Secretary of Labor, this "Brahmin reformer" from Boston
(Schlesinger, 1959), a social worker by training, had given FDR an agen-
da that included unemployment and old age insurance, as well as minimum
wages and maximum hours. The objective, after the immediate emergency
situation of the first days of the New Deal had passed, was to construct
a permanent system of personal security through social insurance, for
which FDR used the phrase "cradle to grave" (Schlesinger, 1959). The
purpose of the committee was to "study the problems relating to economic
security and to make recommendations for a program of legislation." In
addition to Perkins as Chair, the Committee consisted of Henry Morgen-
thau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury; Homer Cummings, Attorney General;
Henry A. Wallace, Secretary of Agriculture; and Harry L. Hopkins, Fede-
ral Emergency Relief Administrator (Altmeyer, 1966). Dr. Edwin E.
Witte, Chair of the Department of Economics at the University of Wis-
consin, became the Executive Director. There was also an advisory
council of 23 persons: five labor leaders, five employers, and thirteen
other persons interested in social welfare.
The completed, signed report of the Committee was delivered to the
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President on January 15, 1935. Two days later FDR delivered a special
message to Congress endorsing the recommendations made by the committee
and urging immediate congressional action (Altmeyer, 1966). After de-
bate and amendment in Congress, the bill was approved by the House (371
to 33) and Senate (77 to 6) and signed by President Roosevelt on August
14, 1935. In 1937 the Supreme Court, which had struck down several
pieces of New Deal legislation, upheld the Social Security Act. This
more than anything else marked a watershed in the role of the federal
government. The Supreme Court, which had declared the Railroad Retire-
ment Act, an early piece of New Deal legislation that established a
retirement plan, unconstitutional in 1933, found the Social Security Act
constitutional just four years later.
As passed in 1935, the Social Security Act was designed to achieve
two major goals that it held in common with other old age movements of
the time. The primary goal was to allow older workers to retire from
the workforce and free up their jobs for the younger unemployed worker.
The second major goal, also related to the origin of the program in the
depression, was to increase the spending power of the elderly (as other
New Deal programs had attempted to do for other groups in the popula-
tion) to combat deflation and increase consumer spending (Committee on
Economic Security, 1937; Haber and Cohen, 1960). They found that "pen-
sion payments, when adequate, have served to prevent the necessity for
superannuated persons to compete for jobs against younger and more ac-
tive workers. . . . It was believed that [there were major] social advan-
tages [in] encouraging retirement at age 65. . . and that the main pur-
pose of the plan is to provide a partial compensation for the loss of
earned income" (Committee on Economic Security, 1937, pp.1 99-20 3 ).
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According to the drafters of the Social Security Act, the program
was designed to have each generation pay for the support of the people
then living who are old. The burden of providing for aging and aged for-
mer workers was given to the population of younger wage earners. This
was justified by the Committee on Economic Security (1937) on the basis
of three arguments:
1. The worker after years of productive effort has earned the
right to rest;
2. Advanced age or invalidity renders him (sic.) incapable of an
effective part in productive enterprises, and
3. His (sic) continuance at work prevents a younger man from
filling his place and gaining occupational skill, experience,
and promotion.
The Committee claimed that part of its motivation was to reduce not
only the economic costs of dependency on government, charities and other
help networks, but also the psychological costs of the loss of self-
respect and constant fear of insecurity that plagued the country's aged
before 1935. They maintained that not only had the depression left many
older persons permanently dependent, but persistent changes in economic
life had lowered the age at which superannuation was likely to occur.
They confirmed that "noninstitutional assistance for those who are
not in need of institutional care has become an accepted standard of de-
cent provision for the dependent aged" (p. 189), rejecting the almshouse
or old-age home as the normative solution. The age of 70 was rejected
as the qualifying age because it would exclude "far too great a propor-
tion of dependent aged persons" (p. 192). The Committee affirmed that
it "was not the intention to discourage in any way the support of needy
aged persons by their relatives. Rather, it was [designed] to avoid
the distress which might occur when relatives obligated to provide sup-
port failed to do so or failed to afford sufficient aid. . . It was con-
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sidered more advantageous, both socially and administratively, to encou-
rage an arrangement whereby legal action against indifferent relatives,
where necessary, would be brought by a public authority rather than by
the needy aged person" (p. 193).
What did the Social Security Act, as passed in 1935, accomplish?
1. It provided federal grants to the states for public assistance
to the needy aged, the blind, and dependent children. Begun as
a set of measures to relieve the most obviously pauperized
groups, three of these programs for general relief were later
consolidated into the Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
program in 1973. Of this group, the program that assisted the
elderly was called the Old Age Assistance (OAA) program,
designed to give immediate help to old people ineligible for
emergency relief and not employable on work projects or in the
private market.
2. It enabled states to enact unemployement insurance laws and
expand their employment services.
3. It provided federal funds for the extension of state public
health and rehabilitation facilities within the United States
Public Health Service, and for the development of state mater-
nal and child health and welfare programs under the supervision
of the Federal Children's Bureau.
4. It set up a federal program of old age insurance for persons
working in industry and commerce called Old Age, Survivors, and
Disability Insurance (OASDI), the only one of the programs ori-
giniated in the Social Security Act that was fully funded by
the central federal government. This OASDI program was called
"a preventive measure which aims to reduce the extent of future
dependency among the aged and to assure a worker that the years
of employment during his working life will entitle him to a
life income" (Committee on Economic Security, 1937, p. 217;
Haber and Cohen, 1960)).
Schlesinger (1959) quoted John Quincy Adams that "the great object
of the institution of civil government was the progressive improvement
of the condition of the governed," and asserted that, with the Social
Security Act, "the constitutional dedication of federal power to the
general welfare began a new phase of national history" (p. 315).
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Leuchtenburg concludes that "in many respects, the law was an as-
tonishingly inept and conservative piece of legislation. In no other
welfare system in the world did the state shirk all responsibility for
old age indigency and insist that funds be taken out of the current earn-
ings of workers" (p. 132). He goes on to state that "Roosevelt's pro-
gram rested on the assumption that a just society could be secured by
imposing a welfare state on a capitalist foundation" (p. 165). Whatever
its faults or merits, the Social Security Act was counted by many, in-
cluding FDR himself, as the crowning achievement of the New Deal. In
1940 the Republican Party platform pledged to extend Social Security,
causing Frances Perkins to exclaim, "Well, God's holy name be praised.
No matter who gets elected we've won!" (quoted in Leuchtenburg, 1963, p.
320).
2.3.1 Expanded Coverage of Workers
As passed in 1935, the Social Security Act applied only to the 25
percent of the workforce in commerce and industry. Beginning in 1939,
before the first Social Security insurance check was even issued (the
first check for Old Age Assistance was issued in February, 1936) and con-
tinuing through the 1940s and 50s, coverage of workers and dependents
under Social Security was expanded. In 1939 coverage was expanded to
include benefits for dependents and survivors, and the benefit formula
was revised to increase benefits, which have continued to increase
throughout the past three decades.
Between 1950 and 1975, coverage under Social Security was expanded,
particularly in election years (Derthick, 1980) to include millions more
workers, including farmers, non-farm self-employed members of some pro-
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fessions, other farm and domestic employees, some state and local govern-
ment employees, and, at the election of the individual, ministers and
members of religious orders. Eligibility was frequently expanded, the
wage base raised for tax and benefit computation, and the contribution
schedule continuously raised. The retirement test was liberalized, and a
rule permitting the dropping of the five lowest years of earnings from
the computation of benefits was introduced.
Despite these increases and expanded eligibility policies, benefits
had not been keeping pace with the rising standard and cost of living.
In 1975 Social Security benefits were indexed to the Consumer Price In-
dex and benefits began to be adjusted twice a year to compensate for in-
flation. Since 1970 OASDI benefits have gone up 140 percent and prices
106 percent, but wages have increased more slowly, and the purchasing
power of the retired elderly is rising more rapidly than the purchasing
power of the working population (Kutza, 1981).
In 1980, most workers not covered under Social Security are civil-
ian employees of the federal government and state and local government
employees in states and localities that have chosen not to participate
in the Social Security program.
2.3.2 Other Public Programs for the Aged
In addition to expanding benefits under the Social Security Act,
the elderly's economic support system was augmented in the 1960s by a
set of programs aimed at providing services to the aged with entitlement
on the basis of age rather than on previous contributions (as in Social
Security) or a means test (as in SSI). The Older Americans Act of 1965
was designed to provide assistance in the form of new or improved
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programs for older people, financed through grants to the states, for
community planning, services and training, and research, development,
and training project grants. It also established within the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare an operating agency known as the Admi-
nistration on Aging. One of the goals of this Act was to provide "suit-
able housing, independently selected, designed and located with refer-
ence to special needs and available at costs which older citizens can
afford" (Baumhover and Jones, 1977, p. 3-4).
2.3.3 What Have These Programs Accomplished?
Richard M. Titmuss (1968) has said that "the most important funda-
mental principle which should guide the planning of services for the old
is concerned with the enlargement, or at least the preservation, of the
individuals's sense of freedom and self-respect. . . . [A]pplying this
principle [means] seefing] that many more old people have more spare
cash in their pockets, and more in their shopping baskets, and . . .
adequate housing to sustain their self-respect" (page 91). The programs
authorized by the Social Security Act as they have developed over the
past half-century have done more than any other single piece of legis-
lation in the history of the United States to achieve these goals. But,
how successful has it been, for whom has it been successful, and what
are the implications of all of this for the housing problems of the
elderly population?
The development of major components of the publicly and privately
funded economic support system that today provides the bulk of financial
assistance to elderly Americans has been traced. The major effect of So-
cial Security (as revised over the past fifty years), pensions, Supple-
107
mental Security Insurance, and the other building blocks of the elder-
ly's economic support system, has been a reduction in the proportion of
elderly people with incomes under the poverty line (Figure 2.3), and a
concomitant increase in the number of elderly people living alone (Fi-
gure 2.1). However, although the majority of the elderly receive ade-
quate incomes, the biggest housing problem of the elderly is excessive
cost; even rather dramatic improvements in the economic situation of
aged Americans have not solved the housing cost problem (See Chapter 3).
2.4 The Elderly Package Their Incomes
At the beginning of 1977 about 91 percent of the elderly in this
country were receiving monthly Social Security benefits, or would
shortly receive them when they stopped working. About 115 million
workers, or 90 percent of the labor force, contributes to the Social
Security trust funds with each pay check; since 1936, about 270 million
Social Security numbers have been issued, and about 200 million cards
are now in active use (U. S. Department of Health and Human Services,
1981). The ten percent of the labor force that is not contributing to
Social Security consists mainly of federal, state and local government
employees and railroad workers, all covered by separate pension pro-
grams, and alien migrant workers who are not covered at all (Kutza,
1981). The average benefit received by a single retired worker was $373
a month in June of 1981, and the average amount received by a retired
couple was $638 in that same month.
Although earnings and Social Security account for most of the
income of the aged population, and private and public pensions (other
than OASDI) are relatively minor in terms of proportional contribution
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to total income and dollar amounts involved, in 1976, elderly persons in
this country received just over half (55%) of their incomes from retire-
ment pensions. Of this amount, 39% came from Social Security alone, 1%
from railroad retirement, 6% from government employee pensions, and 7%
from private pensions or annuities. Another 23% of the incomes of elder-
ly persons (or two-person households) came from earnings, 18% from as-
sets, 2% from public assistance, and 2% from other sources. Table 2.3
introduces the story:
TABLE 2.3
Percent of income from various sources, 1976
All elderly Married Single Single
units couples women men
All retirement pen-
sions (public and
private) 55 51 61 61
Social Security 39 34 47 41
Public pensions 7 8 7 10
Private Pensions 7 8 5 9
Earnings 23 29 11 18
Income from Assets 18 18 21 15
Public Assistance 2 1 4 3
Other 2 2 2 3
All Sources 100 100 100 100
Source: derived from Grad and Foster (1979), Table 28, p. 46.
From this table it is clear that most of the income of persons age
65 and over comes primarily from public and private pensions, and secon-
darily from earnings. The proportion of income derived from public assis-
tance is negligible, although it is more important for single women (this
category includes the widowed and divorced) over 65 than for all other el-
derly units. Single persons, whether female or male, rely more heavily
than others on pensions, and most of the difference is accounted for by a
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heavier reliance on Social Security than on other forms of public or pri-
vate pensions. More of the income of married couples is derived from
earnings, and single women are most reliant on income from assets. It is
clear that the elderly are packaging their household incomes from a vari-
ety of sources (Rein and Rainwater, 1981), while relying heavily on So-
cial Security and earnings for most of their personal incomes. Although
many elderly people receive some income from private and federal pen-
sions, the dollar amount is low, the contribution to total family income
is not major, and the incomes provided are not much above the poverty
line:
TABLE 2.4
Official poverty level for calendar years 1980 and 1981
1980 1981
Aged Individual $3,900 $4,340
Couple, aged head 4,920 5,475
Family of four 8,300 9,245
Source: U. S. Department of Health and Human Services, (1981), p. 9.
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TABLE 2.5
Median income, and source of income, of aged and nonaged families
and unrelated individuals, 1978
Families Unrelated individuals
Head Head 65 and under 65 and over
under 65 over 65
Median Income $18,939 $10,124 $8,178 $4,211
Median dollar amount
from:
Earnings 18,310 6,700 8,991 2,505
Public Assistance 2,120 1,441 1,562 443
SSI 1,552 1,227 1,805 1,052
Social Security and
Railroad retirement 3,069 4,769 2,562 2,998
Private and federal
pensions 4,622 2,999 2,964 2,397
Veterans benefits,
unemployment, and
workman's comp. 999 1,390 933 1,078
All other sources 300 1,201 175 825
Source: Special Committee on Aging, 1981, p.8 .
Note: "Families" in this table are not disaggregated by family size,
with the result that the first two columns reflect incomes
earned by families of all sizes. This would tend to bias the
comparison between young and older families, since the elderly
live in much smaller families than do younger people.
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TABLE 2.6
Number and proportion of units receiving any income from
all sources of income, 1978
Families Unrelated indivi
Head Head age 65 under 65 65 a
under 65 and over
Total Number
(in millions) 49.3 8.5 17.3
Percent with
any income from:
Earnings 94.2 48.1 84.6
Public assistance 6.6 2.4 2.4
SSI 1.8 8.1 2.4
Social Security and
Railroad Retirement 11.1 92.0 7.7
Private and federal
pensions 6.1 39.1 4.2
Veteran's benefits,
unemployment, and
workman's comp. 1 14.8 9.4 10.3
All other sources 61.2 70.1 50.9
1 includes annuities, alimony, regular contributions from p
living in the family, and other periodic income.
Source: derived from Special Committee on Aging, 1981, p. 8.
7.6
16.3
1.4
12.1
92.5
25.1
7.9
62.1
ersons not
The biggest difference between the incomes of individuals living
alone and of families whose head is age 65 or over, is the proportion of
income received from earnings compared to the proportion of income from
Social Security. Table 2.7 shows that individuals living alone derive
about 12 percent of their income from earnings, compared to 37 percent
of the income of families with aged heads that is earned. Conversely,
single person households receive 46 percent of their incomes from Social
Security, but joint-headed households get 32 percent of income from that
source, even though 92 percent of joint-headed households get some in-
come from Social Security.
The low-income families who enrolled in the demand experiment in
both cities were receiving much higher proportions of their gross in-
duals
nd over
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comes from public sources than was the population at large, as we can
see from the last column of Table 2.7.
At enrollment in the demand experiment, of those receiving any in-
come from Supplemental Security Income (SSI), the mean percent of gross
income from this source was 43.3 percent; of those with any income from
pensions, the mean percent of gross income from pensions was 35.5 per-
cent, and for those with any income from Social Security, the mean pro-
portion of gross income from Social Security was 64.6 percent (Hades and
Central Files, demand experiment). Although the household income of eli-
gible households could range from $0 per year to just under the eligibi-
lity limit, which ranged up to $12,256 net income per year for families
of 9 or more people in Phoenix, and to $8,650 for that size family in
Pittsburgh (Bendick and Squire, 1981, pp. 53), all the families who were
offered enrollment in the demand experiment had incomes below the eligi-
bility line, by definition. The maximum average monthly income in all
twelve cities was $4,477 for a single-person household, and $5,468 for
two people. In the demand experiment, the average monthly payment per
recipient households was $59 in Phoenix, and $43 in Pittsburgh; in the
supply experiment, the figures were $72 and $78 for Green Bay and South
Bend respectively, with average incomes of $4,612 in Green Bay and
$3,782 in South Bend (Bendick and Squire, 1981, pp. 56).
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Table 2.7: Sources of income, 1978
Individuals
age 65 or Families with Enrollees
over, living head age 65 or in 5
alone over EHAP
Proportion of income
received from:
Earnings 12% 37% 47%
Social Security 46 32 65
Supplemental Security
Income 3 1 43
Other public 4 4 6
assistance 2
Other programs 2 1
Dividends, interest, 6
rent 23 16 6
Private pensions, 3
annuities, other 15 12 36
Total percent 100 100 --
Notgs:
2 May include railroad retirement payments
Unemployment insurance, workers compensation, or veterans'
3 payments
Private pensions, government employee pensions, alimony,
annuities, etc.
5 Less than .05 percent
Mean percent of gross income from this source, for those
eceiving any income from this source.
not available
Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1980b, pp. 62;
Hades and Central files of the demand experiment.
2.5 What Effect Have Economic Supports Had On Poverty Among The Aged?
The package of programs that was put together during the New Deal
has served to move most of the country's elderly citizens out of pover-
ty, at least as defined by the official poverty level (Figure 2.3). One
problem with the poverty level as it is defined by the Bureau of the Cen-
sus is that it is based on a Department of Agriculture food budget, and
implicitly considers expenditures on food as most important. Even if
the budget were enough to pay for food, and there is some question about
114
Figure 2.3
PERCENT OF HOUSEHOLDS EEADED BY PERSONS 65 AND OVER,
WITH INCOMES BELOW POVERTY LEVEL, 1960-1979
69.1
64.8
70-
65-1
60-,
55-
50-
454
40
35-
304
25-
20.
15a
10-
54
0
27.0
24k%
22.4
1965
9.9
58.5
'44
\4 t 4'
49.6 \
40.0
31.5 31.7
28.8
20.7
12.2
7.7
U
1979
23.5 25.8
16.6 \
12.3
1970
7.9
YEAR
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the US: 1980
(101st edition) Washington, D.C. 1980. No. 39, p. 34.
* = Family heads
o = Unrelated individuals
= Females
= Males
$4
0
0
-)
Q
a) \4
29.7 %
1960 1975
115
that (Select Committee on Aging, 1980) there is still a strain when hous-
ing costs are considered. Since many aged people spend high proportions
of their incomes for shelter (see Chapter 3), a good many more elderly
people would be considered to live below poverty level than under the
present system of measuring poverty.
However, even with widened eligibility for benefits over the past
decades and indexing Social Security payments to the Consumer Price In-
dex, poverty is still more prevalent among the nation's elderly than in
the rest of the population; people over age 65 comprise 10.7 percent of
the population, and 13.2 percent of the population living below the po-
verty line. Benefits are unevenly distributed and the groups that re-
ceive the lowest benefits usually predominate on any list of the most
needy: females, minorities, and single person households.
For the whole country, the mean income of white men in 1974 was
$10,548; of white women, $4,769; of black men, $6,400, and of black wo-
men, $4,199 (See Table 4). In the housing allowance experiment, mean
incomes in the Pittsburgh SMSA were higher than in the Phoenix SMSA for
men of both races, but among women age 65 and over, both white and black
women in Phoenix had higher incomes ($3,918 and 3,613 respectively) than
did older women in Pittsburgh ($3,355 and $467 respectively).
Table 2.8 shows that as recently as twenty years ago one third of
the elderly population had incomes below the official poverty line; ten
years ago, the proportion had dropped to one-quarter, and by 1978 to
less than 14%. However, the rate of poverty reduction has slowed over
the past several years, and between 1978 and 1979 the proportion of el-
derly with incomes under the poverty line actually increased slightly:
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TABLE 2.8
Proportion of aged with incomes below poverty line
1959 35.2%
1969 25.3
1978 14.1
1979 15.1
Rate of reduction in poverty among elderly:
1959-1969 1 percent per year
1969-1974 2 percent per year
1974-1979 no decrease, slight increase in last year
studied
Source: Select Committee on Aging, (1980), p. 7.
The story has been one of dramatic improvement in the economic
conditions under which most elderly persons live, but the improvement
has been uneven. The gap between females and males has been main-
tained, and among unrrelated individuals has actually widened over the
past five years; the gap between family heads and unrelated individuals
has also been maintained, although it has narrowed since 1970.
Women and minorities are overrepresented among the aged poor, as
Table 2.9 shows:
TABLE 2.9
Percent of older persons living in poor household, 1979
by sex and race
Both Sexes Male Female
Total 15.1 11.1 17.9
White 13.2 9.5 15.8
Black 35.5 26.9 41.7
Hispanic 26.7 23.8 29.1
Source: Special Committee on Aging, 1981, p. xvi.
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The major basis of after-retirement income is earnings, accounting
for 23 percent of income earned (Table 2.3), and pensions based on pre-
vious earnings. The lower post-retirement incomes of women can largely
be attributed to their lower rates of of participation in the labor
force during the working years. For minorities, lower average lifetime
earnings result in lower incomes during retirement.
One of the major changes in the source of income in old age during
the past century has been the reduced rate of labor force participation
among elderly men, especially the reduction in age at which they leave
the labor force, known as "the early retirement phenomenon" (Special
Committee on Aging, 1981). The labor force participation rate of women
has always been low, and has not increased appreciably for the over-
sixty-five group, even though younger women have been working in larger
numbers. Table 2.10 tells the story:
Civilian labor
TABLE 2.10
force participation, 1950-79, in percents
Age group
Men
195~0
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1979
Age group
Women
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1979
45-49
na
97.1
96.6
96.1
95.3
94.1
93.4
45-49
na
45.9
50.7
51.7
55.0
55.9
60.4
50-54 55-59 60-64
na na na
95.7 92.5 82.5
94.7 91.6 81.1
95.0 90.2 78.0
93.1 89.5 75.0
90.1 84.4 65.7
89.6 82.2 61.8
50-54 55-59 60-64
na na na
41.5 35.6 29.0
48.7 42.2 31.4
50.1 47.1 34.0
53.8 50.4 36.1
53.3 47.9 33.3
56 5 48.7 33.9
Source: Derived from Special Committee on Aging, 1981.
>65
45.8
39.6
33.1
27.9
26.8
21.7
20.0
>65
9.7
10.6
10.8
10.0
9.7
8.3
8.3
.
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2.6 Conclusion
This description of the economic support system for the elderly has
served two purposes. The first was to place this system, a complicated
patchwork of contributions from many sources, in its historical context.
The second was to show that although the proportion of old people living
below the poverty line has dramatically decreased, the economic system
still does not provide adequate resources, especially to women and minor-
ities.
The next chapter, Chapter 3, describes the housing problems of the
elderly and concludes that, despite this elaborate, multi-faceted econo-
mic support system, the major housing problem of the elderly is exces-
sive cost. All the legislative actions and programs described in this
chapter have not managed to house our aged population at a cost commensu-
rate with their economic resources.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 2
An aged unit is either a married couple age 65 or over, or an
elderly nonmarried person no matter the position or relationship to
the head of the household in which they reside.
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CHAPTER 3: HOW WELL ARE THE ELDERLY HOUSED?
3.1 Introduction
The housing problems of the elderly have shifted as the whole hous-
ing picture of the country has changed. We have become a nation of home-
owners living in relatively new and quite well built homes, and most of
the elderly are owner-occupants (Table 3.1) living in good housing
(Struyk and Soldo, 1980). A significant proportion of elderly renters
have housing problems that are primarily financial in nature (Frieden
and Solomon, 1977), but that include problems of physical quality for
about one out of five elderly eligible households. Good housing costs
more money than aged poor families can find in their meager budgets;
some scrimp on quality, others on cost, in order to finance their non-
housing needs.
More old people than ever before are living independently, but the
costs of doing this are growing beyond the reach of most older people.
Some elderly people can solve the problem of high housing cost through
nonmonetary resources provided to them by friends and families in their
independent living quarters, but this solution is not available to all
older people. Some of the elderly, primarily the very old and the unmar-
ried (widowed, divorced, or never-married) need a kind of help not
usually offered in the context of a housing program.
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Table 3.1
TENURE AND HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION, 1970 AND 1976
(IN THOUSANDS)
Renter Occupied Owner Occupied
percent percent
change, change,
1970- 1970-
1970 1976 1976 1970 1976 1976
Two or more
person
households
Female head,
under 65
65 or
over
Male head,
wife
present
under 65
65 or
over
17,171 17,541 2.2
3,270 4,520 38.2
2,899 4,130 42.5
375 391
35,124 41,626 18.5
3,019 3,889 28.8
2,159 2,922 35.3
5.7
12,759 11,291 -11.5
11,523 10,164 -11.8
1,236 1,127 -8.8
860 967 12.4
30.806 36,108 17.2
26,316 30,578 16.2
4,490 5,530 23.2
Other
male head
under 65
65 or
over
One Person
households
under 65
65 or
over
1,143
1,010
1,730
1,642
132
51.4
62.6
88 -33.3
6,389 8,560 34.0
4,109 5,803 41.2
2,279 2,757 21.0
1,298 1,629
974 1,251
324 378
4,762 6,278
2,075 2,677
2,688 3,602 34.0
23,560 26,101 10.8 39,886 47,904
Source: Sternlieb and Hughes, 1980, pp. 65 and 67.
Total
25.5
28.4
16.7
31.8
29.0
20.1
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3.2 Living Alone: The Big Shift
One of the most important trends in the housing conditions of the
elderly is the recent sharp increase in the proportion of both women and
men living alone (Figure 2.1). This increase in the proportion of peo-
ple living in one-person households is a trend that is especially pro-
nounced among the elderly (Kobrin, 1978). In 1960, 19 percent of the
noninstitutionalized elderly lived alone. By 1979, that proportion in-
creased to 30 percent and was especially strong among elderly women, and
among those over 75 years old (Benedict, 1981; Figure 3.1).
Reasons for this cluster around the three factors of increases in
disposable income; reduced incidences of living with children; and
changing expectations regarding maintenance of lifestyles over the life
course ((Pampel, 1981; Vandell; Crystal, 1981; Riley, 1Q79).
Table 3.2 shows that fewer men than of women live alone. In 1q40,
10 percent of all men and 22 percent of all women over the age of 65
were living in the same household as their married children. Of single,
widowed, separated or divorced women over the age of 65, fully 41 per-
cent, or two out of five, and of those over the age of 75, nearly half
(48%), were living with adult children. Over the next thirty years the
proportions halved; by 1970 only 4.2% of men and 11.9% of women over age
65 lived with children. Among unmarried women over 65, 24 percent, and
of those over 75, 28%, lived as the parent of the household head.
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Table 3.2
Proportion of aged living as "other relative"
(neither head nor spouse of head), by sex
1940 1970 1975
Men 15.0 6.5 3.9
Women 30.2 16.1 13.4
Single, separated, widowed
or divorced women:
Over age 65 41 24 na
Over age 75 48 28 na
Source: Derived from Bane, 1976, pp. 48; Mindel, 1979.
These figures reveal that the proportion of older people living
with their children has declined over time, and also shows us that most
of those who continue to live as parents of the head of the household
are unmarried women. Figure 2.1 shows that there has recently been a
steady decline in the number of older people living with people other
than their spouses or alone (lines D and F). This trend is declining
rather sharply among women (line D), whereas among men, the proportion
living with someone other than a spouse declined between 1965 and 1975,
but increased slightly between 1975 and 1979.
By 1978, men were more likely to be living in families than were
women (82.3 percent of old men, and 56.6 percent of old women), but ex-
actly half as likely to be living as an "other relative" in a family
(5.7 percent of elderly men, compared to 11.4 percent of elderly women,
Table 3.3). In 1978, 43.4 percent of women age 65 and older, compared
to 17.7 percent of men in that age group were living in single-person
households. The same story is told in Figure 3.1. Table 3.3 shows
these proportions.
Living arrangements are highly but not perfectly correlated with
marital status, and analysis of recent changes in these two measures
will proceed in tandem. Figure 3.1 shows trends in marital status of
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people over age 65 between 1960 and 1979, the last year for which data
are available. Of men over 65, most are married and living with their
spouse, and this proportion has increased over the past two decades
(Figure 3.1).
In contrast, most women over age 65 are widowed (Figure 3.1) and
living alone (Figure 2.1). Three out of four men over the age of 65
were married in 1979, and over half of all women that age were widowed;
of aged women, over forty percent were living alone, compared to only
fifteen percent of men. In 1950 a quarter of aged widows lived alone,
but by 1976 nearly two thirds (64.5%) maintained independent households
(Pampel, 1981). The major reason for the sex-linked disparities in mari-
tal status and living arrangements is woman's longer life expectancy, re-
sulting in large imbalances in the number of men and women, especially
in the higher age brackets.
Table 3.3
Living Arrangements of persons aged 65 and over, 1978
(in thousands)
Percent
Officially
Men Women Total poor
7F~ % # % # %
Unrelated
individuals 1,693 17.7 5,918 43.4 7,610 32.8 27.0
Family
members 7,855 82.3 7,710 56.6 15,565 67.2 7.6
head or
wife 7,314 76.6 6,161 45.2 13,475 58.2 8.1
other
relative 541 5.7 1,549 11.4 2,090 9.0 4.5
Total 9,548 100.0 13,628 100.0 23,175 100.0 14.0
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1980b.
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Figure 3.1
TRENDS IN MARITAL STATUS OF PERSONS 65 YEARS OLD AND OLDER,
1960-1979
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Table 3.4
Average remaining years of life at selected ages, 1900-1978
% increase,
1900 1920 1940 1960 1978 1900-1978
At birth
White
male 46.6 54.4 64.2 70.6 74.0 44.4
female 48.7 55.6 66.6 74.1 77.8 59.8
Other
male 32.5 45.5 51.5 61.1 66.3 100.0
female 33.5 45.2 54.9 66.3 73.6 119.7
At age 65
White
male 11.5 12.2 12.1 13.0 14.0 21.7
female 12.2 12.8 13.6 15.9 18.4 50.8
Other
Male 10.4 12.1 12.2 12.8 14.1 35.6
female 11.4 12.4 14.0 15.1 18.0 57.9
At age 75
White
male 6.8 7.3 7.2 7.9 8.6 26.5
female 7.3 7.6 7.9 9.3 11.5 57.5
Other
male 6.6 7.6 8.1 8.9 9.8 48.5
female 7.9 8.4 9.8 10.1 12.5 58.2
At age 85
White
male 3.8 4.1 4.0 4.3 5.3 39.5
female 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.7 6.7 63.4
Other
male 4.0 4.5 5.1 5.1 7.8 95.0
female 5.1 5.2 6.4 5.4 9.9 94.1
Source: U. S. Department of Commerce, 1980
Although life expectancy at birth has increased over the past seve-
ral decades, the increase has been greater for females than for males.
In 1960, male life expectancy at birth was 66.6, and in 1978 it was
In contrast, female life expectancy at69. a 4.4 percent increase.
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birth in 1960 was 73.1, and rose to 77.2 in 1978, a 5.6 percent in-
crease. Not only are women living longer, their rate of life expectancy
is increasing at a faster rate than men's (Table 3.4).
In 1940, 58 percent of males and 69 percent of females, in 1950, 63
percent of males and 69 percent of females, and in 1960, 66 percent of
males and 81 percent of females lived to age 65 (U.S. Department of
Commerce, 1980).
3.2.1 Implications of Increased Solo Living Among the Aged
Should living alone be seen as independence or isolation? It has
been looked at both ways, but I believe the crucial intervening varia-
bles are choice (whether the person has chosen to live alone, or whether
there are no alternatives) and the number and quality of social ties
available to the individual. Some people who live alone have many so-
cial ties outside their homes, but others are both alone and isolated.
There are substantial differences between the quality of life of those
living an independent, autonomous existence, and those who are social
isolates with no help with the ordinariy daily tasks that even young
people need, like minor borrowing, but that is more important to the
elderly whose capabilities for self-sufficiency are often reduced.
For residents of a slum SRO (single room occupancy) hotel, isola-
tion and loneliness are "the price they are prepared to pay to maintain
their independence (Stephens, 1976, p.35). These elderly individuals
had either never married or were divorced or widowed, and showed life-
long patterns of isolation and few social ties.
Shanas et.al (1968) found the isolated elderly to be older than
average, single or widowed, lacking children or other relatives nearby,
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retired from work and infirm, and more female than male, although the
population Stephens (1976) studied had more males than females.
Kobrin (1978) argues that the increase in living alone that has
occurred at both the youngest and oldest stages of the life cycle is in-
dicative of two major changes in the family as a social unit. The first
change is increasing age segregation; the second is "decreasing tole-
rance for family forms which include nonnuclear members," as a result of
a "general redefinition of the family toward invariable and perhaps un-
compromising nuclearity. While there may never have been an extended
family pattern in U.S. history, the evidence so far is that norms have
changed to make it less likely, despite demographic pressures, that
there ever will be such a pattern in the foreseeable future" (p. 79).
Kobrin predicts that "family membership will occur over a more restric-
ted portion of the life cycle, and, at any given time, perhaps less than
a majority of adults will be living in families. The rest, if current
trends continue, will live alone" (p.80).
Pampel (1981) found the probability of living alone for all income
groups in the aged as well as the non-aged population increased for both
males and females, with increases in income insufficient to account for
this trend. Demand for the privacy and autonomy of independent living
has increased, supported by a variety of programs begun under the Older
Americans Act of 1965 that help keep old people out of institutions for
longer proportions of their lives. He suggests that norms and values
sanction against living with relatives, that preferences for maintaining
one's own lifestyle have increased, or that government services for the
elderly have made it safer and easier to live alone. "Whatever the na-
ture of this change, it is clear that persons are more likely to live
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alone on less income in recent years than in the past, and that regard-
less of changes in income in the future, independent living will con-
tinue to increase" (p. 171). The norm of independence in living arrange-
ments is historically documented (Dinkel, 1944; Wake and Sporakowski,
1972; Mindel, 1979); the elderly only give up their autonomy when forced
to do so by declining health and increased disability (Habenstein and
Biddle, 1973; Newman, 1976). As average health status improves in the
aging population, and as disabilities are less debilitating, it is like-
ly that the elderly will be more unwilling than ever to become "burdens"
on their children or on public institutions.
Over fifteen years ago, Beresford and Rivlin (1966) suggested that
affluence has permitted Americans to buy privacy. Evidence from Sweden
shows that household headship and income are positively correlated for
both sexes, every age group, and each marital status (United Nations,
1973). Using attitudinal data, Crystal found economic changes the "dri-
ving force" in changes in intergenerational relations and in coresi-
dence. As the economic status of the elderly improved, they were able
to act on their "long standing preferences and maintain independent
homes, even when widowed." Increased availability and adequacy of pen-
sions led to a decline in work-force participation, to financial indepen-
dence from children, and to attitudinal shifts that accommodated these
massive structural changes in support for elderly members of society.
The economic changes preceeded changes in behavior, which in turn pre-
ceeded changes in attitudes.
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3.3 How Do the Elderly Live?
In 1980, 72.2 percent of people age 65 or over, but just 65.6 per-
cent of people of all ages who headed their own households also owned
that home (Table 3.5). The quality of owned housing is, on the whole,
better than that of rented units (McDowell, 1979; Leigh, 1980), so on
the average, the housing quality of the elderly is better than that of
younger families. Do the needs of homeowners differ from those of ren-
ters?
Although nearly three out of four elderly headed households live in
homes that they own, homeowners were not eligible for housing allowances
in ten of the twelve experimental sites. The housing needs of home-
owners and renters are in some ways different, and have been categorized
as follows, (after H.U.D., 1979):
Owners:
1. households whose financial and physical condition make main-
tenance difficult (most renters depend on landlords to main-
tain the dwelling unit);
2. prospective owners who would like to buy but cannot get con-
ventional financing;
3. owners living in substandard housing but who cannot afford to
either rehabilitate it or move.
Either Owners or Renters:
4. households with high rent or burdens or operating costs who
cannot afford their present dwelling units, or where the high
proportion of income allocated to shelter costs means that
other necessities of life are stinted on;
5. individuals living with relatives who wish to be independent
but cannot afford it;
6. residents of substandard housing who cannot afford to or do
not wish to move to standard housing, but need help with
health and other social services in their present units;
7. the frail and infirm who require but cannot afford home or
institutional nursing care;
8. households living in substandard housing who would like to
move to standard housing but cannot afford either the move or
the higher rent in a new home.
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Table 3.5
PROPORTION OF HOUSEHOLDS HEADED BY PERSONS 65 AND OLDER
BY TENURE OF RESIDENCE, 1970 AND 1Q80
1970 Percentage change,
1970-1980
Owner occupied
all ages
age 65 or over
Renter occupied
all ages
age 65 or over
Total
all ages
age 65 or over
39,886 62.9% 52,516
8,361 67.5 11,749
23,560
4,018
63,446
12,379
37.1
32.5
100.0
100.0
Source: 1980 Annual Housing Survey, Part A, pp. 5-6.
65.6%
72.2
34.4
27.8
100.0
100.0
27,556
4,528
80,072
16,277
31.7%
40.5
17.0
12.7
26.2
31.5
1980
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In an early analysis of data collected specifically to assess the
housing conditions of America's residents (the 1973 Annual Housing Sur-
vey), Struyk (1976) found that although the dwellings of the elderly are
somewhat more modest in terms of size and quality than are the dwellings
of all American households, the disparity is smaller than would be expec-
ted on the basis of their very much lower incomes. Most housing unit de-
fects in the homes of the elderly were found among elderly households re-
siding in rural areas; most neighborhood deficiencies were found in the
neighborhoods of the urban elderly, whose dwelling units themselves were
generally adequate.
A more recent conclusion regarding the housing quality of the aged
population, from a more recent Annual Housing Survey (1976) is that the
homes of the elderly have a higher incidence of basic structural defi-
ciencies than do those of the nonelderly, but the homes of the nonel-
derly tend to have the same or more deficiencies in maintenance (Struyk
and Soldo, 1980: p.42). Elderly owners have more problems of main-
tenance than do elderly renters. There is. no difference between the el-
derly and the nonelderly in the incidence of heating system and sewage
breakdowns. A higher incidence of missing basic components among the
elderly is probably related to the fact that their housing units are
considerably older than those of the nonelderly; in 1976, 62 percent of
elderly owners lived in units built before 1950, compared to only 32
percent of nonelderly owners; 59 percent of elderly renters, and 51
percent of nonelderly renters, lived in buildings built before 1950.
While analysis reveals that 94 percent of elderly homeowners and 85
percent of elderly renters lived in units with none of the deficiencies
measured by the 1976 Annual Housing Survey, and only two and five per-
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cent, respectively, reside in units with more than one defect (Struyk
and Soldo, 1980: p. 50), high incidences of multiple deficiencies are
concentrated among blacks and among households whose income is below
poverty level (Struyk and Soldo, 1980: p. 50). In aggregate, the elder-
ly in the United States are relatively well housed, but housing condi-
tions among the poor and the black, the population eligible for housing
allowances, is not as good. Elderly blacks live in housing that, for
both owners and renters, has a very high incidence of housing deficien-
cies (Struyk and Soldo, 1980: p. 46-49).
3.4 What Are the Housing Problems of the Elderly?
The national housing goal is, according to the Housing Act of 1949,
to provide a decent home in a suitable living environment for every
American family. The problem for public policy has always been to de-
fine "decent" and "suitable" in a way that would not exhaust the bud-
getary resources devoted by Congress to achieving that goal, while not
compromising the goal itself. The housing allowance experiment made a
valient effort to do both: "decent" was defined in accordance with pre-
vailing housing standards and health codes (McDowell, 1979); the cost of
the housing allowances was far lower, per household, than other kinds of
subsidies (Khadduri and Struyk, 1982). But, what are the salient compo-
nents of a decent home and suitable living environment? How is "environ-
ment" defined?
The question of a "decent home" has most often been interpreted in
physical terms, usually defined by presence or functioning of has such
basic facilities as plumbing and utilities, and dilapidation (Birch et.
al., 1973; Frieden and Solomon, 1977). The question of environment, how-
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ever, encompasses social as well as physical factors. The housing
programs of the past forty years have been very successful in providing
a "decent home" to the nation's citizens, but have been less successful
at achieving the "suitable living environment" portion of the goal
(Struyk and Soldo, 1981).
Two features of this definition should be examined. The first is
whether a very high housing cost burden contributes to a poor living
environment. The second is whether once-suitable environments, perfect
for young families or individuals, can become unsuitable for the elderly
just with the passage of time, with or without physical deterioration of
the unit. In addition to the problems of quality and cost, the home may
be unsuitable for independent living, a dimension lacking in a discus-
sion of the housing needs of younger families. The housing of an aged
person can be substandard because a homeowner cannot perform routine
maintenance due to poor health or inadequate financial resources, or
because a renter cannot pay enough money to a landlord to make repairs
worthwhile. The elderly headed household may be living in a neighbor-
hood that has changed while the individual(s) aged in place (Ginsberg,
1975); in a home that was once in good condition but has deteriorated;
in a home that was, by the standards of forty or fifty years ago ade-
quate, but changing housing, building and living standards has caused to
become unsuitable or below standard (with very small rooms, no window
screens, or old-fashioned plumbing), reasons often the cause of housing
unit failures in ERAP, in Jacksonville and the demand experiment sites.
It is also possible that the low-income elderly household was low-income
throughout life, and has always resided in housing that would be consi-
dered inadequate by almost any standard.
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Even if the home of an aged person or couple is not in deteriorated
physical condition, with a "reasonable" (see below) rent burden, house-
holds with elderly heads can have special problems above and beyond
those of the younger population. The unit itself can be in perfectly
good condition, and within the budget of the tenant, but ill-suited to
her needs as a result of changes in family composition and life-style
associated with aging. As people age their family size usually decrea-
ses when children grow up and move away, or spouses die or are sent to
nursing homes. This could leave once-full homes half empty, with one or
two people living where formerly there were four, six, or more, but with
maintenance just as demanding as when the residents were healthier and
there were many hands to help out. Stairways or bathrooms that were
once adequate for a young person become too steep or too hazardous for
an elderly person to manage safely. A home located in a distant suburb
unserved by public transit can be perfect for a young family, but impos-
sible for an aged person to live in once she can no longer drive a car
or pay for private transportation.
A second housing problem is ability to pay (Frieden and Solomon,
1977). When people retire, their incomes generally drop by half (Hen-
retta and Campbell, 1976; Clark and Spengler, 1980; Pampel, 1981), but
the housing expenses of renters rarely decrease commensurately, because
most do not move (Rossi, 1980). While the fixed housing costs of the
elderly do decrease when they finish paying off their mortgages (80 per-
cent of owner households with heads over the age of 65 had fully-paid up
mortgages in 1975, Baer, 1975; see also Weisbrod et. al., 1982), monthly
operating costs do not decrease, and in fact, over the past decade have
increased substantially.
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To summarize, the housing problems of elderly headed households can
include a home in bad physical condition; one that takes too high a pro-
portion of income from other needs; or one that is inconvenient, unsuita-
ble, or unsafe. To what extent to do the elderly suffer from these prob-
lems? Of these three, which is the major source of housing deprivation
for elderly headed households?
The next sections discuss the extent to which the three problems of
housing quality, special needs, and cost were important to the elderly
in the housing allowance experiment. The physical quality of the
housing of the elderly before they began to participate in the housing
allowance experiment is analyzed; the extent to which the elderly re-
quire special adaptive environments in order to live independently is
discussed; and lastly the question of affordability is assessed.
3.4.1 Housing Quality in the Demand Experiment
What can the demand experiment data base tell us about the quality
of the housing that elderly headed households lived in before the experi-
ment began? The quality of participant's housing prior to the housing
allowance experiment was measured by a special set of questions found on
the baseline survey. (See Introduction for explanation of baseline hous-
ing standards, and Appendix I for overview of the data base.) Three con-
ditions were used to judge housing quality: the presence or absence of
basic systems; the working condition of these basic systems; and other
miscellaneous items such as leaks in the roof or electrical problems.
The last two conditions are measures of how well the units are main-
tained.
In the demand experiment, the housing inhabited by households of
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different ages failed to meet these criteria at different rates (Table
3.6). The column labeled "passed low, medium, and high" means that the
dwelling unit had all the required systems in place, all systems were
operational, and there were no water leaks or electrical problems. The
elderly were most likely to be living in housing of this quality, and
the over-seventy group was most likely of all, with approximately seven-
ty percent of this age group passing this test in Pittsburgh, and nearly
eighty percent in Phoenix. By the measures of both the presence and
maintenance of basic systems, a higher proportion of elderly headed
households than of younger families were living in at least minimally
acceptable housing before the experiment began.
The next two columns, those labeled "passed low, medium, failed
high" and "passed low, failed medium, high" summarize the situation
where the basic components were present but there were problems in
keeping them in working order; as indicated above, this is a measure of
repairs and maintenance. Young families were more likely than were el-
derly headed families to be living in housing where basic components
were present but maintenance was deficient. The housing of families
headed by younger people in both Pittsburgh and Phoenix more frequently
failed these two measures of maintenance (15% and 21% in Pittsburgh, 13%
and 19% in Phoenix) than did the housing of the elderly (only 6% of the
over 75 in Pittsburgh and 8.5% in Phoenix). This is consistent with
Struyk and Soldo's (1980) findings that, among renters, maintenance is
more commonly a problem for young than for old families.
For housing that failed all three meaures, some basic systems were
missing, and those that were present were not well functioning; this
housing can be judged substandard. The overall proportion living in the
Table 3.6
HOUSING QUALITY OF ENROLLED HOUSEHOLDS AT BASELINE, BY AGE
Passed low, Passed low, Passed low,
medium, medium, failed medium, Failed low,
Age high failed high high medium, high Total
Pittsburgh
18-54 697 57.6% 186 15.4% 250 20.6% 78 6.4% 1211 100.0%
55-59 61 71.8 6 7.1 14 16.5 4 4.7 85 100.0
60-64 41 57.7 9 12.7 12 16.9 9 12.7 71 100.0
65-69 94 62.7 12 8.0 19 12.7 25 16.7 150 100.0
70-74 82 72.6 8 7.1 9 8.0 14 12.4 113 100.0
75 and 76 68.5 7 6.3 5 4.5 23 20.7 111 100.0
over
Total 1051 60.4 228 13.1 309 17.7 153 8.8 1741 100.0
Phoenix
18-54 875 61.3 184 12.9 266 18.6 102 7.1 1427 100.0
55-59 32 69.6 3 6.5 6 13.0 5 10.9 46 100.0
60-64 51 72.9 4 5.7 9 12.9 6 8.6 70 100.0
65-69 69 68.3 8 7.9 13 12.9 11 10.9 101 100.0
70-74 71 79.1 5 5.8 5 5.8 8 9.3 86 100.0
75 and 71 75.5 5 5.3 8 8.5 10 10.6 94 100.0
over
Total 1166 63.9 209 11.5 307 16.8 142 7.P 1824 100.0
Source: Baseline Survey.
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"worst" housing was not significantly different in the two cities (9% in
Pittsburgh, 8% in Phoenix), but the distribution by age was different
between the sites.
In Pittsburgh a higher proportion of households with aged heads
lived in very bad housing than did young families, but in Phoenix there
was very little difference by age. More than one out of five households
in Pittsburgh headed by an individual over the age of 75 was living in
housing that failed all the measures of housing quality, compared to
just about 6 percent of those under age sixty. In Phoenix, about one
out of ten families of all ages were living in housing that both lacked
some basic components and had maintenance problems. The housing of the
elderly was no worse than of young people in Phoenix, and was in fact
somewhat better.
In the supply experiment, the elderly were less likely than the non-
elderly to live in dwelling units that failed the initial evaluation
(McDowell, 1979: p.56). Indications are from all the available informa-
tion in the housing allowance experiment that the housing problem of el-
derly headed households was not primarily one of substandard quality,
with the exception of those over the age of 75 in Pittsburgh.
3.4.2 Is Bad Health an Obstacle to Good Housing for the Elderly?
To what extent do special circumstances prevent the aged from ope-
rating successfully in the private housing market? The housing problem
of the majority of the elderly is not predominantly of housing that is
unsuited to their needs, although an adapted environment is very impor-
tant for the minority of elderly, mostly those age 75 or over, who re-
quire special facilities such as ramps, grab-bars, and water faucets
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that can be operated by arthritis-crippled hands. Conventional wisdom
states that although most elderly people are living independently in
their own homes, and only five percent are in nursing homes at any given
time (see Figure 2.1), the health of the aged is, on the average, poor.
Although about one out of five persons sixty-five or older is function-
ally impaired (Maddox, 1979: p. 124), the data indicate that the majo-
rity of elderly people are capable of living independently in market
housing.
A national study conducted in the mid-sixties (Shanas et. al.,
1968) found that a quarter of individuals between the ages of 65 and 69
and 42 percent of those above the age of 80 have difficulty climbing
stairs, but another national study done a few years later found that the
comparable figures were 9 percent of those aged 65-69, and 20 percent of
those above the age of 75 (Schooler, 1972). In terms of personal care,
the evidence is more consistent; less than ten percent of those between
ages 65 and 69 in either study have difficulty in bathing or dressing
themselves, but the proportion over age 70 who have problems of personal
maintenance rises to about twenty percent (for bathing) and about 13
percent (for dressing) (cited in Lawton, 1977: p. 282) at older ages.
However, the fastest growing segment of the population is indivi-
duals over the age of 75 (Table 3.7), the age at which these special
needs become especially frequent (Soldo, 1980; U.S. Bureau of the Cen-
sus, 1981). It is probable that in the future there will be more very
old people (over age 75) who will need specially adapted environments to
a greater extent than do the aged of today (see Chapter 1).
Turning to the question of preferences, a special survey of the el-
derly done for the administrative agency experiment (Wolfe et. al.,
Table 3.7
CHANGE IN COMPOSITION OF AGED POPULATION, 1960-1979
Males and Females, in millions and percent of aged population
65-69 70-74 75-79 80+ Total % of
# # % # # (in millions) Population
1960 6.3 38.2 4.7 28.5 3 18.2 2.5 15.2 16.5 10.2%
1965 6.5 35.9 5.4 29.6 3.5 19.3 3.1 17.1 18.1 9.4
1970 6.7 33.8 5.4 27.0 3.8 19.4 3.8 19.0 19.8 9.8
1975 8.0 37.7 5.7 26.8 3.9 18.4 4.4 20.9 21.1 10.1
1979 8.6 37.0 6.5 28.1 4.2 18.3 5.0 21.7 23.1 10.7
Percent Change in Composition of Aged Population, 1960-1979
% Change, 1960-1979 Females Males
Total aged
population 40% 51.1 26.7
65-69 36.5 42.6 29.7
70-74 38.3 51.6 23.2
75-79 40.0 48.0 28.5
80+ 100.0 130.3 59.0
derived from: 1980 Statistical Abstract, p.34, No. 39.
H
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1977, p. 102-104) found that more than half of the aged prefer to live
in mixed-age settings, and in a place where meals are not provided; 37
percent must live in a place where all the rooms are on one floor, and
36 percent need a place with few stairs. Only four percent need grab
bars, one percent need ramps or special bathrooms, and zero percent of
the sample need special kitchens. Over half said that they had no mobi-
lity problems at all.
All rooms on one floor or few stairs to climb are criteria that can
be relatively well met in private market housing, especially in the
small cities and suburbs where most elderly households live (Struyk and
Soldo, 1980). Although many elderly people do need special, "friendly"
environments, and these special, usually age-segregated environments
work quite successfully when attempted (Hochschild, 1973; Rosow, 1967;
Myerhoff, 1978), most of that need can be met without building new
buildings to house these communities.
3.5 Defining High Rent Burden
For more than a century people have felt that a family should pay
"a week's wage for a month's rent" (Feins and Lane, 1981: p.8). What
is the meaning of this twenty-five percent guideline, a figure central
to the housing allowance experiment and used in determining housing pro-
gram and policy guidelines for almost two decades? Although that figure
has come under attack recently, both by Feins and Lane (1981) and Wel-
feld (1982), no other single standard has been suggested to take its
place. In fact, the two works just cited conclude that there is no one
standard to decisively determine appropriate rent burden.
As income increased during the decade of the fifties, the propor-
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tion of income spent on housing fell, and housing expenditures varied
with occupation and education within income classes (Meyerson, Terrett
and Iheaton, 1962: p. 60). Up until the mid-seventies, consumers had
been consistently reducing the proportion of their incomes allocated to
on housing (Feins and Lane, 1981); twenty years ago Myerson, Terrett and
Uheaton (1962: p. 50) concluded that "consumers prefer to spend their
money on other things than housing." A major problem posed at the time
was how to get Americans to "rank housing higher in their budget alloca-
tions" (Myerson, Terrett and 1heaton, 1962: p. 64). These writers specu-
lated that as consumer incomes rose, a large part of that increase might
be directed to housing "if the convenience and attractiveness of the pro-
duct were improved" (p.65). The implication of their words is that hous-
ing should represent a higher proportion of consumer's budgets than it
did during the 1950s.
Their words proved prophetic. During the decade of the seventies
housing prices began increasing more rapidly than wages and so did the
proportion of income allocated to housing (Feins and Lane, 1981). Al-
though by 1973 much of that increase was due to across-the-board improve-
ments in housing quality and some inflation, according to Feins and Lane
(1981: p.37-38) since 1973 pure price inflation has accounted for most
of the increase. Between 1960 and 1973, 28.3 percent of the increase in
rents was due to increased housing consumption and 71.7 percent was due
to inflation.
Feins and Lane (1981) asserted that between 1973 and 1977 renters
actually decreased their housing consumption in order to adjust to in-
flation in housing costs. As they defined it, consumption decreased by
5.9 percent in real terms, while rents increased, due to inflation
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alone, by 105.9 percent. The technique they used adjusts both dollars
and housing expenditures to 1960 dollars, to judge whether increases in
real rents can be attributed to increases in housing consumption or to
housing inflation. They measured the change in housing consumption ver-
sus inflation by increases in real rents deflated to 1960 dollars accor-
ding to the Consumer Price Index (CPI) housing index. Because that in-
dex was based on the cost of buying rather than renting housing, the
monthly index figures implied that people purchased a home every month
and is widely thought to overstate the effect of inflation on average
housing costs. After publication of Feins and Lane, the CPI housing
index was revised to remove the disproportionate effect of interest
rates on estimates of housing costs by substituting the cost of renting
for the cost of purchasing a new home.
The rise in real rents was interpreted by Feins and Lane to repre-
sent a general increase in the quantity of housing consumed by renters
over the time period in question. They rely on the CPT housing index to
remove the impact of shelter price increases from the cost of housing.
To the extent that cost is a good proxy for housing quality, this assump-
tion can be useful.
Feins and Lane interpret as a decrease in housing consumption the
lack of increase in average real rents from 1973 to 1977, and a slight
drop over all income ranges. However, they do not attempt to measure
this decrease by examining housing consumption directly. They attribu-
ted increasing real rents to improvements in housing quality: larger
apartments, more storage, and multiple bathrooms in rental units. How-
ever, they do not attempt to measure either the increase or decrease in
housing consumption. Absent such a measure, the conclusion is question-
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able.
This chapter of the dissertation finds evidence that cost is, at
best, a crude proxy for other, more direct measures of housing quality.
Although "there is no such thing as a single 'right rent' or a single
'right ratio'" (lelfeld, 1982, p.11 1 ), there is clearly a point at which
the proportion of income spent on rent by an elderly household is so
high that the amount left over to pay for other necessities, such as
utilities, food, clothing, and health care, is small and other needs go
unmet, leading perhaps to the unwelcome choice between heating and eat-
ing. The Bureau of Labor Statistics sets housing expenditure guidelines
for families with lower incomes and larger household sizes at less than
25 percent of income (Stone, 1978; see also Peattie, 1966, p.12), even
though the poor generally expend a higher proportion of their income for
housing than the well-to-do.
The consequence of high rent burden for families living very close
to the poverty line can be drastic, and a large proportion of the aged
have incomes just slightly above this admittedly inadequate measure of
need (Select Committee on Aging, 1980). Between 1973 and 1978 a rapidly
increasing Consumer Price Index meant that the purchasing power of the
low incomes of the elderly was decreasing, while the vast majority of
families enrolled in this program were paying excessive proportions of
their total incomes for shelter. Although it may not be possible to
established a single standard for appropriate rent burden, the question
of affordability should not be avoided when the average incomes of
participants was as low as it was (about $5000) and the average rent
burden was as high as it was before the payments were received, and in
many cases, even afterwards.
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Budding (1978) studied the effect of rent burden on the ability of
poverty-level households to purchase other goods. He found that al-
though two-thirds of poverty level households in the demand experiment
with rent burdens below 25 percent had enough income after housing expen-
ditures to meet their nonhousing needs, only about half of those with
rent-income ratios between 25 and 40 percent could also meet these non-
housing needs. But of those with rent burdens of more than 40 percent,
only 11 percent could meet their nonhousing needs, and just 40 percent
could meet even half of their nonhousing need. Budding declared that
although these figures are no more than suggestive, they help show that,
although any particular cut-off point used define excessive rent burden
is arbitrary, high rent-income ratios can result in housing and budget-
ary deprivation.
Frieden and Solomon (1977) defined the elderly to have an excessive
rent burden when they paid more than 35 percent, not the usual 25 per-
cent, of income for housing. Although the guideline normally used to de-
termine appropriate rent burden is 25 percent, the elderly often have
lower living expenses than do young people. They do not incur such work-
related expenses as transportation to work and businesslike clothing,
and can spend time doing things for themselves that working people often
pay others to do, like cooking, cleaning their homes, and home main-
tenance. However, many elderly people have high medical costs, and when
they become ill can no longer perform the ordinary chores that most of
us can do for ourselves, like cooking, housecleaning, and laundry. Be-
cause the problems of frailty and chronic conditions increase with age,
especially above the age of 75 (Neugarten, 1974), it ,might be reason-
able to expect the young-old to pay more for housing than do the old-
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old. le will return to this question in Chapter 6.
In this monograph, a 35 percent figure is used in evaluating the
rent burdens of elderly households in the housing allowance experiment,
although it might be more appropriate to use a high figure for rent bur-
den for the young-old, and a lower figure for the old-old. Nationwide,
the mean proportion of income spent on gross rent in 1977 for household
heads age 65 and over was 37 percent, and varied directly with income.
Elderly renters with incomes between $2,000 and $4,999 had a mean rent
burden of 46 percent and aged renters with incomes between $5000 and
$9,999 had a mean ratio of 32 percent. The proportion of income spent
for housing declined evenly thorugh the income classes, reaching just 10
percent for elderly households with an annual income of $30,000 or over
in 1977 (Feins and Lane, 1981, pp. 52; source of information was the
1977 Annual Housing Survey).
The housing allowance in the demand experiment was calculated to
bridge the gap between a fourth of net household income and an estimate
of a fair, modest standard rental price appropriate for the family size,
but many elderly households both before and after receiving a housing
allowance spent a more than 25 percent, and even more than 35 percent,
of their incomes for rent. To make this analysis consistent with other
analysis of rent burdens, both the 25 percent and the 35 percent figures
are reported. No one standard is appropriate, and all figures are arbi-
trary, but is does not seem unreasonable to believe that low-income el-
derly households spending between a third and half of their incomes for
housing will be not be able to afford other necessities of life.
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3.5.1 Rent Burdens in the Housing Allowance Experiment
The vast majority of the participating renters in the demand
experiment (only renters were eligible to participate in the demand expe-
riment) were spending more than twenty-five percent of their income on
housing before the program began, but the elderly were devoting an even
higher proportion of their incomes to housing costs than were others
with comparable incomes. Table 3.8 shows that whereas just over a
third of young families were spending twenty-five percent or less of
their income for rent at enrollment, only about 18 percent, or less than
one in five elderly families, spent that little for rent. Conversely,
more than half of the households in Pittsburgh headed by people over the
age of 75 were paying more than 35 percent of the household's gross in-
come for housing; in Phoenix, over 60 percent were paying more than a
third of their income for shelter when they enrolled in the program.
Even after they received a housing allowance payment a large propor-
tion of the elderly still suffered from excessively high rent burdens.
Table 3.9 shows that, among households receiving a housing allowance pay-
ment, in Pittsburgh, 30 percent of those between 70 and 74, and 60 per-
cent of those aged 75 and over, were still paying more than 35 percent
of their gross household income for shelter costs, but in Phoenix the
proportions were much lower. Comparison with Table 3.8 shows that the
allowance succeeded in reducing the housing cost burden for many parti-
cipating families, but less for the elderly in Pittsburgh than in
Phoenix, and less for the old than for the young. The attrition of near-
ly one-third of the sample during the two year period, plus the small
cell size of each treatment group, means that the number of families
still active in each treatment group was very small at the two year
Table 3.8
RENT BURDEN AT ENROLLMENT
Age* Less then .25 .25-.35 over .35 Total
%F # % T # %
Pittsburgh
18-54 380 34.8% 304 27.8% 408 37.4% 1092 100.0%
55-59 25 31.3 23 28.8 32 40.0 80 100.0
60-64 14 21.9 16 25.0 34 53.1 64 100.0
65-69 26 19.8 40 30.5 65 49.6 131 100.0
70-74 19 17.9 30 28.3 57 53.8 106 100.0
75 and over 18 17.6 26 25.5 58 56.9 102 100.0
Total 482 30.6 439 27.4 654 41.5 1575 100.0
Phoenix
18-54 483 38.6 406 32.5 361 28.9 1250 100.0
55-59 9 22.5 9 22.5 22 55.0 40 100.0
60-64 9 14.5 15 24.2 38 61.3 62 100.0
65-69 14 15.9 22 25.0 52 59.1 88 100.0
70-74 9 12.0 23 30.7 43 57.3 75 100.0
75 and over 12 14.6 20 24.4 50 61.0 82 100.0
Total 536 33.6 495 31.0 566 35.4 1597 100.0
at enrollment
Source: Hades and Central Files
H-
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Table 3.9
TWO YEARS OF THOSE WHO MET EARMARK
Age* Less then .25 .25-.35 over .35 Total
# %# % #T% #%
Pittsburgh
18-54 79 50.0% 46 29.1% 33 20.9% 158 100.0%
55-59 5 71.4 2 28.6 0 - 7 100.0
60-64 6 54.5 4 36.4 1 9.1 11 100.0
65-69 7 53.8 3 23.1 3 23.1 13 100.0
70-74 3 30.0 4 40.0 3 30.0 10 100.0
75 and over 3 30.0 1 10.0 6 60.0 10 100.0
Total 103 49.3 60 28.7 45 22.2 209 100.0
Phoenix
18-54 87 64.9 31 23.1 16 11.9 134 100.0
55-59 4 50.0 3 37.5 1 12.5 8 100.0
60-64 4 80.0 0 - 1 20.0 5 100.0
65-59 2 22.2 5 55.5 2 22.2 9 100.0
70-74 6 40.0 4 26.7 5 33.3 15 100.0
75 and over 5 45.4 4 36.4 2 18.2 11 100.0
Total 108 59.3 47 25.8 27 14.8 182 100.0
*
at enrollment
Source: Hades and Central Files
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mark. Nevertheless, the allowances were quite successful in reducing
the budget share allocated to housing among young families, and among
the young-old, but the old-old were still paying substantial proportions
of their incomes for shelter even after receiving a housing allowance.
In Pittsburgh, the situation was worse than in Phoenix; three out of
five people over the age of 75 were paying more than 35 percent of their
incomes for shelter, compared to less than one out of five in Phoenix.
However, a third of those between the ages of 70 and 74 in both cities
were spending more than a third of their incomes for housing, which was
an improvement from the situation at enrollment when more than half had
rent burdens in excess of 35 percent, but still represents a heavy Table
burden on already meager budgets.
Housing allowances were effective in reducing rent burdens for fami-
lies who qualified for payments; conversely, families who did not qua-
lify for a payment were worse off than those who did receive a housing
allowance payment, in terms of rent burden. Table 3.10 shows that the
rent burden of those who did not meet the earmarking requirement re-
mained quite high, with a third of all participants paying more than 35
percent of income for their housing. In this case, the elderly in Phoe-
nix were worse off than those in Pittsburgh; rent burdens were higher,
on the average, in Pittsburgh than in Phoenix, especially among house-
holds headed by people over the age of 75. Receiving a housing allow-
ance "housing gap" formula payment did reduce the average rent burden of
participating households, but they were still, in many cases, still pay-
ing excessive proportions of their incomes for rent.
Table 3.10
RENT BURDEN AT TWO YEARS OF THOSE WHO DID NOT MEET EARMARK
Age* Less then .25 .25-.35 over .35 Total
# % # % # % #
Pittsburgh
18-54 53 37.1% 54 37.8% 36 25.2% 143 100.0%
55-59 5 45.5 2 18.8 4 36.4 11 100.0
60-64 3 33.3 4 44.4 2 22.2 9 100.0
65-69 8 38.1 5 23.8 8 38.1 21 100.0
70-74 4 28.6 5 35.7 5 35.7 14 100.0
75 and over 4 22.2 6 33.3 8 44.4 18 100.0
Total 77 35.6 76 35.2 63 29.2 216 100.0
Phoenix
18-54 34 36.9 21 22.8 37 40.2 92 100.0
55-59 2 33.0 1 16.7 3 50.0 6 100.0
60-64 4 50.0 0 -- 4 50.0 8 100.0
65-69 1 9.1 4 36.4 6 54.5 11 100.0
70-74 2 18.2 5 45.4 4 36.4 11 100.0
75 and over 3 25.0 1 8.3 8 66.7 12 100.0
Total 46 32.9 32 22.9 62 44.3 140 100.0
*
at enrollment
Source: Hades and Central Files
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3.5.2 Did High Rent Burdens Buy Better Housing for Participating
Families?
One goal of the experiment was to discover if high housing prices
bought better quality shelter, a test of the assumption that higher-cost
housing is better quality than lower-cost housing. Barnett and Noland
(1981, pp. 2) estimated that the elasticity of demand for quality in
the supply experiment was 2.32 for renters and 1.65 for owners. This
means that a ten percent increase in the expense of housing increased
the demand for quality by 23 percent for renters and 17 percent for
owners. In comparison, the elasticity of demand for space is closer to
.3; the same ten percent increase in housing expense would increase the
demand for space by only three percent.
How was the cost of housing, as measured by the housing cost bur-
den, related to housing quality in the housing allowance experiment? le
expect that families with lower incomes would have higher rent burdens,
even though they lived in lower quality housing. This would lead one to
expect an association between low quality and high cost burden. Running
counter to this, higher prices generally buy better housing, so high
cost burdens might be associated with high quality, even though higher
income families generally can afford to buy better housing without pay-
ing the penalty of an onerous rent burden.
There is evidence that, at the time of the baseline survey, people
with high rent burdens lived in better housing than did those paying a
smaller proportion of their income for shelter, although the evidence is
mixed. It seems that families were willing to pay extraordinary propor-
tions of their low incomes for housing because it bought them better
housing. Those who scrimped on the price of housing paid in another
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way, by living in housing of worse quality. Table 3.11 shows that,
among elderly headed households, the old-old were more likely to be pay-
ing a disproportionate share of income to obtain good housing than were
the young-old; the differences were sharper in Phoenix than in Pitts-
burgh.
For the very old in Phoenix, four out of five of those over the age
of 70 and paying more than 25 percent of their income for shelter were
living in the "best" housing, compared to only half of those paying less
than 25 percent. In Phoenix, those in the middle group, paying between
25 and 35 percent of income for housing, seemed to live in the best hous-
ing.
In Pittsburgh, high rent burdens did not buy better housing; a very
small proportion of those paying over 35 percent of income for rent and
between the ages of 70 and 74, in Pittsburgh, were living in the "worst"
housing (only 5 percent), but a high proportion of those over the age of
75 were paying more than a third of their income for housing costs, and
were still living in housing that failed the low, medium and high mea-
sures of quality. In Pittsburgh, a stable proportion, about 20 percent,
lived in the "worst" housing, no matter the housing cost burden, for
those age 75 and over.
In Phoenix, the association between quality and costs was more dra-
matic than in Pittsburgh. Except among the young and the young-old
(households headed by persons under the age of 70), a high proportion
were living in the "best" housing and paying more than 25 percent of
their incomes for shelter. Overall, a higher proportion of those with a
rent burden of less than 25 percent were living in the "worst" housing,
especially in the older ages. A third of those above the age of 70 were
Table 3.11
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RENT BURDEN AND HOUSING QUALITY AT BASELINE
Total
Age % in best % in worst number % in best % in worst number % in best 7 in worst number number
Pittsburgh
18-54 60.3% 3.7% 380 56.4% 10.57 305 55.1% 6.9% 408 10Q3
55-59 76.0 4.0 25 65.2 13.0 23 71.9 - 32 80
60-64 71.4 - 14 43.8 18.8 16 58.8 14.7 34 64
65-69 53.8 23.1 26 57.5 22.5 40 66.2 12.3 65 131
70-74 73.7 10.5 19 66.7 26.7 30 75.4 5.3 57 106
75 and 66.7 22.2 18 73.1 15.4 26 70.7 20.7 58 102
over
Total 61.8 5.6 482 58.2 13.4 440 60.4 8.6 654 1576
Phoenix
18-54 61.6 9.7 485 65.3 4.4 406 59.4 6.6 362 1253
55-59 66.7 11.1 9 88.9 11.1 9 54.5 13.6 22 40
60-64 66.7 11.1 9 66.7 6.7 15 76.3 10.5 38 62
65-69 64.3 21.4 14 78.3 4.3 23 65.4 7.7 52 89
70-74 55.6 33.3 9 78.3 8.7 23 83.7 7.0 43 75
75 and 50.0 33.3 12 80.0 15.0 20 80.0 4.0 50 82
over
Total 61.5 11.0 538 67.5 5.2 496 64.6 7.1 567 1601
Note: The "best" housing passed the low, medium and high standards; the "worst" housing failed all three measures.
Source: Baseline Survey, Hades and Central Files.
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living in the worst housing and paying less than 25 percent for housing,
compared to about five percent of those paying more than 35 percent.
Analysis of Table 3.10 shows that in Pittsburgh 16 percent and in
Phoenix 11 percent of households with heads aged 70 or over lived in
housing that failed some or all of the baseline housing measures and
paid more than 35 percent of their incomes for shelter. One out of ten
or more of the very old people in those cities was doubly deprived --
the quality was bad, yet they were paying more than a third of their
incomes to live there.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter reviews evidence concerning the housing conditions of
the elderly, and finds this evidence to point to a substantial improve-
ment in the overall condition of the elderly's housing. This is shown
both in the high and rapidly increasing rates of homeownership and a new-
found ability to live independently of children or other family members.
There are still problems, however, in the housing conditions of the
aged population considered as a whole. 1hile most of the elderly live
in good quality housing that is also suitable to their physical needs as
they age, most of the low-income elderly in the housing allowance experi-
ment are paying a third or more of their incomes for shelter, even after
receiving an allowance payment. About half of the enrolle elderly house-
holds in the experiment paid more than 35 percent of their incomes for
housing, and between a fourth and a third lived in housing with serious
problems of quality. In addition, between 10 and 15 percent of the el-
derly suffered from both substandard housing conditions and high rent
burdens. The housing problems of the elderly in the housing allowance
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experiment are both high cost and problems of maintenance and physcial
condition. The problem is not simple, and neither is the solution.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 3
Housing cost burden is defined as the proportion of gross income that
was paid for total housing expenditures including contract rent and
utilities.
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CHAPTER 4: SOCIAL FACTORS IN THE HOUSING ALLOWANCE EXPERIMENT
4.1 Introduction
"Participation" in the housing allowance experiment reflects both
the degree to which a family would or could work to meet the require-
ments of the program, and the degree to which institutional or personal
factors facilitated or blocked qualifying for a housing allowance pay-
ment. Participation, in this sense, may reflect a great deal more than
just the willingness of one or more family members to fill out a set of
bureaucratic forms. The outcome of the experiment for participating fa-
miles may reflect:
o the quality of the supply of housing;
o family members who were particularly good searchers;
o having a good network of people who helped households meet the
conditions for receiving a payment; or
o eagerness to receive the payment, related to the level of need.
Some households involuntarily failed to qualify for the payment,
perhaps because they were discriminated against or because they could
not get help they needed to repair their pre-program home or to move to
a place that qualified (Holshouser, et. al., 1976; Wolfe and Hamilton,
1977).
Qualifying for a payment may be more of a reflection on the require-
ments themselves, particularly a gap between the quality of available
housing and the the set of standards that housing inhabited by program
participants had to meet, than on the willingness of a family to meet
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those requirements (Holshouser, et. al., 1976; folfe and Hamilton,
1977). These factors probably influenced the degree to which aged house-
holds met the conditions of the experiment and received a housing allow-
ance payment, but the relative importance of each factor is unknown. Al-
though these influences are mixed together, and despite muddy data, this
chapter tries to separate out some of the most salient social factors
that affected the experiment's outcomes.
Section 4.2 examines a set of contextual influences. These include
such indicators of social networks as marital status, living arrange-
ments, sex of the household head, race, length of tenure, relatives in
the neighborhood, kinship with landlord and proximity of landlord's resi-
dence. Section 4.3 looks at the stages of participation (with the ex-
ception of questions of mobility), and especially at the overall influ-
ence of social networks at each stage: how people heard of the program,
who helped them to apply, deciding to enroll, and qualifying for a pay-
ment. Issues of searching and moving, and assistance in moving and re-
pairing, are examined in Chapter 5.
The overall hypothesis of this monograph is that the elderly at all
times attempted to increase the resources available to them. The experi-
ment had some apparently contradictory results. Some groups with low
resources, such as the single elderly, qualified for the program at high
rates (Table 4.1 and 4.2), but other groups with few assets, such as
racial minorities, qualified for the program at relatively low rates
(Table 4.3). Being related to the landlord reduced the probability of
meeting the program's requirements (Table 4.4), but living near the
landlord (Table 4.5) or near relatives (Table 4.6) increased the propor-
tion of enrollees who eventually received the housing allowance subsidy.
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Table 4.1
PROPORTION MEETING EARMARKING REQUIREMENT
AFTER TWO YEARS, BY HOUSEHOLD TYPE AT ENROLLMENT, BY AGE,
PITTSBURGH AND PHOENIX
Single Total proportion
Age person Couple meeting earmark
Pittsburgh
18-54 0 -% 55 42.3% 180 46.6%
55-59 0 - 4 40.0 8 36.4
60-64 5 50.0 4 44.4 13 54.2
65-69 12 37.5 2 20.0 16 34.8
70-74 6 27.3 3 42.9 12 35.3
75 and 12 38.7 1 14.3 15 35.7
over
Total 35 36.8 69 39.9 244 44.0
Phoenix
18-54 0 - 92 52.0 184 52.0
55-59 1 100.0 2 25.0 10 52.6
60-64 0 - 3 50.0 7 36.8
65-69 10 50.0 2 28.6 13 41.9
70-74 17 58.6 2 40.0 19 54.3
75 and 13 54.2 3 37.5 16 45.7
over
Total 41 51.2 104 49.3 249 50.5
Sources: Hades and Central Files
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Table 4.2: PROPORTION OF ELDERLY ELIGIBLE FOR,
ENROLLED IN, AND RECIPIENTS OF,
ALLONANCES IN THE SUPPLY EXPERIMENT,
BOTH SITES, AS OF THE END OF
THE FOURTH PROGRAM YEAR
Eligible2 Enrolled3 Recipients3
Brown County
(Green Bay)
Renters
Elderly Singles
Elderly Couples
771 63
266 54
605 78
97 36
583 76
89 33
All Families 3,689 26 2,122 58 1,775
Owners
Elderly Singles
Elderly Couples
All Families
St. Joseph County
(South Bend)
Renters
Elderly Singles
Elderly Couples
All Families
Owners
Elderly Singles
Elderly Couples
1,007
1,087
39
32
483 48
211 19
473 47
209 19
4,223 13 1,144 27 1,060 25
1,271 71
277 37
4,644
640 50
72 26
30 2,504
4,193 62
2,399 30
1,634 39
639 27
583 46
68 25
54 1,822 39
1,565 37
616 25
All Families 10,755 19 3,177 30 2,930 27
dA U l 1981: A 76 77
Note: The proportion of households eligible for the program were
estimated by Carter and Balch from the households surveys for wave 4
in Brown County and wave 3 in St. Joseph County. Counts of the
enrolled clients and those receiving payments are from the housing
allowance office administrative records for June, 1978 in Brown
County and for December 1978 in St. Joseph County; in both cases,
these represent the end of the fourth program year.
2 "Elderly" refers to all household heads age 62 or over
3 As a percent of the whole population
As a percent of the eligible population
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Table 4.3
PROPORTION MEETING EARMARK, BY RACE
% meeting earmark Total
1 Native 2 meeting3
Age White Black Hispanic American earmark
Pittsburgh
18-54 138 50.0% 40 38.5% 2 33.37 0 - % 180 46.6%
55-59 6 33.3 2 50.0 0 - 0 - 8 36.4
60-64 11 55.0 2 50.0 0 - 0 - 13 54.2
65-69 14 38.9 2 22.2 0 - 0 - 16 34.8
70-74 12 40.0 0 - 0 - 0 - 12 15.3
75 and 15 42.9 0 - 0 - 0 - 15 35.7
over
Total 196 47.2 46 35.1 2 25.0 0 - 244 44.0
Phoenix
18-54 117 57.1 8 36.4 46 42.6 11 64.7 184 52.0
55-59 7 53.8 2 100.0 1 25.0 0 - 10 52.6
60-64 7 46.7 0 - 0 - 0 - 7 36.8
65-69 12 57.1 0 - 1 16.7 0 - 13 41.9
70-74 18 62.1 0 - 1 25.0 0 - 19 54.3
75 and 15 48.4 0 - 1 33.3 0 - 16 45.7
over
Total 176 56.1 10 32.3 50 39.1 11 61.1 249 50.5
1. There were only eight Hispanics in Pittsburgh in treatment groups with an earmarking requirement.
2. There were no native Americans in Pittsburgh in any treatment group with an earmarking requirement.
3. "Other" category is omitted from this table, but not from calculations of total meeting earmark.
Source: Baseline Survey, Hades and Central Files.
H0*'
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Table 4.4
PROPORTION OF PARTICIPANTS RELATED TO THE LANDLORD
WHO DID AND DID NOT MEET THE EARMARKING REQUIREMENT
Proportion
related to
landlord of
those who met
earmarking
requirement
# T,
Proportion
related to
landlord of Total number
those who in group
did not meet with earmark
requirement requirement
# % #
Both cities combined
23
1
1
0
1
2
6.3%
5.6
5.0
3.3
6.5
28 5.7
38
0
2
2
2
2
10.2%
9.1
4.3
5.3
4.3
46 8.4
736
41
42
76
68
77
1040
Source: Baseline Survey, Hades and Central Files.
Age
18-54
55-59
60-64
65-69
70-74
75 and
over
Total
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Table 4.5
LOCATION OF LANDLORD'S RESIDENCE AT BASELINE
FOR PARTICIPANTS WITH AN EARMARKING REQUIREMENT FOR
THOSE WHO MET THE EARMARKING REQUIREMENT AFTER TWO YEARS
Met the earmark
Pittsburgh
Same building
Same neighborhood
Same area, locality
Outside area
Group of owners
Total
20
60
105
22
0
52.6%
46.5
50.7
38.6
207 47.8
Phoenix
Same building
Same neighborhood
Same area, locality
Outside area
Group of owners
Total
27 73.0
54 52.4
86 51.8
24 52.2
3 75.0
194 55.3
Source: Baseline Survey, and Hades and Central Files.
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Table 4.6
PROPORTION MEETING EARMARK, BY NUMBER OF
RELATIVES LIVING IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD AT TWO YEARS
No relatives Relatives in Total meeting
Age in neighborhood neighborhood earmark
Pittsburgh
18-54
55-59
60-64
65-69
70-74
75 and
over
81
2
7
9
3
4
53.6%
33.3
53.8
34.6
30.0
20.0
86
6
6
5
9
6
49.7%
46.1
60.0
35.7
56.3
58.3
167
8
13
14
12
10
51.57-
42.1
56.5
35.0
46.2
33.3
106 46.9 118 50.0
118
6
3
4
9
7
59.0
46.2
60.0
30.8
64.3
46.7
147 56.5
41
2
3
6
7
9
54.7
100.0
33.3
66.7
50.0
69.2
68 55.7
224 48.5
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8
6
10
16
16
57.8
53.3
42.9
45.5
57.1
57.1
215 56.3
Source: Third Periodic Survey.
Total
Phoenix
18-54
55-59
60-64
65-69
70-74
75 and
over
Total
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Social ties clearly had mixed effects on participation, and at some
points in the process of moving through the program social networks en-
hanced participation, such as for those who lived near their landlords
and near relatives, and at others reduced participation, such as for
minorities and those who were related to the landlord. The process is
visualized as in Figure 4.1:
Figure 4.1: How resources affected participation in EHAP
Early Stages Late Stages
Low assets Enhanced Participation Inhibited Participation
High assets Inhibited Participation Enhanced Participation
The social system can either obstruct or facilitate participation.
Households may be either unwilling to move away from people who help
them, or anxious to leave prying or even criminal neighbors. Another
kind of social factor is discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity
or sex, where social factors, in this case, membership in a particular
racial, ethnic or gender group, affects housing quality and even availa-
bility. Housing might be bad because the family is living in a ghetto
neighborhood, and cannot find better housing because landlords in neigh-
borhoods where the housing stock meets the program's standards do not
rent to minorities, or to welfare families, or to single-parent families
with children, or to single women because "women can't shovel the side-
walks when it snows, and my tenants all have to shovel their own side-
walks" (personal communication to author, 1978).
It is partly a question of who wanted to get an allowance, most vi-
sible in the application and enrollment stages (Figure 4.2, Stages 1-4),
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and partly a question of who could find the personal and financial re-
sources to help meet the requirements, as revealed when repairing and/or
moving (Figure 4.2, Stages 5-7, discussed in Chapter 5).
This model has two aspects, "need" and and "ability." Not all need
is the same; ability to qualify also differs among families, and is not
always positively correlated with need. All families in the demand expe-
riment "needed" the program, since the H.U.D. guidelines declared them
eligible. But within that eligible category some families were economi-
cally better off than others; some families had low monetary incomes but
high nonmonetary assets and did not try to qualify for the payment.
For example, in Jacksonville, Florida, one of the cities of the ad-
ministrative agency experiment, housing market segregation and an old,
severely substandard low-income housing stock meant that most enrolled
black families never qualified for a payment (20 percent of those who
had planned to move and 42 percent of those who had planned to stay)
while a higher proportion of enrolled white families did qualify (48
percent of those who had planned to move, and 63 percent of those who
had planned to stay) (from folfe and Hamilton, 1977, pp. iii). Although
by objective measures the blacks were more needy, this program, as imple-
mented, could not serve them because they could not meet the require-
ments when they wanted to move in a difficult housing market. In Jack-
sonville, the major obstacle was the requirement to live in standard
housing. Housing good enough to meet the quality standards of the pro-
gram was not available to low income blacks in the segregated, low qua-
lity Jacksonville housing market.
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4.1.1 Iho Are the High- and Low-Resource Elderly?
The elderly with low economic assets tend to be single, members of
minority groups, over the age of 75, and female; elderly with high mone-
tary assets tend to be married or living in families, white, under the
age of 75, and living in a household headed by a male (called "joint-
headed households" by Ahrentzen, 1982). Social assets are distributed
differently. People over the age of 75 seem to have particularly low in-
comes and sparse social networks, although the networks they have seem
to be more salient to their lives (Lawton, 1977).
These factors interact in a quite complicated way, but the main out-
lines of the argument are that some groups categorically are more likely
to have fewer monetary resources (women, minorities, and the very old)
and there is considerable overlap with those who have few nonmonetary
resources (single-person households, most of whom are women living
alone), and the very old, most of whom are also women. But, the availa-
bility of resources interacted in a complicated way with the offer of
the allowance.
Previous chapters have shown that the components of asset packages
are both monetatry and nonmonetary; one can be high on both monetary and
nonmonetary resources, low on both, or have a mixture (high monetary,
low nonmonetary, or high nonmonetary, low monetary). Elderly with high
monetary and nonmonetary resources receive adequate economic and perso-
nal assistance from the market, the state, and the social support struc-
ture. The aged with high monetary but low nonmonetary resources, or
vice versa, can fall short of living at an adequate level, despite what
can, if taken out of context, be considered adequate resources. It is
the combination of resources, not necessarily any one component in the
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resource package, that determined the adequacy of this support system to
the needs of the elderly.
High rent burdens acted as an incentive to participating families,
especially the aged, to meet the requirements of the program and receive
a payment. Table 4.7 shows that a much higher proportion of households
that eventually qualified for a housing allowance payment (see Introduc-
tion for explanation of experimental design) had rent burdens over 35
percent, than did households who never did qualify for a housing allow-
ance subsidy. Among those age 75 and over, three out of four who re-
ceived a payment had had a rent burden of over 35 percent, compared to
less than half of those of the same age who never did qualify for the
housing allowance payment. Conversely, only 4 percent of that age group
had had a rent burden of less than 25 percent and still received a pay-
ment, while nearly a fourth of those who did not qualify for a housing
allowance had had a rent burden of less than 25 percent. The presence
of a high rent burden clearly was an incentive for the participating
household to make an effort to meet the requirements of the program and
qualify for a payment, either because those with lower incomes qualified
for higher payments, and higher payments were associated with higher par-
ticipation, or because those with lower incomes needed the financial
assistance more and would do more to qualify for it.
High housing cost seemed to present less of an obstacle to qualify-
ing for the housing allowances than living in bad housing. Living in
bad quality housing seemed to spur somewhat less activity toward qualify-
ing for a payment than did the problem of high housing cost, although
the outcomes for families who lived in bad housing were somewhat ambigu-
ous. It is harder to to fix up bad housing, or move to new housing,
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than it is to accept a check to help pay for that housing. People whose
major housing problem was cost, and who lived in relatively good hous-
ing, were more likely to qualify for a payment than people who were
living in bad housing before the program started.
Table 4.8 shows that about a third (in Pittsburgh) and less than 40
percent (in Phoenix) of the households of all ages living in the worst
housing (which failed all three measures of housing standardness) eventu-
ally qualified for a housing allowance payment, compared to nearly half
of the households paying more than a third of their incomes who even-
tually met the program's requirements and received an allowance subsidy
(Table 4.7).
Bad housing, as measured in the demand experiment, did not seem to
be as important to the participating families as their high rent burden,
or may be more difficult to correct. Perhaps families in the worst
housing felt it least worth their while to try to qualify, since they
would have to do the most to qualify; they had to either repair their
present units, pay a higher rent, or move to a new home. There is also
a question of the role of race and poverty; racial minorities and the
lowest income households had the hardest time qualifying for a payment
of all families. This could be because of widespread discrimination
among the landlords, but the record of complaints of being discriminated
against on the basis of race or income does not indicate that this was a
widespread problem (Cite).
Table 4.7
RENT BURDEN AT ENROLLMENT OF THOSE WHO EVENTUALLY MET EARMARK, BOTH SITES COMBINED
Age* Less then .25 .25-.35 over .35 Total
# % # % # % # 7
18-54 74 23.2% 104 32.6% 141 44.2% 319 100.0%
55-59 3 17.6 4 23.5 10 58.8 17 100.0
60-64 0 - 5 29.4 12 70.6 17 100.0
65-69 1 3.8 8 30.8 17 65.4 26 100.0
70-74 4 14.3 7 25.0 17 60.7 28 100.0
75 and over 1 3.8 6 23.1 19 73.1 26
Total 83 19.2 134 30.9 216 49.9 433 100.0
RENT BURDEN AT ENROLLMENT OF THOSE WHO DID NOT MEET EARMARK, BOTH SITES COMBINED
18-54 104 31.1% 103 30.8% 127 38.0% 334 100.0%
55-59 5 23.8 4 19.0 12 57.0 21 100.0
60-64 5 25.0 6 30.0 9 45.0 20 100.0
65-69 5 12.5 12 30.0 23 57.5 40 100.0
70-74 5 13.9 11 30.6 20 55.5 36 100.0
75 and over 10 23.3 13 30.2 20 46.5 43
Total 134 27.1 149 30.2 211 42.7 494 100.0
Source: Hades and Central Files
*
at enrollment
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Table 4.8
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE HOUSING QUALITY AT BASELINE
AND WHETHER HOUSEHOLD MET EARMARK
Total number
with earmark Search No move
Met Earmark requirement Moved no move or search
# % #% # %" # %#%
Pittsburgh
Pass low, medium,
high 142 50.7% 280 100% 52 59.8% 21 38.2% 68 50.4%
Pass low, medium,
fail high 30 50.8 59 100 18 66.7 7 36.8 5 38.5
Pass low, fail
medium, high 43 47.3 91 100 6 54.5 1 45.8 4 33.3
Fail low, medium,
high 11 29.7 37 100 6 54.5 1 8.3 4 28.6
Total 226 48.4 467 100 101 59.4 40 36.4 84 45.9
Phoenix
Pass low, medium
high 144 60.3 239 100 102 69.9 7 46.7 35 44.9
Pass low, medium
fil high 25 51.0 49 100 19 65.5 3 42.9 3 23.1
Pass low, fail
medium, high 34 57.6 59 100 28 70.0 2 25.0 4 36.4
Fail low, medium
high 16 38.1 42 100 12 46.2 0 - 4 33.3
Total 219 56.3 389 100 161 66.8 12 35.3 46 40.4
Source: Hades and Central Files
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4.1.2 The question of assets
Rainwater (1981) discusses the near-impossibility of judging pover-
ty on the basis of current income, and gives estimates of the permanence
of the poverty status of the elderly. He found that although most fami-
lies move in and out of poverty, according to current economic and fami-
lial conditions, the elderly tend to be "stuck" in poverty to a much
greater extent than other poor people.
Did the elderly have assets that could blunt the impact of their
high housing costs, or were they living on current income alone? Most
elderly renters in the demand experiment had almost no cash assets and
very little in the way of non-cash assets (Table 4.9) that they could
use to help pay housing costs. The major asset of many elderly is their
home, but that asset is non-income producing unless it is sold or some
kind of reverse annuity mortgage is arranged (cite Ballinger book, "Un-
locking home equity of the aged).
In the demand experiment, asset amounts were translated into an in-
come stream, so this variable is an estimate of income from assets, not
the amount of the asset itself. The "income from assets" refers to sa-
vings accounts, bonds, and stocks, as well as income imputed from cash
on hand and life insurance policies. The majority of participants in
both Pittsburgh and Phoenix had no income at all from assets (Table
4.9).
The elderly did have higher income from assets than did younger fa-
milies, but there is no evidence that elderly households with high rent
burdens had especially high asset incomes. Table 4.9 shows that, in
Pittsburgh, of those whose rent burden at enrollment was less than 25
percent, three-fourths of all participants, but about a third of the
Table 4.9
ASSET INCOME BY RENT BURDEN, AT ENROLLMENT
(IN PERCENTS)
Under 25% 25%-35% Over 35%
Less than More than Less than More than Less than More than Total
Age None $100/year $100/year None $100/year $100/year None $100/year $100/year Number
Pittsburgh
18-54 81.1% 11.8% 7.2% 93.8% 4.3% 1.6% 94.4% 3.9% 1.7% 1093
55-59 80.0 12.6 8.0 78.3 17.4 4.3 81.3 15.6 3.1 80
60-64 57.1 7.1 35.7 62.5 12.5 25.1 76.5 17.6 5.8 64
65-69 34.6 26.9 38.7 52.5 20.0 29.5 60.0 21.5 18.5 131
70-74 47.4 26.3 26.4 43.3 40.0 16.7 45.6 22.8 31.6 106
75 and 33.3 38.9 27.9 46.2 34.6 19.2 44.8 24.1 31.0 102
over
Total 74.7 14.1 11.3 81.8 10.9 7.3 80.7 10.4 8.9 1576
Phoenix
18-54 87.0 9.3 3.7 88.2 7.4 4.4 90.1 6.4 3.7 1253
55-59 66.7 33.3 - 77.8 11.1 11.1 86.4 4.5 9.1 40
60-64 77.8 22.2 - 66.7 6.7 26.7 76.3 10.5 13.2 62
65-69 78.6 21.4 - 56.5 17.4 26.0 75.0 11.5 13.5 89
70-74 66.7 11.1 22.2 60.9 8.7 30.3 53.5 18.6 27.9 75
75 and 58.3 25.0 16.7 30.0 25.0 45.0 56.0 18.0 26.0 82
over
Total 85.3 10.6 4.2 82.3 8.7 9.0 81.8 9.0 9.2 1601
Source: Hades and Central Files.
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aged and nearly half of those age 70 to 74, had no asset income at all;
About 45 percent paid over 35 percent of income for shelter without any
asset income at all. In Pittsburgh, a slightly higher proportion of
those paying more than 35 percent of income for housing had more than
$100 a year of income from assets (31 percent) than those paying under
25 percent (28 percent) among those over the age of 70. In Phoenix,
only those over the age of 70 were likely in any case to have income
from assets of more than $100 annually, except among those over age 60
and paying between 25 and 35 percent of income for rent.
Households with income from assets were more likely to qualify for
a payment than were those without asset income (Table 4.10). The pro-
portion of those who qualified for a payment and had income from assets
was, for all age categories over 65, higher than the proportion of all
people of those ages who received a housing allowance payment. The ef-
fect was most clear for those having asset income of over $100 annually.
There is thus some indication that assets play a role in helping fami-
lies meet the requirement, but the way that they operate is still un-
known. About half of the participants of all ages and asset levels met
the program's requirements and received a payment, and the proportion of
households with no asset income who qualified for a payment was almost
identical to the site average (43 percent in Pittsburgh, 49 percent in
Phoenix, compared to site averages of 44 percent in Pittsburgh and 51
percent in Phoenix). There were noticeable differences among the el-
derly, although the numbers are too small to draw firm conclusions.
Is it likely that the low-income elderly were under-reporting their
incomes, and really had higher incomes from assets than the operating
forms revealed? Radner (1982) studied errors in the ways that families
Table 4.10
PROPORTION MEETING EARMARKING REQUIREMENT BY ASSET INCOME AT ENROLLMENT
Total meeting
Age None Under $100 $100-$499 Over $500 earmark
Pittsburgh
18-54 165 46.1% 9 50.0% 4 66.7% 0 - % 178 46.4%
55-59 5 33.3 3 50.0 0 - 0 - 8 36.4
60-64 11 55.5 2 100.0 0 - 0 - 13 54.2
65-69 7 26.9 3 30.0 4 57.1 2 66.7 16 34.8
70-74 2 12.5 5 41.7 4 100.0 1 50.0 12 35.8
75 and 6 26.1 3 33.3 4 57.1 2 100.0 15 36.6
over
Total 196 42.8 25 43.9 16 61.5 5 50.0 242 43.9
Phoenix
18-54 165 51.9 13 56.5 4 50.0 1 50.0 183 52.1
55-59 7 50.0 2 50.0 1 100.0 0 - 10 52.6
60-64 4 26.7 1 50.0 1 100.0 1 100.0 7 36.8
65-69 6 30.0 6 75.0 0 - 1 100.0 13 41.9
70-74 13 52.0 2 50.0 3 60.0 1 100.0 19 54.3
75 and 5 33.3 3 33.3 6 100.0 2 40.0 16 45.7
over
Total 200 49.1 27 54.0 15 65.2 6 60.0 248 50.6
Source: Hades and Central Files.
1--
177
in 1972 reported their income to survey researchers, and found that fami-
lies whose heads are over age 65 are more likely than any other age
group to underestimate their total income. The income of these fami-
lies, according to tax records and other means of verification, was
about 42 percent higher than had been reported to interviewers conduct-
ing the Current Population Survey (CPS). However, the under-reporting
was most serious among the highest income groups; the lowest income
elderly, most dependent on fixed incomes from Social Security and pen-
sions (see Chapter 3 of dissertation), were least likely to under-report
their incomes; the elderly with incomes in the lowest ten percent of the
income distribution under-reported income by two percent, compared to
the elderly in the top decile who under-reported income by 68 percent
(Radner, 1982: p. 17).
The kind of income most likely to be left out when reporting to the
CPS was income from "property," defined as interest, dividends, rent,
royalties, and estates and trusts. This evidence reveals that while it
is possible that the asset (property) income of the elderly was under-
reported to interviewers in EHAP, the fact that this under-reporting
was, according to another researcher, most serious among the highest in-
come elderly suggests that this was probably not a source of serious
bias in the data of the housing allowance experiment, since the eligible
population was, by definition, low income.
4.1.3 The Stages of Participation
A housing allowance was paid to families only after completing seve-
ral steps (in some treatment groups in Pittsburgh and Phoenix not consi-
dered in this report, only Step 4 was necessary, and a payment automati-
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cally was made). In ten of the twelve cities (the supply experiment and
the administrative agency experiment, See Introduction) families first
had to hear about the program (Step 1), apply for it (Step 2), be certi-
fied as eligible (Step 3), and enroll (Step 4).
In Pittsburgh and Phoenix, the cities of the demand experiment, the
process begins with Step 4; families were offered enrollment over the te-
lephone, and had to accept or reject the offer of enrollment (Step 4).
Once enrolled in the program, families had to prove that their housing
met an earmarking requirement set by H.U.D. (see Introduction). Meeting
this requirement could, but did not have to, entail three intermediate
stages. If current housing did not qualify, families either had to ar-
range a move to a new home (Steps 5 and 6) or have their current home
meet the earmarking requirement, either a minimum rent or a minimum stan-
dard (Step 7). If the housing allowance agency judged that their cur-
rent housing met these requirements, there was nothing more to do but
begin sending housing allowance checks (Step 8). If families did not
actively try to qualify for the allowance they could still receive it,
providing their homes already met the program's requirements. If their
home did not meet the test, and they did not meet the earmarking require-
ment, they could not receive the allowance payment.
Figure 4.2 shows these eight steps. Not every family had to go
through every step in sequence. For example, a family was not required
to search or move, but could have their pre-program housing inspected
and, if it passed the inspection or met the minimum rent condition, qua-
lify for the payment in their own home.
Figure 4.2 also reveals five distinct points where people could
leave the program. thile some of these ways of exiting are voluntary,
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some are not. People could fail to hear about EHAP (Exit 1), could
choose not to apply (Exit 2), choose not to enroll (Exit 4), and search,
move and repair, or search and not move, or just repair, and still fail
to meet the standards set by the program (Exit 5).
"Participation" in this report means the willingness or capacity of
families enrolled in the demand experiment to go through these rather de-
manding steps, meet the requirements and receive a housing allowance pay-
ment. Section 4.2 looks at the social networks of the elderly in the
demand experiment, to set the stage for the analysis in Section 4.3 and
Chapter 5.
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Figure 4.2:
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
Step 4
Step 5
Step 6
Step 7
Step 8
Demand Experiment Supply and Administrative Agency
Experiments
t 1
Exit 2
s no -Exit 3
) Exit 4
yes
(Receive EHAP payment)
Exit 5
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4.2 Context
This section focusses on the social networks of the elderly before
and during the housing allowance experiment. Four indicators of these
networks are investigated: demographics, particularly marital status,
sex and race; length of tenure; relatives in the neighborhood; and kin-
ship and proximity aspects of the relationship with the landlord. Sec-
tion 4.3 examines the effect of these four indicators of social ties on
meeting the requirements of the program. Chapter 5 examines intermedi-
ate Steps 5, 6, and 7, to see what role social networks play in search-
ing, moving, and repairing.
4.2.1 Marital Status
Before the rise of the old age economic support system described in
Chapter 2 of the dissertation, the only method of survival for the elder-
ly was through the assistance provided on an individual basis by fami-
lies or communities to their aged relatives or neighbors. Old women and
aged minorities, especially blacks, have historically been more likely
than have old (white) men to live in a household in which they are not
the head, that is, with other family members, such as children or sib-
lings. These families combine, what is often called "doubling up," for
survival. But Chapter 3 showed us that one of the biggest changes over
the past few decades is a tremendous increase in elderly people living
alone.
These individuals are perceived to be particularly at risk, and to
have an especially sparse network of nonmonetary resources. Single peo-
ple have more need of help from outside the home, since there is no one
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else inside the home to provide that help. It is therefore somewhat sur-
prising that singles did not have significantly more kin in their neigh-
borhood. But, this indicator of higher need may mean that they will
turn to the housing allowance or other programs to pick up the slack.
There is something fundamental missing from their survival package, rela-
tives living nearby. They make up for that lack by being more willing
to go after a public subsidy like housing allowances.
In the demand experiment, most elderly households were single per-
son households (Tables 4.11 and 4.12). Whereas half the non-elderly
households in both cities had, at enrollment, three or four people,
about 70 percent of households headed by people over the age of 75 (at
enrollment) had only one person.
In Pittsburgh, a slightly higher proportion of all households were
single person households, 16.3 percent compared to 12.2 percent in Phoe-
nix (Table 4.11). Within the elderly population, the proportion living
as single individuals increases with age. In Pittsburgh families headed
by people 75 and over were more likely to be single-person households
than were families headed by individuals between the ages of 70 and 74
(70.3 percent of the 75 and over, and 63.7 percent of those ages 70 to
74) but in Phoenix there were less likely (69.1 percent of those 75 and
over, and 76.7 percent of those between 70 and 74). In both cities,
about two-thirds of those age 65 and over lived alone, but more than 70
percent of those in Pittsburgh age 75 and over, and over three-fourths
of those in Phoenix between 70 and 74, lived alone (Table 4.11).
Table 4.11
HOUSEHOLD SIZE, BY AGE, AT ENROLLMENT
Three and Five
Age One Person* Two People Four People and over Total
Pittsburgh
18-54 1 0.1% 264 21.8% 616 50 .9% 330 27.2% 1211 100.0%
55-59 3 3.5 50 58.8 26 30.6 6 7.1 85 100.0
60-64 34 47.9 21 2Q.6 12 16.9 4 5.6 71 100.0
65-69 96 64.0 40 26.7 11 7.3 3 2.0 150 100.0
70-74 72 63.7 34 30.1 5 4.4 2 1.8 113 100.0
75 and 78 70.3 33 29.7 0 - 0 - 111 100.0
over
Total 284 16.3 442 25.2 670 38.5 345 19.8 1741 100.0
Phoenix
18-54 2 0.1 370 25.9 665 46.6 390 27.3 1427 100.0
55-59 2 4.3 22 47.8 17 37.0 5 10.9 46 100.0
60-64 24 34.3 22 31.4 20 28.6 4 5.8 70 100.0
65-69 63 62.4 26 25.7 9 8.9 3 3.0 101 100.0
70-74 66 76.7 15 17.4 5 5.8 0 - 86 100.0
75 and 65 69.1 26 27.7 1 1.1 2 2.1 94 100.0
over
Total 222 12.2 481 26.4 717 39.3 404 22.2 1824 100.0
*One person households were not eligible unless they were handicapped or age 62 or over.
Source: Hades and Central Files.
H-a)
W~A
Table 4.12
HOUSEHOLD SIZE, BY AGE, AT TWO YEARS
Three and Five
Age One Person* Two People Four People and over Total
# % # 7 # # % #%
Pittsburgh
18-54 26 2.6% 195 19.3% 502 49.8% 286 28.3% 1009 100.0%
55-59 11 15.1 32 43.8 24 32.9 6 8.2 73 100.0
60-64 31 51.7 21 35.0 7 11.7 1 1.7 60 100.0
65-69 82 66.1 32 25.8 6 4.8 4 3.2 124 100.0
70-74 58 61.7 32 34.0 2 2.1 2 2.2 94 100.0
75 and 57 74.0 17 22.1 1 1.3 2 2.6 77 100.0
over
Total 265 18.4 329 22.9 542 37.7 301 20.9 1437 100.0
Phoenix
18-54 22 2.4 183 19.8 439 47.6 278 30.1 922 100.0
55-59 5 13.9 15 41.7 11 30.6 5 13.9 36 100.0
60-64 22 40.0 19 34.5 11 20.0 3 5.4 55 100.0
65-69 53 67.1 17 21.5 6 7.6 3 3.8 79 100.0
70-74 46 76.7 12 20.0 2 3.3 0 - 60 100.0
75 and 50 72.5 16 23.2 0 - 3 4.3 69 100.0
over
Total 198 16.2 262 21.5 469 38.4 292 23.9 1221 100.0
*One person households were not eligible unless handicapped or age 62 or over.
Source: Hades and Central Files.
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4.2.2 Sex of Single Person Household
The marital status of the elderly is one of the biggest differences
found within that population, and produces some of the most glaring in-
equities within this group (Figure 3.1). The elderly who are married
have access to social and physical assistance as well as to economic re-
sources, from a spouse that is simply, by definition, unavailable to el-
derly singles. Compounding this situation of one person having half the
resources of two, is the fact that most elderly singles are women (see
Table 4.13 who have lower lifetime earnings and therefore lower pension
and Social Security income. Since most elderly men are married, the
question of sex disparities is prominent in discussions of elderly well-
being.
Most of those single-person elderly-headed households were women,
although the overall proportion of female households was higher in Pitts-
burgh (52.7 percent) than in Phoenix (35.6 percent). Table 4.13 shows
that 85.3 percent of the one-person households aged 60 to 64 were women,
78.1 percent of those 65 to 69, 70.8 percent of those 70 to 74, and 75.6
percent of those age 75 and over. In Phoenix, however, a constant pro-
portion, about two-thirds, of single person households were headed by
women, with the exception of those age 75 and over, which is 72.3 per-
cent female.
Table 4.14 shows that, at enrollment in the program, most of the
single-person households were females; this was most true for households
whose head was age 75 or over. A higher proportion of these households
in Pittsburgh than in Phoenix were women (76 percent and 66.4 percent
respectively). Among the old-old, 75.6 in Pittsburgh and 71.2 percent
in Phoenix were women living alone.
Table 4.13
PROPORTION OF HOUSEHOLDS HEADED BY FEMALES,
BY SIZE OF HOUSEHOLD, AT ENROLLMENT
One Two Three or Five or Seven or
Age person people four six more Total#~~ % . T-## 7 #~
Pittsburgh
18-54 0 - % 181 68.6% 291 47.2% 111 46.2% 38 42.2% 621 51.3%
55-59 2 66.7 29 58.0 10 38.5 2 50.0 0 - 43 50.6
60-64 29 85.3 2 9.5 6 50.0 1 25.0 0 - 38 53.5
65-69 75 78.1 9 22.5 2 18.2 1 33.3 0 - 87 58.0
70-74 51 70.8 8 23.5 4 80.0 0 - 0 - 63 55.8
75 and 59 75.6 6 18.2 0 - 0 - 0 - 65 58.6
over
Total 216 76.1 235 53.2 313 46.7 115 45.6 38 40.9 917 52.7
Phoenix
18-54 1 50.0 162 43.8 192 28.9 67 26.1 36 27.1 458 32.1
55-59 0 - 11 50.0 7 41.2 1 100.0 0 - 19 41.3
60-64 15 62.5 2 9.1 6 30.0 1 50.0 0 - 24 34.3
65-69 44 69.8 4 15.4 2 22.2 0 - 0 - 50 49.5
70-74 42 63.6 2 13.3 2 40.0 0 - 0 - 46 53.5
75 and 47 72.3 5 19.2 0 - 0 - 0 - 52 55.3
over
Total 149 67.1 186 38.7 209 29.1 69 26.1 36 25.7 649 35.6
Source: Hades and Central Files
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Table 4.14
SEX OF HEAD OF SINGLE-PERSON
HOUSEHOLD, AT ENROLLMENT
Age Male Female Total
Pittsburgh
18-54
55-59
60-64
65-69
70-74
75 and
over
1
1
6
21
22
19
50.0%
33.3
17.1
21.0
29.7
24.4
1
2
29
79
52
59
50.0%
66.7
82.9
79.0
70,3
75.6
2
3
35
100
74
78
100.0%
222 76.0
1 50.0
0 -
15 62.5
44 68.8
43
47
63.2
71.2
150 66.4
292 100.0
2 100.0
2
24
64
68
66
226 100.0
Source: Hades and Central Files
70 24.0Total
Phoenix
18-54
55-59
60-64
65-69
70-74
75 and
over
1
2
9
20
25
19
50.0
100.0
37.5
31.3
36.8
28.8
Total 76 33.6
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4.2.3 Length of Tenure
Within cities, the elderly were, at the baseline survey, living in
their current residences for the longest period of time, and the oldest
were there longest of all (long-term residents are defined as those who
have lived in one place or ten years or more; recent residents have been
in their homes for five years or less, after Hollister, et. al., 1978).
The big difference is between the two cities, and between the old-old
and the young-old. Pittsburgh, an older northeastern city, has longer-
term residents, and Phoenix, the new and growing Sunbelt city, has resi-
dents who have been in their homes for a much shorter time. Table 4.15
shows that although 76 percent of young families in Pittsburgh and 94
percent in Phoenix were living in their present units for less than five
years at baseline, only a third of those over the age of 70 in Pitts-
burgh and about two-thirds in Phoenix were living in their current units
for that short a period of time. Conversely, in Pittsburgh a quarter,
and about 10 percent in Phoenix, of households whose head is over 70
were living in their residences for more than ten years.
The elderly have the lowest mobility rates of any age group (see
Chapter 5 and Wiesbrod, et. al., 1982). The reasons for the low mobili-
ty of the elderly has never been satisfactorily explained, but can
include such factors as familiarity with their areas, difficulty of
moving (both physical and financial), attachment to place (reason un-
specified), intertia, and poor health. Although neighborhoods can
change for the worse, many older people do not wish to leave, or cannot
find the monetary or nonmonetary resources to help them leave, their
long-term neighborhoods despite profound changes in neighborhood social
composition (Ginsberg, 1973; Myers, 1982).
Table 4.15
YEARS LIVING AT PRESENT RESIDENCE, AT BASELINE
Age Under 5 years 5-10 years 10-20 years Over 20 years Total
#% #F % # T # % #
Pittsburgh
18-54 1,927 76.3% 368 14.6% 188 7.4% 41 1.5% 2,524 100.0%
55-59 83 38.4 62 28.7 45 20.8 26 12.0 216 100.0
60-64 112 43.8 60 23.4 58 22.7 26 10.1 256 100.0
65-69 155 29.5 89 22.7 98 25.0 50 12.8 392 100.0
70-74 127 32.6 86 22.1 109 28.0 67 17.2 389 100.0
75 and 167 33.9 125 25.4 120 24.4 80 16.2 492 100.0
over
Total 2,571 60.2 790 18.5 618 14.5 290 6.8 4,269 100.0
Phoenix
18-54 2,862 93.8 145 4.8 37 1.2 7 0.3 3,051 100.0
55-59 73 62.4 28 23.9 14 12.0 2 1.8 117 100.0
60-64 125 74.4 31 18.5 9 5.4 3 1.8 168 100.0
65-69 129 66.8 34 17.6 24 12.4 6 3.1 193 100.0
70-74 132 65.3 50 24.8 18 8.q 2 1.0 202 100.0
75 and 180 60.8 65 22.0 39 13.2 12 4.1 296 100.0
over
Total 3,501 86.9 353 8.8 141 3.5 32 0.8 4,027 100.0
Source: Baseline Survey, Hades and Central Files
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People with long tenure in an area tend to have more social ties in
that area (Bott, 1957), especially if they are relatively homogeneous,
or if there is a system of ongoing mutual assistance. Two conditions
are identified in the literature under which proximity becomes a factor
in friendship. The first is perceived homogeneity, and the second is a
need for mutual aid (Michelson, 1973). Although neighborhoods can of
course change profoundly, many elderly people still feel ties to their
physical neighborhoods despite significant changes in the social environ-
ment (Myers, 1982).
Even though the differences between the cities are large, the pat-
tern of residential mobility within age categories is quite stable. In
Pittsburgh, forty percent of those over age 75, and nearly 80 percent of
those between 70 and 75, were living in their units for over ten years.
4.2.3.1 Did longer tenure mean lower rent burden?
The model of resource packaging predicts that families with low mo-
netary resources would try to compensate by developing or encouraging
either monetary or nonmonetary resources, and would combine these into a
survival package. One question of interest is the relationship between
rent burden (the proportion of total household budget devoted to hous-
ing), mobility, and age. If the resource packaging theory is correct,
households with meager resource packages, such as those whose head is
age 75 or over would be more likely than the young-old to try to qualify
for a housing allowance, since they needed to augment their survival
package with the assistance that that subsidy would provide. However,
the data results are counter-intuitive.
Contrary to what has been found in other studies, although the old-
191
old have been living in their homes for a very long time, they do not,
as a consequence, have lower rent burdens than do shorter-term resi-
dents. Rents may be less than market rate among long-term residents,
although we have no evidence of this, but incomes are so low that the
budget share allocated to shelter is still very high. The fact that
rents of long-term residents tend to be low does not in any way affect
their incomes, which, for the very old, are also low. One way in which
the elderly may be considered "stuck" in their present homes, and one
reason that they were so anxious to receive a housing allowance payment,
may be because many of them do not have the lower rent burdens thought
to be associated with longer tenure.
The demand experiment evidence shows that longer tenure is associa-
ted with lower rent burden primarily for young families (Tables 4.16,
4.17, and 4.18). For the old-old, living in a home for longer than ten
years does not mean they are paying a smaller proportion of their in-
comes for rent, although the long-term renter discount has been found
both in the demand experiment as a whole, and in the supply experiment.
Rent burden must be distinguished from absolute level of rent, which is
discounted with longer tenure (Barnett, 1979; Noland, 1980; Phillips,
1982).
If rent burdens are so high in long-term units, moving can only in-
crease the burden. The most appropriate strategy to maximize total re-
sources is to remain in a long-term residence and collect the housing
allowance subsidy there. That is, in fact, the way that most of the el-
derly families eventually qualified for a payment, by remaining in their
pre-program housing (Table 5.1), although financial factors are by no
means the only influences on the preference of the elderly not to move
Table 4.16
PROPORTION PAYING LESS THAN 25% OF INCOME FOR RENT,
AT ENROLLMENT, BY LENGTH OF TENURE AND AGE
Less than Five to Ten to Over Total
Age five years ten years twenty years twenty years number
# % % #% #7% #T
Pittsburgh
18-54 280 32.2% 58 40.3% 37 52.Q% 5 50.0% 380 34.8%
55-59 12 31.6 8 32.0 3 21.4 2 66.7 25 31.3
60-64 3 9.4 3 30.0 5 35.7 3 37.5 14 21.9
65-69 17 27.9 4 11.4 5 17.9 0 -- 26 19.8
70-74 7 14.9 3 15.8 5 18.5 4 30.8 19 17.9
75 and 8 15.4 5 17.9 5 29.4 0 -- 18 17.6
over
Total 327 29.8 81 31.0 60 35.3 14 30.4 482 30.6
Phoenix
18-54 435 37.1 36 57.1 11 84.6 3 75.0 485 38.7
55-59 3 13.0 4 40.0 2 28.6 0 -- 9 22.5
60-64 6 12.2 2 18.2 0 -- 1 100.0 9 14.5
65-69 6 9.8 4 26.7 3 27.3 1 50.0 14 15.7
70-74 7 13.7 1 5.3 1 20.0 0 -- 9 12.0
75 and 3 6.3 4 21.1 4 33.3 1 33.3 12 14.6
over
Total 460 32.7 51 37.2 21 42.9 6 60.0 538 33.6
Source: Central and Hades files
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Table 4.17
PROPORTION PAYING BETWEEN 25% AND 35% OF INCOME FOR RENT,
AT ENROLLMENT, BY LENGTH OF TENURE AND AGE
Less than Five to Ten to Over Total
Age five years ten years twenty years twenty years number
Pittsburgh
18-54 236 27.2% 46 31.9% 19 27.1% 4 40.0% 305 27.9%
55-59 10 26.3 7 28.0 5 35.7 1 33.3 23 28.7
60-64 10 31.3 1 10.0 3 21.4 2 25.0 16 25.0
65-69 14 23.0 18 51.4 6 21.4 2 28.6 40 30.5
70-74 16 34.0 3 15.8 8 29.6 3 23.1 30 28.3
75 and 13 25.0 6 21.4 6 35.3 1 20.0 26 25.5
over
Total 299 27.2 81 31.0 47 27.6 13 28.3 440 27.9
Phoenix
18-54 386 32.9 18 28.6 1 7.7 1 25.0 406 32.4
55-59 6 26.1 2 20.0 1 14.3 0 -- 9 22.5
60-64 11 22.4 4 36.4 0 -- 0 -- 15 24.2
65-69 13 21.3 4 26.7 6 54.5 0 -- 23 25.8
70-74 17 33.3 6 31.6 0 -- 0 -- 23 30.7
75 and 10 20.8 6 31.6 4 33.3 0 -- 20 24.4
over
Total 443 31.5 40 29.2 12 24.5 1 10.0 496 31.0
Source: Central and Hades files
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Table 4.18
PROPORTION PAYING MORE THAN 35%
OF INCOME FOR RENT, AT ENROLLMENT, BY LENGTH OF TENURE AND AGE
Less than Five to Ten to Over Total
Age five years ten years twenty years twenty years number
# % #
Pittsburgh
18-54 353 40.6% 40 27.8% 14 20.0% 1 10.0% 408 37.3%
55-59 16 42.1 10 40.0 6 42.9 0 - 32 40.0
60-64 19 59.4 6 60.0 6 42.9 3 37.5 34 53.1
65-69 30 49.2 13 37.1 17 60.7 5 71.4 65 49.6
70-74 24 51.1 13 68.4 14 51.9 6 46.2 57 53.8
75 and 31 59.6 17 60.7 6 35.3 4 80.0 58 56.9
over
Total 473 43.0 99 37.9 63 37.1 19 41.3 654 41.5
Phoenix
18-54 352 30.0 9 14.3 1 7.7 0 - 362 28.9
55-59 14 60.9 4 40.0 4 57.1 0 - 22 55.0
60-64 32 65.3 5 45.5 1 100.0 0 - 38 61.3
65-69 42 68.9 7 46.7 2 18.2 1 50.0 52 58.4
70-74 27 52..9 12 63.2 4 80.0 0 - 43 57.3
75 and 35 72.9 9 47.4 4 33.3 2 66.7 50 61.0
over
Total 502 35.7 46 33.6 16 32.7 3 30.0 567 35.4
Source: Central and Hades files
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(see Chapter 5).
As in many of the tables, the small numbers in each cell make pro-
portions difficult to interpret, but the trends are relatively clear.
The last column of those tables, labeled "Total number," gives us, for
example, the proportion of all participants paying, in Table 4.16, less
than 25 percent 'of income for housing. We can compare the figures in
that line with the breakdown by length of tenure at enrollment, and find
that, in Pittsburgh, there is a slight tendency for more households li-
ving in their home for more than ten years to be paying a low fraction
of income for housing, than of the sample as a whole. In Phoenix, the
picture is clearer; living in a unit for longer than five years seems to
produce some benefit in terms of reduced rent burden. A third of all
participants in Phoenix, but 42 percent of those living in a unit be-
tween ten and twenty years and 60 percent of those living there for more
than twenty years, were paying less than a quarter of gross income for
shelter (Table 4.16).
It is mostly the older, poorer people with high rent burdens who
have been living in their units for the longest period of time. Eighty
percent of those over the age of 75 and living in their unit for more
than 20 years were paying over 35 percent of income for shelter, com-
pared to 57 percent of all participants of that age paying that propor-
tion of income for housing. Table 4.18 shows that, although for young
families longer tenure does mean a lower rent burden, within the elderly
population this is only true for the young-old (between 60 and 64) in
Pittsburgh and those 60-69 and the 75 and over in Phoenix. Among the
old-old, a higher proportion of those paying more than 35 percent of in-
come for housing had been long term residents (over 20 years) than for
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the sample as a whole. The instability of the small sample sizes may ex-
plain the anomalous results for those between 65 and 69, and 75 and over
in Pittsburgh, and those between 70 and 74 in Phoenix.
4.2.4 Relatives in the Neighborhood
Families in the housing allowance experiment avoided reducing their
total resource package. An important component of that package was the
help available from friends and relatives in their neighborhoods. Evi-
dence of maintenance, or even increase, of social support systems should
be sought. The evidence from the demand experiment indicates that so-
cial ties were, in fact, maintained or increased, except among the very
old and among minorities. The very old compensated for gradual loss of
social ties with the housing allowance subsidy, but minorities could not
easily find substitutes for the allowance.
Families with heads over the age of 75 were less likely in both
Pittsburgh and Phoenix to have relatives living in their neighborhood af-
ter two years than were younger elderly households (last column of Table
4.19). Although about three-fourths of the young-old in Pittsburgh, and
over 80 percent in Phoenix still had relatives in their neighborhoods
after two years in the program, in each case a smaller proportion of the
elderly over the age of 75 (62.9 percent in Pittsburgh, 73.1 percent in
Phoenix) could maintain these social supports for the whole experimental
period (Table 4.19). These proportions are substantial, and indicate
quite clearly that this aspect of the nonmonetary support system was
maintained during the course of the experiment, but to a lesser degree
for the old-old. Comparing the two cities, Table 4.19 shows that fami-
lies in Pittsburgh were more likely than in Phoenix both to have rela-
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Table 4.19
CHANGE IN THE PROPORTION OF PARTICIPANTS
HAVING ANY RELATIVES LIVING IN THE SAME NEIGHBORHOOD,
OVER THE TWO YEAR PERIOD, BY AGE
Total proportion
Relatives absent Relatives present with relatives
at baseline, and at baseline, and in neighborhood
Age present at 2 years present at 2 years at two years
Pittsburgh
18-54 155 30.6% 377 72.5% 532 51.9%
55-59 10 25.6 30 85.7 40 54.1
60-64 9 22.0 13 76.5 22 37.q
65-69 22 30.1 38 74.5 60 48.4
70-74 12 23.1 31 77.5 43 46.7
75 and 12 27.9 22 62.9 34 43.6
over
Total 220 29.2 511 73.2 731 50.5
Phoenix
18-54 131 20.4 152 49.2 283 29.8
55-59 3 11.1 4 40.0 7 18.9
60-64 7 18.9 16 80.0 23 40.4
65-69 8 15.4 21 80.8 29 37.2
70-74 9 25.0 20 87.2 29 49.2
75 and 9 21.4 19 73.1 28 41.2
over
Total 167 20.0 232 56.0 399 31.9
Source: Baseline and Third Periodic Surveys, Hades and Central Files
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tives in the neighborhood at baseline (47.7 percent in Pittsburgh and
31.8 percent in Phoenix, according to Table 4.20), and also to acquire
relatives in the neighborhood over the course of the experiment; 30 per-
cent of families who had no relatives present at baseline did have some
there after two years, compared to 20 percent in Phoenix. This could oc-
cur through a move either by the participant or by their relative(s).
While the young-old were maintaining their familial neighborhood
networks, the old-old were losing them, through either death or resi-
dential mobility. Or, the old-old with fewer relatives in the area were
more likely to stay in the area than were those with more relatives in
their neighborhoods; perhaps they did not have assistance to move (see
Chapter 5). As a group, elderly families in Pittsburgh were less likely
to have relatives in their neighborhoods after two years than were youn-
ger families; over half of all families between 18 and 54 had relatives
in their neighborhood at the end of two years, compared to 37.9 percent
of familes 60-64, 48.4 percent of families 65-69, and 43.6 percent of
families over 75. But, in Phoenix, the elderly were more likely than
nonelderly families to have relatives present in the area; 29.8 percent
of familes headed by someone between 18 and 54, but 37.2 percent of
65-69, 49.2 percent of 70-74, and 41.2 percent of 75 and over, had
relative in the neighborhood at the end of two years.
Table 4.20 shows that, in Pittsburgh, a higher proportion of cou-
ples than of singles had relatives in their neighborhood at baseline
(50.8 percent compared to 38.8 percent), but in Phoenix the opposite is
true. A major difference is found among those over age 75. In Pitts-
burgh, 52 percent of couples but 44.2 percent of singles age 75 or over
have relatives living in their area, compared to 34.8 percent of singles
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Table 4.20
PROPORTION OF HOUSEHOLDS HAVING ANY
RELATIVES IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD, AT BASELINE,
BY MARITAL STATUS AND AGE
Total
Age Single person Couples (all family types)
~~~# %# % #1 %
Pittsburgh
18-54 0 0.0% 279 52.7% 607 50.2%
55-59 1 33.3 11 39.3 40 47.1
60-64 11 31.4 6 27.3 22 31.0
65-69 37 37.0 12 38.7 58 38.7
70-74 30 40.5 14 58.3 53 46.9
75 and
over 34 44.2 13 52.0 50 45.5
Total 113 38.8 335 50.8 830 47.7
Phoenix
18-54 1 50.0 258 30.9 444 31.2
55-59 2 100.0 4 22.2 12 26.1
60-64 9 37.5 10 43.5 27 38.6
65-69 21 32.8 8 32.0 34 33.7
70-74 21 30.9 5 45.5 29 33.7
75 and
over 23 34.8 5 25.0 34 36.2
Total 77 34.1 290 31.1 580 31.8
Sources: Baseline Survey, and Hades and Central Files
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and only a fourth of couples in Phoenix.
4.2.5 Sex of Head
There was very little difference in Pittsburgh in the presence of
relatives in the neighborhood between families with male (that is,
joint) heads, and female heads, but female headed households were more
likely than were joint headed households to live near relatives. Table
4.21 shows that, in Pittsburgh, couples were slightly more likely than
female-headed households (48.5 percent and 47.0 percent) to have rela-
tives in their neighborhoods. Young-old women, aged 65 to 69, were also
more likely than men to live near relatives (42.5 percent and 33.3 per-
cent respectively) but there was virtually no difference for households
aged 70 and over. But in Phoenix, females, and especially the very old,
seemed much more likely to be living in a neighborhood with relatives
nearby (48.1 percent of those age 75 and over) than did male elderly
households (21.4 percent in that age category).
4.2.6 Race
To further examine the notion that those with the lowest economic
resources depend most heavily on human resources we examine evidence
from the housing allowance experiment with regard to race. Throughout
the three experiments, blacks and minorities enrolled in the program in
higher than average numbers, but received payments at lower than average
rates (see Section 4.3.8.3).
In the demand experiment, a higher proportion of blacks and hispa-
nics than of white families lived in neighborhoods where they had re-
latives, and this is especially true for the elderly (Table 4.22). In
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Table 4.21
PROPORTION OF MALE AND FEMALE HEADED HOUSEHOLDS
HAVING ANY RELATIVES LIVING IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD, AT BASELINE
Age Male Female Total
Pittsburgh
18-54 308 52.2% 299 48.2% 607 50.2%
55-59 16 38.1 24 55.8 40 47.1
60-64 10 30.3 12 31.6 22 31.0
65-69 21 33.3 37 42.5 58 38.7
70-74 23 46.0 30 47.6 53 46.9
75 and 22 47.8 28 43.8 50 45.5
over
Total 400 48.5 430 47.0 830 47.7
Phoenix
18-54 306 31.6 138 30.1 444 31.2
55-59 9 33.3 3 15.8 12 26.1
60-64 18 39.1 9 37.5 27 38.6
65-69 13 25.5 21 42.0 34 33.7
70-74 13 32.5 16 34.8 29 33.7
75 and 9 21.4 25 48.1 34 36.2
over
Total 368 31.4 212 32.7 580 31.8
Sources: Baseline Survey, Hades and Central Files
Table 4.22
PROPORTION WITH RELATIVES IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD,,BY RACE, AT BASELINE
Total with
Native relatives in
Age White Black Hispanic American neighborhood
.
# 1 1 T -T
Pittsburgh
18-54 443 49.9% 157 50.5% 7 58.3% 0 - % 607 50.2%
55-59 27 43.5 13 59.1 0 - 0 - 40 47.1
60-64 18 31.6 4 30.8 0 - 0 - 22 31.0
65-69 44 35.8 13 52.0 1 50.0 0 - 58 38.7
70-74 43 46.2 9 50.0 1 50.0 0 - 53 46.9
75 and 40 41.7 10 71.4 0 - 0 - 50 45.5
over
Total 615 46.7 206 51.1 9 50.0 0 - 830 47.7
Phoenix
18-54 247 27.2 42 42.0 143 39.7 12 24.5 444 31.2
55-59 5 17.9 3 42.9 4 36.4 0 - 12 26.1
60-64 20 37.7 1 20.0 6 50.0 0 - 27 38.6
65-69 19 27.5 7 50.0 7 41.2 0 - 34 33.7
70-74 22 31.4 2 33.3 5 62.5 0 - 29 33.7
75 and 29 34.5 0 - 5 83.3 0 - 34 36.2
over
Total 342 28.2 55 40.4 170 41.1 12 24.5 580 31.8
Source: Baseline Survey, Hades and Central Files.
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Pittsburgh, about 42 percent of whites over age 75 had relatives in the
neighborhood, compared to 71 percent of blacks of the same age. In Phoe-
nix, one third of whites, but over 83 percent of hispanics, lived in
neighborhoods with relatives. This is probably related to the racial
segregation commonly found in the American cities (Atkinson, et. al.,
1977).
A lower proportion of young-old than of either young families or
old-old families had relatives in their neighborhoods at baseline. The
last column of Table 4.22 shows that, in Pittsburgh, about half of young
families had relatives in their neighborhood, about a third of those
ages 60 to 70, but about 45 percent of those over age 70. The same
pattern is found in Phoenix. The young-old have higher incomes and
better health, and thus are less dependent on the presence of relatives
to survive. The relatives become important later in life.
One problem in the analysis of elderly racial minorities is that
there were so few of them in the experiment. Blacks, hispanics, and Na-
tive Americans have shorter life expectancies than do white people, and
consequently there were not as many of these minorities among the elder-
ly as there were among the younger age groups.
4.2.7 Did having relatives in the neighborhood mean that families had
lower rent burdens?
The idea that people package their resources is bolstered by the
evidence from the demand experiment regarding rent burdens and having
family in the neighborhood; families with high rent burdens lived near
their relatives in order to tap the nonmonetary sources of assistance
those kinfolk offered. Poor people can afford to pay more for housing
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if they have relatives around to help them in ways that do not require
monetary payment. Perhaps people were willing to pay more to live near
their relatives. Or maybe people who tend to live near relatives are
poorer than people who do not. Many of those who had relatives in the
area were also minorities, who generally had lower incomes and higher
rent burdens, making it difficult to separate the issue of having
relatives in the area from income and housing cost issues.
Tables 4.23 and 4.24 reveal that households with kin living nearby
were paying higher proportions of their incomes for rent than were fa-
milies without kin nearby; this is more true for those age 75 and over,
and less so for the young. These factors are associated with race; mi-
norities are both more likely to live near their kin and to have lower
incomes than the white participants. These people with higher rent bur-
dens need the help families can offer; they are also more tied to a
place and would be less likely to move for any reason.
4.2.8 Relationship with the Landlord
The personal relationship between tenant and landlord is very impor-
tant; tenants often receive below-market rents from their relatives,
since kinship, not profit, is presumably the major motivating force in
the landlord-tenant relationship.
4.2.8.1 Kinship
One group with high social resources is those who live in housing
owned by a relative. Households who are related to their landlords can
be said to have high social resources, or at least high social ties in
their neighborhoods. The theory of resource packaging predicts that
Table 4.23
RENT BURDEN OF FAMILIES WITH RELATIVES IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD, AT ENROLLMENT
Under 25% 25-35% Over 35% Total
Pittsburgh
18-54
55-59
60-64
65-69
70-74
75 and
over
Total
Phoenix
18-54
55-59
60-64
65-69
70-74
75 and
over
Total
204 37.7%
10
5
11
7
6
27.8
26.3
22.9
14.6
13.3
243 33.0
166 42.5
4
3
4
3
36.4
15.0
12.9
11.5
3 11.1
183 36.2
145 26.8%
9 25.0
4 21.1
12 25.0
16
10
192 35.5%
17 47.2
10 52.6
25
2533.3
22.2
196 26.6
113 28.Q
2 18.2
7 35.0
7 22.6
6 23.1
6 22.2
141 27.9
52.1
52.1
29 64.4
298 40.4
112 28.6
5 45.5
10 50.0
20 64.5
17 65.4
18 66.7
182 36.0
541 100.0%
36 100.0
19 100.0
48 100.0
48 100.0
45 100.0
737 100.0
391 100.0
11 100.0
20 100.0
31 100.0
26 100.0
27 100.0
506 100.0
Source: Hades and Central Files.
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Table 4.24
RENT BURDEN OF FAMILIES WITHOUT RELATIVES IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD, AT ENROLLMENT
Age Under .25 .25-.35 over .35 Total
% # % #
Pittsburgh
18-54 176 31.9% 160 29.0% 215 39.0% 551 100.0%
55-59 15 34.1 14 31.8 15 34.1 44 100.0
60-64 9 20.0 12 26.7 24 53.3 45 100.0
65-69 15 18.1 28 33.7 40 48.2 83 100.0
70-74 12 20.7 14 24.1 32 55.2 58 100.0
75 and 12 21.4 16 28.6 28 50.0 56 100.0
over
Total 239 28.6 244 29.2 354 42.3 837 100.0
Phoenix
18-54 318 37.0 292 34.0 250 29.1 860 100.0
55-59 5 17.2 7 24.1 17 58.6 29 100.0
60-64 6 14.3 8 10.0 28 66.7 42 100.0
65-69 10 17.2 16 27.6 32 55.2 58 100.0
70-74 6 12.2 17 34.7 26 53.1 40 100.0
75 and 9 16.4 14 25.5 32 58.2 55 100.0
over
Total 354 32.4 354 32.4 385 35.2 1093 100.0
Source: Hades and Central Files
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this relationship would not often be relinquished, since losing it would
mean a decrease in the total resource package available to these low-
income households. For the elderly, kinship with landlord indicates
that the landlord has some personal interest in their welfare and
behavior, and might indicate potentially higher levels of assistance
with daily chores or special. needs than would be available if the
landlord were not a kinsman.
Being related to the landlord is presumably a desirable condition,
and would be an example of a special case of the income packaging hypo-
thesis. The resource packaging hypothesis predicts that this social tie
was not given up by the low income families in the housing allowance ex-
periment; moving away from a home where the landlord was a relative
could mean a substantial decrease in the nonmonetary resources available
to the elderly household. If anything, we would expect that more elder-
ly households would be related to their landlords at the end of the expe-
riment than at the beginning.
The model is confirmed in Phoenix but not in Pittsburgh. In Phoe-
nix, more participants were related to their landlords at the end of the
experiment than at the beginning, but the opposite was true in Pitts-
burgh. In Pittsburgh, at baseline, elderly households were less likely
than were young families to be related to their landlords. Table 4.25
shows that at baseline, 9.9 percent of young families in Pittsburgh, and
6.1 percent in Phoenix, were related to their landlords. However, among
the over 75 age group, the proportions related to their landlords were
reversed; 6.9 percent in Pittsburgh, but 9.6 percent in Phoenix. Elder-
ly headed households in Pittsburgh under the age of 75 were less likely
(except for the 65-69 year olds, for whom there was no change) to be
Table 4.25
PROPORTION OF PARTICIPANTS RELATED TO THEIR LANDLORD,
AT BASELINE AND AFTER TWO YEARS
Total Total still Percent with*
Households active after reduced rent due
Age At baseline Interviewed At 2 years two years to being related at:
# % # baseline 2 years
Pittsburgh
18-54 249 9.9% 2,515 83 8.7% 957 40.5% 31.3%
55-59 17 7.9 216 2 2.8 72 35.5 50.0
60-64 20 7.8 255 2 3.4 58 60.0 0
65-69 29 7.5 389 9 7.5 120 41.4 50.0
70-74 23 6.0 386 2 2.2 89 60.9 50.0
75 and 34 6.9 491 7 9.1 77 47.1 14.3
over
Total 372 8.7 4,252 105 7.6 1,373 43.2 31.7
Phoenix
18-54 183 6.1 3,019 63 8.3 758 35.2 40.3
55-59 4 3.4 116 0 - 33 50.0 -
60-64 8 4.8 167 5 9.6 52 75.0 40.0
65-69 16 8.3 193 6 7.8 77 37.5 100.0
70-74 12 6.1 198 4 6.9 58 58.3 75.0
75 and 28 9.6 293 9 13.8 65 53.6 55.6
over
Total 251 6.3 3,986 87 8.3 1,043 40.2 47.7
Source: Baseline and Third Periodic Surveys.
*Refers to proportion of those who were related to their landlords.
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related to their landlords after two years than at baseline, but in Phoe-
nix were more likely to be related to their landlord, again with the ex-
ception of those 65-69.
Table 4.26 shows that the kinship relationship between landlord and
tenant was so important that 100 percent of those aged 70 and over in
both cities, and 100 percent of those over 60 -- all of the elderly-- in
Phoenix who were related to their landlord at baseline were still
related to them at the end of two years. Not one household in Phoenix,
and very few in Pittsburgh (3 out of 10) of the elderly who stayed in
the experiment for the full two years and were kin to the landlord
before the program started, gave that relationship up.
Table 4.26 also shows that very few families managed to move across
the boundary, from not being related to being related to the landlord.
This seems to be a condition that is hard to achieve (only about 3 per-
cent of the families in either city managed to find housing owned by a
relative); once achieved, it is almost never relinquished.
4.2.8.2 Did Being Related to the Landlord Translate into Lower Rents?
Were the monetary resources of the elderly augmented by this kin-
ship relationship? According to self-reports (the question was, do you
have reduced rent because you are related to the landlord?) after two
years about a third of those in Pittsburgh, and nearly half in Phoenix,
thought that they had translated the kinship relationship with the land-
lord into lower rent (last columns of Table 4.25).
At both baseline and two years, a smaller proportion of those over
75 and related to the landlord than at baseline thought that they were
paying a lower rent than they otherwise would pay. Even though more of
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Table 4.26
PROPORTION OF PARTICIPANTS RELATED TO THEIR LANDLORD AT BASELINE,
AND STILL RELATED TO THEIR LANDLORD AT THE END OF TWO YEARS
Proportion related Total number active
at two years at two years
Age (in percents) (in integers)
Pittsburgh
Related at baseline
18-54
55-59
60-64
65-69
70-74
75 and over
Total
Not related at baseline
18-54
55-59
60-64
65-69
70-74
75 and over
Total
Phoenix
Related at baseline
18-54
55-59
60-64
65-69
70-74
75 and over
Total
Not related at baseline
18-54
55-59
60-64
65-69
70-74
75 and over
Total
67.1%
66.7
50.0
75.0
100.0
100.0
69.1
3.4
0
1.8
2.7
1.1
2.8
2.9
70.0
100 .0
100.0
100.0
100.0
78.6
4.0
0
0
2.7
1.8
0
3.2
76
3
2
8
1
4
94
878
69
56
112
88
72
1275
50
0
4
4
3
9
70
705
33
47
73
55
56
969
Source: Baseline and Third Periodic Surveys
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the old-old than the young-old were related to their landlord at both
baseline and after two years, they were the least likely of all age
groups to think that they had translated that kinship relationship into
a rent reduction, even though a relatively high proportion of the elder-
ly under the age of 75 thought they had done so.
Table 4.27 shows that there were only minor differences among the
races in being related to the landlord, but again, the small sample
sizes prohibit firm conclusions. Hispanics in Phoenix seem to be more
likely to be related to their landlord than are members of other racial
or ethnic groups.
4.2.8.3 Proximity to landlord's residence
The location of a landlord's residence with respect to her tenants
can be an indicator of the type of social ties found in a neighborhood.
At one extreme is the much denigrated absentee landlord, blamed for
every housing and neighborhood ill from abandonment to arson to blight
and flight. At the other extreme is the little old landlady who washes
the front stoop every day and, while resting her elbows on a soft cush-
ion on the windowsill, peers with binoculars at every passerby. Without
placing a value judgement on either stereotype, it seems reasonable that
a landlord who lives in the same building as her tenants creates an at-
mosphere somewhat more conducive to developing a personal relationship
with those tenants than a landlord who lives far away, or is even not an
individual but a group of investors.
The closer the landlord lives to the tenant, the more alike they
are likely to be in terms of social class and race, due to the residen-
tial class and racial segregation commonly found in American cities.
Table 4.27
PROPORTION OF PARTICIPANTS RELATED TO THEIR LANDLORD AT ENROLLMENT,
BY RACE AND AGE
Native
Age White Black Hispanic American Total
% 7T T
Pittsburgh
18-54 72 8.2% 28 9.0% 1 8.3% 0 - % 101 8.4%
55-59 2 3.2 1 4.5 0 - 0 - 3 3.5
60-64 1 1.8 1 7.7 0 - 0 - 2 2.8
65-69 9 7.4 0 - 0 - 0 - 9 6.0
70-74 3 3.3 0 - 0 - 0 - 3 2.7
75 and 4 4.2 2 14.3 0 - 0 - 6 5.5
over
Total 91 6.9 32 7.9 1 5.6 0 - 124 7.2
Phoenix
18-54 46 5.1 6 6.1 30 8.3 2 4.1 84 5.9
55-59 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
60-64 4 7.7 0 - 2 16.7 0 - 6 8.7
65-69 3 4.3 2 14.3 1 5.9 0 - 6 5.9
70-74 3 4.3 0 - 0 - 0 - 3 3.5
75 and 8 9.5 1 25.0 3 50.0 0 - 12 12.8
over
Total 64 5.3 9 6.7 36 8.7 2 3.9 111 6.1
*Refers to proportion of all races who were
Source: Baseline Survey, Hades and Central
related to their
Files.
landlord at baseline.
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Higher degrees of homogeneity have been shown, as suggested above, to be
related to the presence of strong social ties (Michelson, 1973).
Table 4.28 shows that, at the baseline survey, the elderly were
more likely than the young to be living in the same building as their
landlords. The old-old were, in Pittsburgh, slightly more likely (22.1
percent) to have their landlord in the same building than those between
70 and 74 (20 percent) or those between 65 and 69 (16.3 percent). In
Phoenix, those over the age of 75 were only slightly less likely to have
this kind of living arrangement (18 percent, vs. 21.9 percent for the
70 to 74 age group).
4.3 How Did Social Ties Affect Each Stage of Participation?
How can we explore the role of social ties in the housing decisions
of the elderly in the housing allowance experiment? There is no easy
answer to this question. The rest of this chapter analyzes available
evidence for a role for personal communities at each stage in qualifying
for a housing allowance payment (Figure 4.2). Most of the hard data are
from the demand experiment; published data from both the supply and admi-
nistrative agency experiments are used whenever possible.
In the initial stages of participation (Steps 1-4), and in Step 6,
moving, the data of the demand experiment indicates that high social
ties tended to inhibit participation in the experiment, but in the other
stages (Step 5, and steps 7 and 8), people used their personal communi-
ties to facilitate meeting the program's earmarking requirements. (To
see which variables were used and how they were coded, see Appendix I.)
Table 4.28
LOCATION OF LANDLORD'S RESIDENCE FOR ALL PARTICIPANTS AT BASELINE
Same area,
Same outside
Age Same building neighborhood neighborhood Outside area Group Total
# % f #7 7F 7 T T #
Pittsburgh
18-54 222 9.4% 736 31.2% 1,093 46.3% 304 12.9% 6 0.3% 2,361 100.0%
55-59 17 8.3 63 30.9 97 47.5 27 13.2 0 - 204 100.0
60-64 38 15.8 72 30.0 102 42.5 28 11.7 0 - 240 100.0
65-69 60 16.3 103 28.1 162 44.1 42 11.4 0 - 367 100.0
70-74 73 20.0 98 26.8 161 44.1 33 9.0 0 - 365 100.0
75 and 101 22.1 138 30.1 178 38.9 40 8.7 1 0.2 458 100.0
over
Total 511 12.8 1,210 30.3 1,793 44.9 474 11.9 7 0.2 3,995 100.0
Phoenix
18-54 319 11.5 746 27.0 1,324 47.8 330 l1.q 48 1.7 2,767 100.0
55-59 8 7.2 28 25.2 52 46.8 22 19.8 1 0.9 111 100.0
60-64 22 14.1 45 28.8 69 44.2 18 11.5 2 1.3 156 100.0
65-69 34 19.1 56 31.5 62 34.8 21 11.8 5 2.8 178 100.0
70-74 41 21.9 67 35.8 48 25.7 27 14.4 4 2.1 187 100.0
75 and 49 18.0 78 28.7 101 37.1 37 13.6 7 2.6 272 100.0
over
Total 473 12.9 1,020 27.8 1,656 45.1 455 12.4 67 1.8 3,671 100.0
Source: Baseline Survey
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4.3.1 Step 1, Hearing About the Experiment
Word of mouth was the single most frequent source of information on
the experiment in the ten cities where the clients had to take the in-
itiative to join the program. According to MacMillan and Hamilton
(1977), in the administrative agency experiment 38 percent of the
eligible applicants first heard of the program through word of mouth
from family, friends, and other participants; 34 percent heard of the
program from all media sources (newspapers, television, radio, special
pamphlets and posters distributed by the housing allowance agencies).
Similarly, in South Bend, 31 percent of the applicants learned of the
program from a relative or friend (Wang, 1981), and in Green Bay,
percent ( ). The second most frequent source of informa-
tion was television (in South Bend, 11.7 percent, and in Green Bay,
percent). However, the elderly were a particularly hard group to reach
within the housing allowance experiment, in all three experiments and in
most sites, and "information cost is the most important barrier to parti-
cipation" (Ellickson, 1981: p.vii).
In the administrative agency experiment, special outreach efforts
were necessary to reach the elderly (MacMillan and Hamilton, 1977), but
once they applied they became recipients of the allowance in proportion
to their eligibility (Frieden 1980).
Most of those who did not hear about the supply experiment in the
first year were elderly singles and single parents (Ellickson, 1981).
Only 19% of elderly singles have friends and relatives, compared to 36%
of other eligibles (Ellickson, 1981), which makes it less likely that
there will be others who can tell them about the program.
Word of mouth communication plays a triple role in increasing par-
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ticipation: it enhances program awareness; it spurs people to obtain de-
tails so they can judge if the program is suitable for them; and pro-
vides the support required to transform the thought of applying into ac-
tion. "Inertia and administrative burden" may be obstacles to applying
(Ellickson, 1981).
4.3.2 Step 2, Application
The supply experiment found two groups of non-participants in the
first year of the experiment, the most needy and the least needy (Ellick-
son, 1981). The most needy lacked either information about the program,
or social support to "overcome negative attitudes toward government
aid." Elderly singles and single parents are likely to qualify for the
highest payments and spend the highest proportion of their incomes on
housing before joining the program. By the second year, the information
barrier had been overcome and single people were more likely than others
to participate in the program (Carter and Balch, 1981). It just took
them longer to hear about it. Their smaller social networks provided
fewer opportunities to hear about the program, but this disadvantage
decreased with time.
In the administrative agency experiment as well as the supply expe-
riment, lower application rates by the elderly were due both to less
awareness of the program and to greater reluctance to apply if they had
heard of it.
Social networks seem to play an important role in both informing
potential participants of the availability of the program, and in help-
ing people find out about how to qualify for it. If social networks are
missing, participants have fewer opportunities to hear about the pro-
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gram, since the largest single source of information on its availability
is word-of-mouth (section 4.3.1). For the isolated elderly, and those
without sufficient information on application and enrollment procedures,
information is a crucial link in being able to take advantage of pro-
grams for which they are eligible. If the information is not readily
available through routine contacts with the elderly, such as the socia-
ble contacts of families and friends, then special efforts should be
made both to ensure that the isolated elderly learn about programs and
to help them take whatever steps are necessary to become active in those
programs.
4.3.3 Step 3, Eligibility
The single were more likely to be eligible, but only among the
elderly (Table 4.2). Nonelderly single people were ineligible for the
program.
Minorities were also more likely than whites to be eligible for the
housing allowance experiment. The best estimates of eligibility come
from the supply experiment. Among owners in South Bend, 30.3 percent of
minority owners and 18 percent of white owners were eligible for the
program. Renters were even more likely to be eligible for the supply
experiment in South Bend: 52.5 percent of minorities, and 24.9 percent
of white renters in that city were eligible for the program.
Those who are low in social resources also tend to be low in mone-
tary resources, and most means-tested programs depend on financial
status to define eligibility. But there is great variation within the
elderly population with respect to their access to systems of social
networks; monetary resources alone do not represent the only measure of
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need.
Those with high social but low monetary resources can be considered
less needy in an absolute sense than those who are in about the same
economic category, but with few social ties. The indicators of eli-
gibility used in the experiment are not completely accurate measures of
need for this, or any other, program. Although it would be undesirable
to return to the days (described in Chapter 2) when children were, by
law, financially liable for their parent's care, in a time of economic
retrenchment such measures will undoubtedly be considered.
If families begin to be counted as assets, along with money in the
bank and stocks and bonds, the effect might well be to loosen the family
bonds, as children who are themselves going through economic scarcity
try to evade financial responsibility for their parent's care.
4.3.4 Step 4: Enrollment
The demand experiment measures the response of the eligible popula-
tion with full information and an offer of enrollment, eliminating ques-
tions of outreach, application and eligibility. This experiment did not
face the problem of reaching eligible poor households and enticing them
to apply, since they had identified the target population through
"screener" survey in the two cities. A "baseline" survey in Pittsburgh
and Phoenix determined which of the subsample of families eligible for
the experiment were selected. They were then telephoned and asked if
they would like to participate in the program. No application was neces-
sary; there was no question of providing information, outreach, decision
to apply, information about how to apply, overcoming reluctance to ap-
ply, determination of eligibility, or any other issue that affected en-
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rollment in the supply and administrative experiments (Wolfe, Hamilton
and Trend, 1977; Ellickson, 1981).
This feature of the program serves as a control for hearing about
the program. However, the demand experiment administrators did face the
problem of moving people through the program to recipient status. The
path of the elderly through the demand experiment begins with the offer
of enrollment.
Households could either accept or reject the offer of enrollment in
the demand experiment. The elderly rejected the offer of enrollment in
the housing allowance demand experiment at a much higher rate than did
younger families (Kennedy and MacMillan, 1980). Of households headed by
people over age 62, in Pittsburgh 61 percent, and in Phoenix 79 percent,
accepted the offer of enrollment, compared to 75 percent and 82 percent
respectively for those ages 30 to 61, and 81 percent and 86 percent for
households headed by persons under the age of 30. In Phoenix the propor-
tion accepting the offer to enroll did not substantially differ between
those over and under 62, but the elderly enrolled at a much lower rate
in Pittsburgh than in Phoenix. Rejecting the subsidy outright, without
even finding out what the program is about, is more a measure of willing-
ness to participate in a federal subsidy program, or a measure of per-
ceived need (the most needy were presumably the most likely to be will-
ing to join the program), than the result of a sophisticated calculation
of the expected net benefits of participation.
Kennedy and MacMillan (1980: p. 85) found that the main reason why
household heads aged 62 or over declined the offer of enrollment in the
program was, for the elderly, the "requirements, bother, paperwork," (53
percent in Pittsburgh, 56 percent in Phoenix); the second most frequent-
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ly mentioned reason was an objection to participating in a transfer pro-
gram (41 percent in Pittsburgh, 46 percent in Phoenix). Unspecified
"personal reasons" were cited by 28 percent of the elderly in Pitts-
burgh, and 33 percent in Phoenix. Health was not one of the- choices in
the question. Since today's elderly grew up in a world that was largely
privately financed, and the welfare stigma and reluctance to participate
in "government handouts" are very strong, the aged were less likely than
younger people with similar levels of need to want to participate in the
demand experiment. They did not want to bother either with the paper-
work involved in monthly reporting requirements, and many did not wish
to be involved in a transfer program. It is not possible with this data
to know what proportion of the elderly who objected to transfer programs
were receiving Social Security or other retirement benefits, but the
author suspects that most, if not the 90 percent found nationally to par-
ticipate in Social Security, were receiving such benefits.
However, rejecting the program before enrollment does not affect
the results with respect to meeting the requirements once in the pro-
gram. Analysis of participation is largely concerned with how well
people who wanted to receive housing allowances managed to qualify for
those payments.
Step 5, Searching, Step 6, Mobility, and Step 7, Repairs, form a sepa-
rate, coherent whole and are examined together in Chapter 5.
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4.3.5: Step 8, Qualifying For a Payment
Attention now turns to analysis of the final step in the program,
qualifying for a housing allowance payment. The goal of this section is
to disaggregate the enrolled population, to discover which segements of
the eligible population could take advantage of the offer of a housing
allowances, and which were not. As a group, in Pittsburgh the elderly
were slightly less likely, but in Phoenix were slightly more likely than
were people in younger age categories to qualify for a payment. Table
4.29 shows that, at the end of two years in Pittsburgh, 73 percent of
those age 65 or older, but 78.4 percent of young families (ages 18 to
54) in all treatment groups were active and receiving a full payment,
compared to only 58.8 percent of families headed by someone age 75 or
over active and receiving a full payment at that time. By contrast, in
Phoenix 55.2 percent of young families, but 68 percent of elderly
families (67.9 percent of those 75 and over) were active and receiving
full payments at the end of the data collection period. Taken as a
whole, families in Pittsburgh were more likely to be receiving a payment
after two years than were families in Phoenix (77.6 percent and 58.3
percent respectively). Can differences between the cities account for
the disparity in continued participation rates, or do the similarities
among all elderly, even in different cities, account for their similar
continued participation (73 percent in Pittsburgh, 68 percent in Phoe-
nix)? The rest of this chapter will explore some possible explanations
for these outcomes.
The beginning of this chapter laid out a proposed typology of how
the resources of the elderly interacted with the program to produce the
observed outcomes (Figure 4.1). At the beginning of the experiment, the
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Table 4.29
STATUS OF PARTICIPANTS IN THE EXPERIMENT,
BY AGE, AT THE END OF 'WO YEARS,
FOR ALL TREATMENT GROUPS COMBINED
Active, full
payment
Active, minimum
payment Terminated
Pittsburgh
18-54
55-59
60-64
65-69
70-74
75 and
over
Total
743
59
49
95
76
78.4
83.1
80.3
78.5
80.0
50 58.8
1072 77.6
47 5.0
1
1
3
1
1.4
1.6
2.5
1.1
3 3.5
56 4.1
158 16.7
11 15.5
11 18.0
23 19.0
18 18.9
32 37.6
948
71
61
121
95
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
85 100.0
253 18.3 1381 100.0
72
1
4
2
2
6.3
2.9
7.4
2.4
2.7
3 3.8
84 5.8
437
9
11
20
25
38.5
25.7
20.4
24.4
34.2
22 28.2
1136
35
54
82
73
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
78 100.0
524 35.9 1458 100.0
Source: Central and Hades files
Total
7
Phoenix
18-54
55-59
60-64
65-69
70-74
75 and
over
627
25
39
60
46
55.2
71.4
72.2
73.2
63.0
Total
53 67.9
850 58.3
223
elderly with high resources tend not to participate because there is not
enough incentive to draw them into the program, given all the steps they
know are required before a payment would be made. But for those who
find it worth their while to enroll, social factors can help (through
instrumental assistance) or inhibit (through such obstacles as racial
discrimination, extreme old age, or living in very low quality housing)
receiving an allowance payment.
Housing allowances were suitable for those elderly who met the
program's requirements in their current homes, but were not utilized by
those who had to move to meet that requirement. In general, families in
the worst housing were least likely to participate, an effect that re-
mained whether all enrollees were analyzed, or just the enrollees active
after two years (MacMillan & Kennedy, 1980). But, the elderly generally
lived in relatively good housing. In the supply experiment, the problem
was informing the elderly that the program existed, and overcoming their
reluctance to apply if they had heard (Ellickson, 1981).
The model outlined above suggests that aged women, minorities, and
single people, groups with low levels of resources, were very anxious to
qualify for the allowance to compensate for their low incomes. These
low-resource groups should therefore show high rates of participation in
the early stages of the experiment, especially at application and enroll-
ment. The data of the demand experiment, as well as historical data,
tends to confirm this prediction. However, even though they were very
anxious to participate, households in these groups had differential
rates of becoming recipients, largely because of different social fac-
tors, including social obstacles, encountered on the way from enrollment
in the program to receipt of an allowance. The major difference is that
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although women and single people could qualify for the payment in their
own homes, minorities generally would have to move to meet the program's
requirements. Because minorities lived in bad housing, and because peo-
ple in low quality housing had to leave it in order to qualify for a pay-
ment, and because moving is difficult when housing market discrimination
is pervasive, minorities who had to meet an earmarking requirement were
quite unlikely to qualify.
4.3.5.1 Marital Status; Household Composition
Those without the support of another person in the household were
more likely to accept the housing allowance as part of their survival
package, even though the single and married elderly were all eligible.
The single elderly lacked one element of a support network, another per-
son in the household, and so were more in need of the housing allowance
payment. The survival packages of elderly couples, most of whom were
headed by higher-income men, were less likely to need augmenting.
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show that single person households in both the
demand experiment and supply experiment were more likely to meet the re-
quirements of the program and qualify for a housing allowance payment
than were couples, especially among the oldest age categories. This
would confirm the idea that the most needy, with the sparsest resource
packages, such as single person households and people over the age of
75, would be more likely to take advantage of the offer of the housing
allowance subsidy. Of the households headed by people over the age of
75, in Pittsburgh 38.7 percent of singles, and only 14.3 percent of
couples, qualified for a payment; in Phoenix, the comparable proportions
were 54.2 percent and 37.5 percent (Table 4.1).l
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Table 4.2 shows the same pattern in the supply experiment. In
Green Bay, among renters, elderly singles were more likely to be eligi-
ble for the program (63 percent of renters, and 39 percent of owners)
than of elderly couples (54 percent of renters and 32 percent of own-
ers). Once certified eligible, single renters were much more likely to
enroll in the program (78 percent enrolled) than were eligible couples
(only 36 percent enrolled) and to eventually qualify for a payment (76
percent of single renters, but 33 percent of renter couples). In South
Bend, elderly single renters also were more likely to be eligible than
were elderly couples (among renters, 71 percent and 37 percent respec-
tively, and among owners, 62 percent and 30 percent); were more likely
to enroll (among renters, 50 percent of elderly singles and 26 percent
of couples, among owners, 39 percent and 27 percent respectively) and to
receive a payment (46 percent and 25 percent of renters, and 37 percent
and 25 percent of owners.
The big difference in participation between the married and the
single elderly in the supply experiment was not found in the proportion
that qualified after enrollment, but in the proportion who wished to en-
roll in the first place. A higher proportion of singles than of cou-
ples, and of renters than of owners, were eligible. Of these, more sin-
gles and renters enrolled than couples or owners. There was virtually
no difference in the proportions of these groups that qualified after
enrollment. This supports the idea that people with low resources were
more anxious to participate in the program at the early stages than are
people with higher levels of assets.
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4.3.5.2 Sex of Head of Household
The theory of resource packaging predicts that households who, gene-
rically, have fewer resources would be both more likely to qualify for
the housing allowance payment and would be less likely to give up any re-
sources they do have. Evidence from the demand experiment indicates
that this aspect of the theory is supported, with regard to female head-
ed households. Table 4.30 shows that households headed by women were
more likely than were joint-headed households to meet the conditions of
the housing allowance experiment and qualify for a housing allowance sub-
sidy. This sex-linked disparity is especially important among the house-
holds headed by people age 75 or over; in Pittsburgh, 46.4 percent of
the women, but only 14.3 percent of the couples, qualified for a pay-
ment. In Phoenix, the comparable proportions were 55 percent and 33.3
percent.
4.3.5.3 Race
Since there were really only a handful of aged blacks, hispanics,
or Native Americans in the treatment groups with earmarking requirements
(Table 4.3), conclusions are tentative. However, we can see that when
families were required to live in good housing in order to qualify for a
housing allowance subsidy, members of minority groups were much less
likely than were white families to qualify for the allowance payment.
In Pittsburgh, nearly half of the white households, but just over a
third of the black households, qualified for a housing allowance pay-
ment. In Phoenix, more than half (56.1 percent) of white families, and
just under two-fifths (39.1 percent) of the hispanic families, quali-
fied for payments. Although there were only eleven families of Native
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Table 4.30
PROPORTION OF FEMALE AND MALE-HEADED HOUSEHOLDS
THAT MET EARMARK BY SEX
Proportion
all households
Age Female Male that met earmark
# % #% %
Pittsburgh
18-54
55-59
60-64
65-69
70-74
75 and
over
121
4
6
14
8
13
49.8%
44.4
60.0
46.7
40.0
46.4
59
4
7
2
4
2
41.3%
30.8
50.0
12.5
28.6
14.3
180
8
13
16
12
15
46.6%
36.4
54.2
34.8
35.3
35.7
166 48.8
74
5
3
9
11
11
53.6
71.4
60.0
64.3
55.0
55.0
78 36.4
110
5
4
4
8
5
50.9
41.7
28.6
23.5
53.3
33.3
113 55.4 136 47.1
244 44.0
184
10
7
13
19
16
52.0
52.6
36.8
41.9
54.3
45.7
249 50.5
Source: Hades and Central Files
Total
Phoenix
18-54
55-59
60-64
65-69
70-74
75 and
over
Total
228
Americans in these treatment groups, and they were all young families,
over three-fifths (61.1 percent) of them did qualify for the housing al-
lowance payment.
The housing allowance program, as implemented in Pittsburgh and
Phoenix, was more congruent with the needs of white families than those
of minorities. The rules of the program in those cities negatively in-
fluenced the proportion of eligible minorities who qualified for the pay-
ment. Since the allowance depends on a private market solution to hous-
ing problems, the greatest beneficiaries are those for whom the private
market works best. Atkinson et. al. (1980) and Wolfe and Hamilton
(1977) show that race was an issue in the administrative agency experi-
ment as well as in the demand experiment; racial minorities needed more
help in the private housing market than the experiment offered them.
4.3.5.4 Length of Tenure
Length of tenure at baseline was inversely related to receiving a
housing allowance payment, for those families who had to live in housing
that was acceptable by HUD's criteria; the less time a family had lived
in a unit when they enrolled, the more likely they were to meet the
conditions of the experiment and receive a housing allowance subsidy.
Stated differently, this program met the needs of those with shorter
tenure better than those with longer tenure in a home. Elderly headed
households who had lived in their homes longer were less likely to meet
the program's requirements and receive a payment than were more recent
residents. Among the very old (over age 75), of those who met the
earmarking requirement, 28 percent (in Pittsburgh) and 6 percent (in
Phoenix) were living there for more than ten years. By contrast, 37 per-
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cent (in Pittsburgh) and 37 percent (in Phoenix) of those who did not
qualify for a payment were living in their baseline unit for more than
ten years.
Tables 4.31 and 4.32 show that for families who received a housing
allowance subsidy, 73 percent (in Pittsburgh) and 89 percent (in Phoe-
nix) were living in their homes for less than five years. But, of fami-
lies who did not qualify for a payment, 61 percent (in Pittsburgh) and
78 percent (in Phoenix) were living there for less than five years.
Of the families over the age of 75 who received a housing allowance
payment, 27 percent had been living there for over ten years, but 37 per-
cent of those who did not qualify for a payment had been long term resi-
dents. Forty percent of those who met the conditions of the experiment,
but 26 percent of all households still active at two years, had been li-
ving in a unit between five and ten years, in Pittsburgh. In Phoenix,
there was no difference.
4.3.5.5 Relatives in the Neighborhood
For participants of all ages in the housing allowance experiment
there was very little connection between having relatives in the neigh-
borhood and meeting the conditions of experiment, but for the elderly it
made a big difference. Family members provide important sources of
assistance to their elderly relatives, to help them qualify for the hous-
ing allowance payment. These family members provided the nonmonetary
resources that made the difference for their aged kin, and helped them
to augment their resource package (see Chapter 5). The elderly over the
age of 70 (in Pittsburgh) or 75 (in Phoenix) who had kin nearby at the
end of the experiment were much more likely to have met the housing
Table 4.31
PROPORTION OF HOUSEHOLDS WHO MET THE EARMARKING REQUIREMENT,
BY HOW LONG THEY WERE LIVING IN THEIR UNIT AT BASELINE
Total number
Less than Five to Ten to Over who met
Age five years ten years twenty years twenty years the earmark
Pittsburgh
18-54 147 81.7% 23 12.8% 8 4.4% 2 1.1% 180
55-59 3 37.5 3 37.5 2 25.0 0 - 8
60-64 6 46.2 3 23.1 3 23.1 1 7.7 13
65-69 10 62.5 2 12.5 3 18.8 1 6.3 16
70-74 6 50.0 2 16.7 2 16.7 2 16.7 12
75 and 5 33.3 6 40.0 4 26.7 0 - 15
over
Total 177 72.5 39 16.0 22 9.0 6 2.5 244
Phoenix
18-54 174 94.6 8 4.3 2 1.1 0 - 184
55-59 8 80.0 1 10.0 1 10.0 0 - 10
60-64 7 100.0 0 - 0 - 0 - 7
65-69 9 69.2 3 23.1 1 7.7 0 - 13
70-74 12 63.2 6 31.6 1 5.3 0 - 19
75 and 11 68.8 4 25.0 1 6.3 0 - 16
over
Total 221 88.8 22 8.8 6 2.4 0 - 249
Source: Baseline Survey, Central and Hades Files.
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Table 4.32
PROPORTION OF HOUSEHOLDS WHO DID NOT MEET THE EARMARKING REQUIREMENT,
BY HOW LONG THEY WERE LIVING IN THEIR UNIT AT BASELINE
Total number
Less than Five to Ten to Over who did not
Age five years ten years twenty years twenty years meet earmark
#% # % # % # 71 #
Pittsburgh
18-54 146 70.9% 41 19.9% 17 8.3% 2 1.0% 206
55-59 6 42.9 5 35.7 3 21.4 0 - 14
60-64 5 45.5 1 9.1 1 9.1 4 36.4 11
65-69 11 36.7 8 26.7 9 30.0 2 6.7 30
70-74 11 50.0 3 13.6 5 22.7 3 13.6 22
75 and 10 37.0 7 25.9 6 22.2 4 14.8 27
over
Total 189 61.0 65 21.0 41 13.2 15 4.8 310
Phoenix
18-54 154 90.6 11 6.5 3 1.8 2 1.2 170
55-59 4 44.4 2 22.2 3 33.3 0 - 9
60-64 8 66.7 3 25.0 0 - 1 8.3 12
65-69 10 55.6 3 16.7 4 22.2 1 5.6 18
70-74 10 62.5 4 25.0 2 12.5 0 - 16
75 and 5 26.3 7 36.8 6 31.6 1 5.3 19
over
Total 191 78.3 30 12.3 18 7.4 5 2.0 244
Source: Baseline Survey, Central and Hades Files.
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requirements than were people of those ages without family living in
their neighborhood. This is especially important because the old-old
tend to have fewer relatives nearby. What is probable is that people
age 75 or over who had family members living near them, could call on
those family members for help (see Chapter 5, Section 5.4). The pre-
sence in the neighborhood of members of their family made a difference
in their participation in the housing allowance experiment.
Table 4.6 shows that, in Pittsburgh, of those age 75 and over,
about a third of the households met the requirements; 20 percent of
those without relatives, compared to 58.3 percent of those with rela-
tives met the program's requirements and received a payment. In Phoe-
nix, the same pattern held; 46.7 percent of those without family, but
69.2 percent of those with family in the area, qualified for the housing
allowance payment, compared to 57.1 percent of all those age 75 and
over. The role families play, and how they make a difference, is
discussed in Chapter 5.
4.3.5.6 Relationship with the Landlord
Evidence from the author's unpublished field notes from the Jackson-
ville, Florida site of the administrative agency experiment supports the
notion that the nature of the relationship between landlord and tenant
was an important variable in whether families could meet the require-
ments set by HUD to qualify for the housing allowance payment.
The housing allowance program in Jacksonville was run twice. Du-
ring the first enrollment effort in 1973, although the program could
have made allowance payments to as many as 900 families, only 339 fami-
lies qualified for that payment. As a result, in 1974 HUD decided to
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re-open the enrollment process in that city to see, in the words of a
H.U.D. official, "how to make this program work in a difficult housing
market" (author's notes from 1/17/75 conference between Jacksonville
EHAP officials and HUD).
One of the major identified problems of the first enrollment effort
in Jacksonville was the failure of enrolled households, especially black
households, to meet the requirements of the program and receive the al-
lowance payment. The primary reason that they failed, according to Hols-
houser (1976), was that the largest organized group of landlords in the
city, the Property Management Association (PMA), had decided en masse
not to cooperate with the program. Enrollees had to take two major
steps in order to receive an allowance payment: their homes had to meet
the quality requirement by passing an inspection, and their landlords
had to sign a set of special rental provisions as part of a lease which
prohibited discrimination on the basis of race, and required that the
housing allowance agency be notified before a participant could be evic-
ted. The consequence of the PMA's mass refusal to sign these rental pro-
visions meant that no family in Jacksonville that wanted to live in hous-
ing owned or managed by this group, could receive the payment. (This is
the only city where the lease requirement was a major problem).
The brunt of this failure was borne by black participants, although
it also affected white families. In the first enrollment effort, 54
percent of white enrollees, but only 21 percent of black enrollees, qua-
lified for an allowance payment (Holshouser, 1976, p .2). This compares
with 77 percent of whites, and 53 percent of blacks in the administra-
tive agency experiment as a whole who qualified for a payment after en-
rolling (Temple, et. al., p. 135).
234
When HUD asked Jacksonville to reopen enrollment, the agency's
administrators used this second chance to improve relations with the
housing suppliers. During the first five months of the second enroll-
ment effort, one full-time employee was hired for the sole purpose of me-
diating between enrollees in the experiment and the property owners and
managers. Towards the end of the enrollment effort, when several hun-
dred enrollees were either looking for housing that met the quality stan-
dard, or trying to get their present landlords to agree to participate
in the program, a second full-time employee was added to the staff of
the agency, assigned only to helping with the landlords.
These two employees spent their time looking for standard housing
units, determining the ownership of those units, and then mailing bro-
chures to the owners or managers that offered a program to landlords to
"Help Keep Good Tenants." They then followed up with the landlords who
were encouraged to allow their present, good tenants who were eligible
to sign up for the program. If landlords agreed to sign the special
rental provisions, they were then asked if they would like to advertise
any apartment vacancies in the agency's headquarters for other families
in the program to see.
In addition, if any participating tenants had a problem with their
landlord, either before or after qualifying for a payment, these media-
tors would speak to the landlords and try to resolve the problem.
The other major aspect of the relationship with the landlord that
influenced participation in the program was the fear often expressed by
elderly tenants that if they enrolled in the program their living situa-
tion would be disturbed. Observations by the author in Jacksonville in-
dicate that the elderly were afraid to ask their landlords if their
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apartments could be inspected, and did not want the landlord to find out
that an inspector was coming. Their fear was that the inspection would
cause the landlord to ask them to move from their homes (observations,
October, 1974, Jacksonville administrative agency experiment site). The
elderly feared that the program, although possibly able to help them fi-
nancially, would disturb their stable relationship with their landlords.
The cooperation of the landlord in both signing the rental agree-
ment and in being willing to make any necessary repairs was crucial.
The home of a terminal cancer patient in Jacksonville, living with the
aid of a "breathing machine" (according to the agency's counselor in
charge of the case), did not pass the housing inspection. This man's
landlord refused to repair the home, and of course the participant could
not. According to the counselor, the landlord said that he would sign
the lease "if that's all it was," but would not repair the home of the
enrollee. The fatally ill man did not receive the housing allowance.
But a good relationship with a landlord could change an adversary
or neutral, businesslike relationship into a personal one, where ties of
obligation or friendship would help rather than hinder participation in
the program, and help them receive a payment. If the landlord of the
terminally ill man had been a relative or even a friend, with a personal
relationship with the patient, it is less likely s/he would have turned
an indifferent ear to his financial need.
The demand experiment data base had two measures of the nature of
the relationship between landlords and tenants, questions relating to
kinship and questions relating to proximity.
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4.3.5.7 Kinship
Being related to the landlord seems to reduce the probability that
a family will qualify for the housing allowance payment, except for the
old-old. (No evidence is available in the demand experiment on the rela-
tionship between willingness to apply to the program and being related
to the landlord.) Since households related to their landlords are un-
likely to give up that relationship (above), they will only receive an
allowance payment if their current home meets the program's standards
and they can obtain the allowance in their pre-program home. Table 4.4
shows that a higher proportion (8.4 percent) of those who did not meet
the earmarking requirement than of those who did meet the requirements
(5.7 percent) were related to the landlord, but the difference is not
large and, again, the sample size is small.
Families who are related to their landlords, although defined as
eligible for the program in monetary terms, might have access to non-
market benefits that make the market-solution housing allowance rela-
tively unattractive.
4.3.5.8 Proximity
Did living near the landlord increase the chances of qualifying for
a housing allowance subsidy in the experiment? This might indicate that
people who own rental property near their own residences have personal
relationships with their tenants and can explain the program's require-
ments to them and help them to receive the payment.
Table 4.5 indicates that living near landlords made a difference in
qualifying for a payment. In Pittsburgh, 47.8 percent of all partici-
pants, but 52.6 percent of those who lived in the same building as their
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landlord, qualified for the housing allowance payment; this compares to
only 38.6 of those whose landlords lived outside the area who received
the subsidy. In Phoenix, the effect was even more dramatic. There, 73
percent of those in the same building as their landlords, but only 55.3
percent of all participants, met the requirements, an increase of nearly
20 percentage points. Other than having the landlord in the same
building, the location of the landlord's residence at baseline had no
effect in Phoenix on whether households qualified for a housing al-
lowance payment (the number of those living in units owned by a group of
people is too small to analyze). This is probably due to the high mobi-
lity rates in that city, and the fact that a majority of participants
moved during the course of the experiment.
4.3.6 Participation by the Elderly in Other Programs
The elderly participate in some government programs in large num-
bers, but the "image" of programs, ease of enrollment and sense of
entitlement are important influences on the willingness of the elderly
to enroll in programs to which they are entitled.
For example, virtually all (92 percent) individuals and families
who qualify for Social Security receive assistance from that program or
from Railroad Retirement (Table 2.6). But there are at least two major
differences between Social Security and housing allowances.
The first difference is the amount of money involved. Economical-
ly, Social Security is more important. Social Security and railroad re-
tirement provide between a third and two-thirds of the total household
income (Table 2.7) for elderly units; in 1978, the average Social
Security payment was almost $3000 even for single elderly people (Table
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2.5).
By contrast, housing allowances provided much less money to the par-
ticipants, both in absolute and relative terms. The average allowance
payment in Pittsburgh was $59, an average of 14 percent of the partici-
pant's monthly income; in Phoenix, the average payment was $43, 10 per-
cent of monthly income. In Green Bay, renters received $77, 21 percent
of income, and owners received $67 or 16 percent of income. In South
Bend, the figures were $93, for 35 percent of income and $67, for 19
percent of income, for renters and owners respectively (Bendick and
Squire, 1981, pp. 56).
Social Security benefits from an insurance image, even though it is
funded by current revenues rather than from investments of previous pay-
roll tax proceeds. It has been marketed to the taxpaying public for al-
most fifty years as being more like insurance than like welfare. People
were told that they were saving for their futures and that payments in
old age were a return of monies paid into the system during working
years, with earlier deposits or investments paid to retirees as their
due. There is virtually no stigma involved in Social Security, since
people think of it as a just reward.
In contrast, welfare is underutilized by the aged. DeFerranti et.
al. (1974) showed that a lower proportion of the eligible elderly (26.8
percent) than of the eligible nonelderly (37.5 percent) participated in
the welfare program in New York in 1970. These proportions are much
lower than the more than 90 percent of the whole population who receive
Social Security.
Although DeFerranti et. al. (1974) give no indication of why the el-
derly show reduced participation in welfare, the ethics of today's elder-
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ly, which value self-reliance and independence above all, work against
participation in a welfare program. They are willing to accept assis-
tance if it is called "insurance" or a pension, with the implication
that they have somehow earned this benefit, but are much more reluctant
to take part in a "welfare" program. Marketing and packaging count.
This is true whether or not the program conforms to insurance princi-
ples; the Social Security program does not, yet the elderly are over-
whelmingly part of that system.
One program with a disproportionately high rate of participation by
the elderly is the Section 8 New Construction program. According to Abt
Associates Inc. (1981), 80 percent of the units built in this construc-
tion program by 1979 were for the elderly, even though the elderly con-
stitute only about 25 percent of the eligible population (page S-4).
This might be because it is much easier politically to gain approval for
building new subsidized housing when the prospective inhabitants are el-
derly than when they are families with small children, who have a very
bad image (Harriet (Tee) Taggart, 1980, personal communication).
In the Section 8 Existing Housing program, with many similarities
to housing allowances, 28 percent of the eligible households and 26
percent of the subsidy recipients are elderly, figures more in alignment
with each other (Abt Associates Inc., 1981).
What can we conclude about elderly participation in government
programs, in general? First, comparison of recipient and nonrecipient
eligibles in the S.S.I. (Chapter 4) program confirm our notion that
people with high social ties, or social contacts, are less likely to
participate in support programs, because the social network provides
them with nonmonetary resources which make them less needy.
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In addition, we can see that one way to increase participation by
eligible elderly people in programs designed for their use, is to call
that program "insurance" and market it either as a just return for a
lifetime of taxpaying, or as a return on payments into an insurance or
pension system. A program that is called "welfare" or that has an image
associated with a "government handout" is less likely to be utilized pro-
portionately by the eligible elderly.
4.4 The Effect of Participation on Family Composition
This monograph suggests that family and friendship networks affec-
ted participation in the housing allowance experiment. Is there evi-
dence that this participation in any way influenced the stability of
these networks? The demand experiment evidence suggests that the hous-
ing allowance experiment in Pittsburgh and Phoenix had virtually no ef-
fect on the household composition of participating families. This indi-
cates that the glue holding households together was stronger than any
countervailing force from the incentive of the allowance payment to
shift household composition in order to qualify for the subsidy, and con-
firms the notion that the family and household ties were stronger enough
to resist being changed by the allowance.
Table 4.33 indicates that the majority of families (72.4 percent in
Pittsburgh and 62.5 percent in Phoenix) did not change in size over the
two year period. Of those families whose household size did change,
about the same proportion in each city gained and lost people. The el-
derly were, not surprisingly, more likely to lose than to gain people,
especially for those age 75 and over, but were significantly more likely
than young people not to have any change in household size at all.
Table 4.33
CHANGE IN HOUSEHOLD SIZE BETWEEN ENROLLMENT AND TWO YEARS
Percent Meeting Earmark
Age Gained people No change Lost people Total
# % #%%# %
Pittsburgh
18-54 171 16.9% 684 67.8% 154 15.3% 1009 100.0%
55-59 5 6.8 50 68.5 18 24.7 73 100.0
60-64 1 1.7 49 81.7 10 16.7 60 100.0
65-69 5 4.0 107 86.3 12 9.7 124 100.0
70-74 4 4.3 86 91.5 4 4.3 94 100.0
75 and 4 5.2 65 84.4 8 10.4 77 100.0
over
Total 190 13.2 1041 72.4 206 14.3 1437 100.0
Phoenix
18-54 236 25.6 500 54.2 186 20.2 922 100.0
55-59 1 2.8 26 72.2 9 25.0 36 100.0
60-64 2 3.6 45 81.8 8 14.5 55 100.0
65-69 2 2.5 71 89.9 6 7.6 79 100.0
70-74 0 - 58 Q6.7 2 3.3 60 100.0
75 and 1 1.4 63 91.3 5 7.2 69 100.0
over
Total 242 19.8 763 62.5 216 17.7 1221 100.0
Source: Hades and Central
I-j
Files
242
Table 4.34 indicates that, in Pittsburgh, changing household size
had only a slight effect on the probability of meeting the earmarking re-
quirement, but in Phoenix it appears that the families who gained people
were less likely to meet the earmarking requirement (48.5 percent) than
were those who lost people (59.5 percent). Among the elderly the num-
bers are very small, but families with earmarking requirements whose
household size decreased were very likely to meet the earmarking require-
ment; the housing allowance, again, became part of a package in lieu of
a person. This supports the evidence that the housing allowance was
evaluated in the context of the entire household situation; where addi-
tional help was necessary, the requirement was more likely to be met
than where the entire package was in equilibrium.
There is no evidence that households were either augmenting their
households in order to qualify for a larger payment, or in any way alter-
ing their household composition in response to the program. There is no
evidence that the participating families were even aware that changing
household size affected the size of the payment; Table 4.35 indicates
that most people interviewed on the third periodic survey, conducted af-
ter two full years in the experiment, thought that the payment would
stay the same even if a household member moved away, when in fact it
would have decreased.
A higher proportion of elderly than of non-elderly did not, in fact
know what would happen if a person in their household left; in Pitts-
burgh, 29% and in Phoenix, 27 percent of the young knew the payment
would decrease, compared to only 2.6 percent in Pittsburgh, and 4.4
percent in Phoenix, of those over the age of 75.
If the stimulus was too small to significantly affect even the
Table 4.34
CHANGE IN HOUSEHOLD SIZE FOR FAMILIES THAT MET THE EARMARK
Percent Meeting Earmark Total Number
of families
Age Gained people No change Lost people with earmark
# % #%#%#
Pittsburgh
18-54 25 54.3% 117 53.4% 24 45.3% 318
55-59 1 50.0 5 38.5 1 33.3 18
60-64 0 - 12 57.1 1 100.0 23
65-69 0 - 14 38.9 0 - 40
70-74 0 - 10 41.7 2 100.0 26
75 and 0 - 9 34.6 1 50.0 29
over
Total 26 51.0 167 49.3 29 45.3 454
Phoenix
18-54 32 47.8 85 62.5 37 58.7 266
55-59 0 - 4 40.0 4 80.0 15
60-64 1 100.0 2 20.0 3 100.0 14
65-69 0 - 11 47.8 0 - 23
70-74 0 - 16 57.1 0 - 28
75 and 0 - 16 61.5 0 - 29
over
Total 33 48.5 134 57.5 44 59.5 375
Source: Hades and Central Files
N)
6A.
Table 4.35
WHAT WOULD HAPPEN TO PAYMENTS IF A HOUSEHOLD MEMBER MOVED AWAY?
Age Increase Decrease Stay same Don't know Total (n=110)
Pittsburgh
18-54 29 2.8% 301 29.3% 617 60.1% 61 5.9% 1027 100.0%
55-59 2 2.7 10 13.5 48 64.9 6 8.1 74 100.0
60-64 1 1.7 7 12.1 14 24.1 6 10.3 58 100.0
65-69 3 2.4 9 7.3 32 25.8 6 4.8 124 100.0
70-74 2 2.2 6 6.5 28 30.4 5 5.8 92 100.0
75 and 1 1.3 2 2.6 14 18.2 7 9.1 77 100.0
over
Total 38 2.6 335 23.1 753 51.9 91 6.3 1452 100.0
Phoenix
18-54 25 2.6 258 27.2 633 66.6 18 1.9 q50 100.0
55-59 2 5.4 5 13.5 25 67.6 1 2.7 37 100.0
60-64 2 3.5 6 10.5 29 50.9 0 0 57 100.0
65-69 1 1.3 5 6.4 20 25.6 2 2.6 78 100.0
70-74 0 0 2 3.4 15 25.4 4 6.8 50 100.0
75 and 0 0 3 4.4 18 26.5 4 5.9 68 100.0
over
Total 30 2.4 279 22.3 740 59.2 29 2.3 1249 100.0
Source: Third Periodic Interview
Note: Single person households have been removed from table.
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housing choices of the participating families, which EHAP was designed
to do, it was certainly not large enough to affect the living arrange-
ments of the families, which are major decisions of life.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter reviews the evidence of the housing allowance experi-
ment for indicators of social networks in that experiment. The focus is
on the elderly, and the way that social factors affected their partici-
pation in the allowance program. Overall, families with robust re-
source packages tend not to be active in this kind of program, primarily
because they do not need it. Families who have either low monetary
resources, as indicated by low incomes, or low nonmonetary resources,
such as the single, the isolated, and minorities, enroll in this program
in large numbers. However, the elderly tend to refuse an offer of
enrollment in the program for reasons which are not fully understood,
but plausibly include pride and reluctance to be involved in a federal
program. But once enrolled in the program, some of the elderly, such as
single people and women, tend to be quite likely to qualify. It is
primarily minorities, men, and couples who tend not to qualify for the
allowance payment.
Although low-income female headed households were more likely to
meet the conditions of the experiment than were male headed households,
low-income minority households were less likely to qualify for a housing
allowance payment than were white households. One sort of low-resource
family did very well, and another kind did less well meeting the pro-
gram's requirements. Households headed by women did not differ much
from male-headed households in the presence of relatives in their neigh-
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borhoods, but they had significantly lower incomes than comparable fami-
lies with male heads.
Female headed households used the housing allowance to make up for
their low incomes, for the economic contribution of the allowance to
their resource package. While blacks and hispanics had access to fami-
lies and other nonmonetary sources of assistance, they did not propor-
tionally qualify for the allowances because the housing standards set by
the programs disqualified their present housing from eligibility, and
they did not want to, or could not, leave the nonmonetary support sys-
tems embedded in their ethnic neighborhoods. They could not find suit-
able housing in the neighborhoods they either wished to remain in, or
had to remain in because of residential discrimination.
The next chapter turns to an to examination of one of the most
important intermediate steps, the decision to move, and the role of
social ties both in the decision, and in the implementation of that
decision.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 4
1 Only singles age 62 or over were eligible for the program.
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CHAPTER 5: MOBILITY
5.1 Introduction
Chapter 4 began to explore how the elderly used nonmonetary resour-
ces in their income packages, by looking at how social factors influ-
enced their behavior in the experiment. Social factors, defined in
terms of demographics (household composition, sex and race), length of
tenure, relatives in the neighborhood, and relationship between land-
lords and tenants, were examined for their impact on qualifying for a
housing allowance payment.
This chapter continues the examination of the role of social fac-
tors by looking at three intermediate steps in qualifying for a housing
allowance payment: searching, moving, and repairing (Steps 5, 6, and 7,
Figure 4.2). Although most elderly households stay in their long-term
housing for both monetary and nonmonetary reasons, the minority who move
draw on their support networks for help in locating and moving to a new
home. Once a decision is made to move, the assistance of members of the
social network is crucial in implementing that decision, and is more im-
portant to the elderly than to younger families.
Although some anecdotal evidence exists that the elderly required
more assistance than other households to qualify for a payment, the majo-
rity of older participants did not have any special problems, and used
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non-agency resources, mainly friends and relatives, to help them out.
Most of what these helpers did was inform the elderly households of
units available for rent; drove them around to look for units; and
helped them negotiate with landlords (Wolfe, Hamilton and Trend, 1977).
The major way that most elderly households, including the old-old,
deal with their biggest housing problem, high rent burden (Chapter 3),
is by staying in place. Although the elderly do not receive the same
kind of rent-burden advantage as younger people (MacMillan, 1979; Phil-
lips, 1982; Barnett, 1979; Noland, 1980) from long-term tenancy (Chapter
3), moving substantially increases housing costs (see below). Even if
they do not have significant rent burden advantages in their long-term
units, the situation would surely worsen if they moved. Remaining in
place also means that they will not lose the social ties carefully culti-
vated and nurtured over the years. Why should the elderly give up a
lifetime of hard-won friendships and family ties by moving away, when
housing allowance payments in the demand experiment were only promised
for three years? (In the supply experiment, payments were promised for
ten years, but mobility rates were low in this experiment also). This
is especially true for the majority that were living as single indivi-
duals, since they do not have the social support provided by a spouse or
partner in the marital dyad (See Table 4.11).
5.2 Residential Mobility Within the Elderly Population
Despite physical and environmental drawbacks to their current hous-
ing situations, many households with elderly heads are reluctant to
leave their homes, and will put up with unsatisfactory, even unsavory
conditions before consenting to a move. What keeps them so firmly glued
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in place that the incentive of the housing allowance, the availability
of a senior citizen's public housing unit, the invitation of a child for
the parent to live with them (Myerhoff, 1978), or the lure of the golden
sun of Florida or Arizona is not sufficent to induce relocation?
Why would the elderly be reluctant to leave their familiar neighbor-
hoods, if they had family and friends there? In a study of interaction
and adaptation, Lowenthal and Haven (1968) found that the happiest and
healthiest people in the group that they studied seemed to be those who
were, or had been, involved in one or more close personal relationships.
They theorized that that relationship served as a buffer against age-
linked social losses. Schooler (cited by Lawton) found that having a
confidant reduces the likelihood of a negative effect from a change in
environment. This means that the impact of a move can be ameliorated by
having someone to confide in; the role of social supports is beginning
to be revealed. Social ties can absorb some of the shock from the
moving trauma, as well as other important events of the life course.
The evidence in the literature suggests that there are three types
of mobility among the elderly (Wiseman, 1q80), with the highest mobility
rates in old age found between ages 60 and 69, and ages 75 and over.
Moves at different ages have different motivations. "Greater specifici-
ty is needed to recognize both the diversity known to exist among el-
derly migrants and the wide range of reported reasons for moving" (Wise-
man, 1980: p. 144).
"Those who are economically and otherwise robust," with adequate or
even high monetary and nonmonetary resources, "tend to migrate to retire-
ment communities in search of amenities." This type of elderly migrant,
usually just retiring from the workforce, is in search of "better homes
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and gardens." These long-distance movers are generally younger, wealthi-
er, better educated, and more likely to be married than are nonmovers.
The second type of mobility is found among elderly deficient in
both monetary and nonmonetary resources, and who remain residentially
stable until forced to relocate locally in search of assistance. These
movers tend to be very old, and their moves tend to be involuntary, im-
pelled by poor health, widowhood, or displacement due to eviction, condo-
minium conversion, or fire. The need for assistance, dissatisfaction
with present housing and neighborhood, and the need to lower housing
costs dominate their decision to move. This type of mobility describes
the behavior of the elderly in the housing allowance experiment.
A third type of elderly mover is returning to their state of birth.
This return migration generally involves moves to institutions or con-
gregate housing, or an effort to be with or near primary kin.
In the housing allowance experiment, the first and third types of
mobility can be ruled out. Elderly with high monetary resources in
search of amenity would not be eligible for housing allowances; since
the program was experimental and only conducted in a few housing mar-
kets, people who moved out of the program area could not bring the pay-
ment along with them, as they can do with such national transfer pay-
ments as Social Security. This means that, by the rules of eligibility
and program design, only local, low-income movers could participate in
the experiment. Consequently, we would expect that their behavior would
follow the pattern that Wiseman (1980) suggested, with the elderly re-
maining "residentially stable until forced to relocate locally in search
of assistance (p. 145)."
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5.2.1 Residential Stability Is The Rule
In a review of findings from the housing allowance experiment,
Rossi (1981: p.155) concluded that "older households are least respon-
sive to the incentives offered by the Experimental Housing Allowance Pro-
gram payments." He seems to define "responsiveness" as mobility, which
is not, of course, the only possible response. Perhaps the most unequi-
vocal finding of the experiment, according to Rossi, is that the older
the head of the household, the more stable it was, a finding that holds
up under all sorts of ceteris paribus conditions. The main lesson re-
garding the effect of housing allowances on mobility is that:
"The major processes that drive residential mobility are not
touched very deeply by the experimental treatments. In the
aggregate over time, the amounts of moving appear to be sta-
ble, changing slowly rather than in response to identifiable
short-term trends in the economy at large or the housing mar-
ket. Since tenure and family life cycle (emphasis added)
appear to be the major correlates of residential mobility, it
seems unlikely that the housing allowance payments are going
to have much effect on moving; at best they will accelerate or
retard changes that might otherwise have occurred rather than
drastically altering the levels of residential mobility for
the households to whom housing allowances were offered"
(Rossi, 1981: p.15 7 ).
One of the great unsolved mysteries of the experiment and of hous-
ing mobility research in general, is the reason for these low mobility
rates. Why does mobility decrease so dramatically with age? Newman and
Duncan (1979) found, in an analysis of national longitudinal data from
the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics, that each additional year
of age reduced the chance of moving by .3 percentage points, and the age
effect was the most powerful of all the variables with an effect on
mobility.
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5.2.2 Why Do Some Old People Move?
Most studies of both forced and voluntary relocation, show that
moving is traumatic, disruptive, and avoided by both young and old. A
move is usually the last option exercised. But what has previous re-
search shown about why old people do move?
Lawton (1977: p. 290) found that movers among the elderly tend to
be separated or divorced; lower income; less educated; more likely to be
renters; in better health; and possess histories of mobility at earlier
ages. These attributes indicate that movers have fewer social ties to
keep them in place. Factors that seem to inhibit mobility are homeowner-
ship; social ties to the neighborhood, dwelling unit condition (more
important for renters than for owners); and being in poor health (Law-
ton, 1977). Social ties and maintenance of ownership status tend to
make people want to stay, and poor health prevents them from exercising
free choice.
One study of a population that voluntarily gave up private dwel-
lings to enter a congregate retirement living arrangement showed that be-
ing alone was often mentioned as a factor in their decision to leave
their home (Collier and Oliver, 1979); other factors were wanting to
live in a home-like atmosphere; diminished social contacts in their pre-
vious home; and a strong desire not to live with children. Another
study showed that 80 percent of the retired residents of an apartment
building in downtown Los Angeles had decided to move there because of a
specific precipitating event, or "trigger," not because they had any
great wish to move. 35 percent of those interviewed said that the preci-
pitating event was a perceived neighborhood change that led to fear or
insecurity in their old home, although Newman and Duncan (197q) did not
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find that crime to be a significant factor in generating dissatisfaction
with a neighborhood; 25 percent said that they moved in because of the
death of relatives and/or friends (Beaver, 1979).
Struyk (1980) found that the elderly changed their housing when
their income shifted at retirement; when children and their families
moved (either closer or further away); when physical limitations became
paramount; when a spouse died or was institutionalized; and when their
neighborhood underwent unfavorable change. When these elderly house-
holds moved, their family situation had a significant effect, especially
proximity to children.
5.2.3 The consequences of mobility
For the old, moving is traumatic; studies of moves between hospi-
tals and nursing homes, and between different nursing homes, often cite
death as a consequence. Aldrich and Mendkoff (1968) found that, after a
nursing home was closed for administrative reasons and the patients were
relocated to another institution, deaths increased in the year following
relocation, and were highest in the first three months after the move.
Borup, Gallego, and Heffernan (1979) found that relocation between nur-
sing homes brings about stress, but stopped short of saying that moves
are fatal. Of course, these studies were among populations already at
risk and in poor health, being moved from one nursing home to another.
What about healthy, mobile elderly people, who are independent and auto-
nomous?
Studies of families that were involuntarily moved have found the
results of forced relocation to be, on the whole, poor, with questiona-
ble gains in quality accompanied by widespread increases in housing
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costs (Hartman, 1964). Familes who relocate successfully have finan-
cial, personal and social resources, and are prepared for upward mobili-
ty; others incur heavy costs in severe personal and social disruption,
with no improvement in housing conditions and at substantial increases
in housing costs. "The deleterious effects of uprooting, loss of famil-
iar places and persons, and the difficulties of adjusting to and accept
a new living environment may be far more serious issues than are changes
in housing status" (Hartman, 1964, p. 279). Young and Willmott (1957)
found that kin and friendship relationships were disrupted when families
moved to a housing estate, and that relationships with new neighbors
were hostile. A follow-up study by Willmott (1963) showed that the pas-
sage of forty years after establishing a new community enabled close-
knit kin and neighbor relationships to develop again. Rainwater and
Handel (1964) and Rainwater (1964) also report that geographical mobili-
ty breaks up close-knit networks, although Berger (1960) found that fami-
lies who moved from the city to a working-class suburb did not suffer
large disruptions in their social networks. However, the young movers
in Berger's study could maintain their social contacts with relatives in
the neighborhoods they left behind because of the development of the
"network city" (Craven and Wellman, 1974), also know as the "community
without propinquity" (Webber, 1963, 1968; see Chapter 1).
Aged persons often have limited transportation options. They can-
not walk as far as they used to; as eyesight, hearing, and reaction time
deteriorate they stop driving cars. Low incomes make it unlikely that
they can afford to own and operate an automobile, even if they could
still drive. Limitations on transportation may be one reason why old
people are reluctant to leave their own homes; they know how to get
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around in their long-term areas, and if they have to ask for assistance
from a younger neighbor to get to a store or a doctor, they are well
enough acquainted with them to make a request that is likely to be hon-
ored. Living in an area for a long time increases the probability that
there are a least a few people on whom one can call in an emergency.
There is no guarantee, without moving to a new facility designed especi-
ally for the elderly, that in a new home anyone will be aware of or sen-
sitive to the special needs of the aged. In addition to the risks en-
tailed in moving for every age group, the risk to an elderly person in
changing residence is that they will not find the help necessary to meet
the requirements of everyday life.
Although the elderly may have a hard time travelling to see old
friends and neighbors, they do travel. Several studies of the use of re-
sources indicate that a median of 98 percent of elderly with children
visit one or more of those children, with a modal frequency of once a
week and a modal travel time of twenty minutes. The comparable median
percentage visiting friends is 61 percent, and the proportion visiting
other relatives is 57 percent (Lawton, 1977, p. 282; figures are derived
from several studies). Family has top priority, with friends second,
other relatives third, and other social activities (with the exception
of church) of less importance.
The moves anticipated in the housing allowance experiment would, of
course, have been voluntary, not forced, relocations. However, that
fact highlights the clear finding of the experiment that, given a
choice, families will not change their location even when given a fi-
nancial incentive to do so.
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The case of "Ruby Jackson," described in Frieden (1980: p. 55-57)
is the most dramatic illustration of the willingness of the elderly to
give up the housing allowance rather than move. Mrs. Jackson, a black
65-year-old widow, lived in a severely substandard single-family home in
Jacksonville, Florida that had been built by her husband 45 years ear-
lier. The home, which she owned, had no running water or indoor plumb-
ing. The Jacksonville Housing Code Enforcement Division had condemned
it, and the city's social worker had been trying to get Mrs. Jackson to
relocate for several years. Although Mrs. Jackson was eligible for the
housing allowance, and had even gone so far as to make plans to move to
an apartment that passed the inspection requirement, in the end she
chose not to move, and therefore not to receive the housing allowance
payment she was entitled to. Why did she refuse to move, even though
her house had been condemned? She told the author that many of her
neighbors deep in the pine woods of northeast Jacksonville were her rela-
tives, and she did not wish to move away from them. She did not want to
lose contact with her kin; she was also afraid that any new place she
moved to would be too expensive on her $213 monthly income, even includ-
ing her $83 housing allowance payment. Since her home was fully paid
for, her only monthly expense was for electricity, and the rent in the
new apartment of $130 a month plus utilities meant that her housing
1
costs would increase despite the availability of the allowance payment.
This story illustrates two major reasons why the elderly would not
move: reluctance to leave an area where the participant had significant
social ties, and the fact the moving most often resulted in increased
housing cost.
258
5.3 Moving and the Resource Package
The model of resource packaging is supported by two major pieces of
evidence from the demand experiment. Movers were less likely to have
had extensive social ties at the beginning, and those who moved incurred
a decrease in their monetary resources because housing cost burdens in-
creased after their move.
Moving decisions, are, because of high cost (both transaction cost
and higher post-mobility housing cost) spending decisions. The survival
strategy of elderly families is considered, in this monograph, a tripar-
tite structure, with monetary contributions from the market and the
state, and nonmonetary contributions from the social structure (Rein and
Rainwater, 1981). The housing allowance is a relatively small propor-
tion of the monetary contribution, providing, in the demand experiment,
10 to 14 percent of total income. In the supply experiment, housing al-
lowances contributed 19 percent to 25 percent of income, and in the admi-
nistrative agency experiment, an average of 33 percent (Struyk and Ben-
dick, 1980, pp. 56-57), which are higher portions of income but, as we
have seen in Chapter 3, families who received the allowance still had
quite high rent burdens making claims on their low incomes.
Resource packaging involves two kinds of components, monetary and
nonmonetary resources, that together constitute the elderly's survival
package. More than other decisions made within the context of the expe-
riment, the decision to move to a new home or to stay in a long-term
residence has a major impact on both economic and social resources.
The theory of resource packaging predicts that the low-income elder-
ly in the housing allowance experiment would only move if that move did
not reduce the net amount of both monetary and nonmonetary resources
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available to them. Conversely, the aged would be especially likely to
move if their total resources would, as a consequence of the housing al-
lowance subsidy, be increased, or at least not decreased. This would oc-
cur if the movers had fewer social ties to jeopardize, or if they could
find below-market price housing.
This chapter explores the extent to which this theory is supported
by the evidence of mobility behavior in the demand experiment. A move
to a new home is a major disruption of both the monetary and nonmonetary
components of the resource package, and the negative effects of a move
on the survival system of the aged has to be offset by some kind of gain
in the total life situation. One of the inhibiting factors working
against residential mobility by the elderly is reluctance to disrupt so-
cial ties that have been built up during a lifetime. Another major fac-
tor is the high probability that a new home will cost more, despite the
availability of the housing allowance to pay part of the cost. The al-
lowances were only offered for three years (ten years in the supply ex-
periment), and the low income households in the experiment were probably
wary of government promises of future assistance.
A "substantial majority" of young renters whose homes were initial-
ly judged substandard by the housing standards used in the experiment
eventually qualified for the payment by moving to a new home (Cronin and
Rasmussen, 1981), but most of the elderly participants qualified for the
payment without moving from their pre-program housing. Movers experi-
enced an increase in their resource package because they found them-
selves living in a better home. For these families, who initially lived
in substandard homes, qualifying for the housing allowance meant moving
to a better place. As we will see, households headed by aged people
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lived in better quality housing before the housing allowance experiment
began, and moved at a far lower rate than did members of any other age
group.
There are costs and benefits of both moving and staying, and the
costs associated with mobility are substantial and occur at the time of
a move (Struyk and Bendick, 1981), whereas the gains from relocation ac-
crue through time. The aged can see only the costs, and will not have
time to reap the benefits of relocation unless the costs of not moving
are also very high. A thirty-year-old mover can look forward to amorti-
zing the financial and psychic costs of a move over the course of thirty
or more years, and has time to realize benefits. The young family can
plan on many years to develop social ties in an area; elderly headed
households have no such future expectations, since remaining lifespan is
uncertain and constantly decreasing.
Moving can have a variety of effects on social ties. Chapter 4
showed that the elderly rely more heavily than do young people on their
social networks, and those over the age of 75 rely on these social ties
most of all. For the elderly, maintaining the integrity of the social
structure, chiefly the kinship system but including (at least potential-
ly) friends and neighbors, was an important part of the decision to par-
ticipate in the housing allowance experiment. Its importance is shown
both in the role of social ties in keeping the elderly from moving, and
in the assistance provided by members of that social system to those who
wanted to move.
Tinker (1980) concluded that in public (known as "council") housing
in Great Britain there is a demand from elderly people to move near
their relatives, and vice versa, and that there are ways of meeting this
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need which also have the advantages of releasing housing for rent to
larger families. The major obstacle to housing the elderly near rela-
tives was a shortage of small, self-contained units in the proper loca-
tions. These "Granny Annexes," small units added on to existing struc-
tures to house, logically enough, the family's granny, provide an alter-
native to institutionalization for a substantial proportion of resi-
dents; it was estimated that 22 percent of the sample would have been in
residential care had not outside support, mostly from children, been
available.
When a family moves to a new home, they can end up further away
from family and friends, closer to family and friends, or in essentially
the same neighborhood with no change in their physical or psychological
distance from their social support systems. Although it is difficult to
determine from the demand experiment data base which, if, any of these
results was the case in the housing allowance experiment, this chapter
tries to discover which of these effects seemed most important to the
low-income participants in the housing allowance experiment. Whatever
effect a move had on the social support system, the economic support sys-
tem was probably strained by a move.
5.3.1 Old People Move Less Than Younger People
The preference of the elderly, as expressed clearly in their beha-
vior throughout the housing allowance experiment, was to stay in their
pre-program housing even if that meant not receiving a housing allowance
subsidy. Table 5.1 shows that, although over 40 percent of all par-
ticipants in Pittsburgh, and 65.6 percent in Phoenix, moved during the
course of the two-year experimental period, the elderly were much less
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Table 5.1
PROPORTION OF HOUSEHOLDS MOVING
DURING THE TWO YEAR EXPERIMENTAL PERIOD
Age Percent Number Total Number
Pittsburgh
18-54
55-59
60-64
65-69
70-74
75 and
over
Total
Phoenix
18-54
55-59
60-64
65-69
70-74
75 and
over
Total
48.4
33.8
30.5
23.2
20.2
17.9
41.4
75.3
45.9
36.8
35.4
32.2
29.0
65.6
498
25
18
29
14
603
718
17
21
28
19
20
823
1028
74
59
125
94
78
1458
954
37
57
79
59
69
1255
SOURCE: Hades and Central Files
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likely to move than were younger families. Only 17.9 percent (in
Pittsburgh) and 29 percent (in Phoenix) of households headed by an indi-
vidual age 75 and over, moved during the experiment; mobility rates for
young-old families were intermediate, between the rates for the old-old
and young families. The proportion of families of all ages who moved
was much higher in Phoenix than in Pittsburgh. Table 5.2 shows that the
same pattern of mobility was found among the control group, whose beha-
vior was not affected in any way by an offer of a housing allowance,
since all that they received was $10 a month, a small compensation to
them for filling out the data-collection forms for the experiment.
The aged in EHAP were much longer term residents of their homes
than were younger famliies (Table 4.15) and had a much greater chance to
gain familiarity with their areas and become attached to their homes.
We cannot discount the role of length of tenure in decreasing mobility
rates. Table 5.3 shows that, of those who did not even search for a new
unit, the proximity of their present unit to relatives was very impor-
tant to those over the age of 75 in Pittsburgh, but less important in
Phoenix, where proximity to friends was very important (we will recall
that families in Phoenix were less likely than families in Pittsburgh to
have relatives living nearby). The costs of moving were more important
to young families, especially in Phoenix; it seems as if their moving de-
cisions are, to a greater extent, made on the basis of an economic calcu-
lation than are the decisions of the elderly. In Pittsburgh proximity
to relatives was important to the very youngest families, and less impor-
tant only to those between 55 and 70. After age 70, the importance of
family to not searching increased.
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Table 5.2
PROPORTION OF CONTROL HOUSEHOLDS WHO MOVED
DURING THE TWO YEAR EXPERIMENTAL PERIOD
Proportion of Total number of families
Age families who moved in control groups
Pittsburgh
18-54 141 45.6% 309 100.0%
55-59 11 37.9 29 100.0
60-64 2 22.2 9 100.0
65-69 9 23.7 38 100.0
70-74 1 4.5 22 100.0
75 and over 2 14.3 14 100.0
Total 166 39.4 241 100.0
Phoenix
18-54 198 69.7 284 100.0
55-59 2 22.2 9 100.0
60-64 5 27.8 18 100.0
65-69 7 30.4 23 100.0
70-74 5 38.5 13 100.0
75 and over 4 20.0 20 100.0
Total 221 60.2 367 100.0
Source: Central and Hades Files.
Table 5.3
WHY PEOPLE DID NOT LOOK FOR A NEW PLACE TO LIVE
Expected All hh
EHAP payment moving costs This unit is This unit is that did not
Age was not enough to be high near relatives near friends search#% # #
Pittsburgh
18-54 62 24.9% 123 49.2% 142 57.0% 119 47.8% 249 100.0%
55-59 6 23.1 7 26.9 8 30.8 6 23.1 26 100.0
60-64 9 36.0 11 44.0 7 28.0 9 36.0 25 100.0
65-69 17 26.2 31 47.7 20 30.8 26 40.0 65 100.0
70-74 3 5.5 17 30.9 15 27.3 19 34.5 55 100.0
75 and 10 25.0 13 32.5 17 42.5 12 30.0 40 100.0
over
Total 107 23.3 202 43.9 20Q 45.4 191 41.5 460 100.0
Phoenix
18-54 42 38.2 88 80.0 57 51.8 40 44.5 110 100.0
55-59 7 77.8 8 88.4 3 33.3 5 55.5 9 100.0
60-64 9 36.0 16 64.0 10 40.0 6 24.0 25 100.0
65-69 11 37.9 18 62.1 11 37.9 7 24.1 29 100.0
70-74 5 17.9 12 42.9 15 53.6 17 60.7 28 100.0
75 and 11 29.7 17 45.9 9 24.3 17 45.9 37 100.0
over
Total 85 35.7 159 66.8 105 44.1 101 42.4 238 100.0
Adds to more than 100 percent because more than one answer could be given.
Source: Third Periodic Survey, Hades and Central Files.
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In Phoenix, fear of high moving costs was the greatest barrier to
search, but even there, it was more important for the young than for the
old. For old people in Phoenix, living near friends was an equally im-
portant reason for not even thinking about moving.
What do we know about why the elderly do not move very often or
very easily? A study of Boston's neighborhoods has shown that famili-
arity with an area is extremely important in making housing choice
decisions (Hollister et. al., 1977). In fact, familiarity with area was
the most cited reason for choosing to buy a new home in a particular
area, and for wanting to live in one area rather than another. Famili-
arity, dealing with the known, being comfortable, are all reasons why
people move where they do (MacDonald and MacDonald, 1974; Tilly and
Brown, 1974).
The elderly were most likely to qualify for the housing allowance
payment without moving from their pre-program home. Of those families
who qualified for a housing allowance subsidy, three-fourths of the fami-
lies in Phoenix, but less than half in Pittsburgh, had moved (Table
5.4. Of these, the households headed by individuals over the age of 75
were least likely to have moved in order to qualify for the payment; in
Pittsburgh, only 10 percent, and in Phoenix, 25 percent, of households
headed by people age 75 and over qualified for the allowance payment
after moving to a new home.
What does searching behavior indicate? A family who is completely
satisfied with their housing, and does not need anything more to "get
by," will probably not even look for a new home if offered a housing al-
lowance. This is how most of the elderly of all races and ages behaved.
Households can look for new housing and not find any that is suitable
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Table 5.4
PROPORTION OF FAMILIES WITH AN EARMARKING REQUIREMENT,
WHO MET THE REQUIREMENT BY MOVING
Proportion of Total number of families
Age families who moved who met the requirements
Pittsburgh
18-54 88 52.4% 168 100.0%
55-59 2 25.0 8
60-64 5 38.5 8
65-69 4 28.6 14
70-74 2 16.7 12
75 and over 1 10.0 10
Total 102 45.3 225 100.0
Phoenix
18-54 134 83.7 160 100.0
55-59 5 62.5 8
60-64 3 50.0 6
65-69 7 63.6 4
70-74 9 56.3 16
75 and over 4 25.0 16
Total 162 74.7 217 100.0
Source: Central and Hades Files.
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due to cost, location, or suitability for special needs. In addition, a
family could desperately want to move to a better home, but not be able
to find something that they can afford that passed the standards for
good housing set by the experiment's requirements. In other words, a fa-
mily can look for housing and decide that they can find nothing better
than their present home, what can be called a voluntary non-mover, or
can fail to find a home that could meet the standards of the experiment
involuntarily, due to discrimination on the basis of a whole host of
things, or just due to a lack of suitable housing in the market. This
would comment more on the supply of housing than on either their desire
to move or on their ability as searchers.
Table 5.5 shows that for all the treatment groups combined, most of
the aged families in the experiment, no matter the type of housing allow-
ance they were offered, qualified for that payment by remaining in their
long-term homes, even though moving would have increased their chances
of receiving an allowance. In Pittsburgh about a third of the families
moved, about a fifth looked for a new home but ended up not moving, and
just over two-fifths neither searched nor moved. In Phoenix, a much
higher proportion moved (61.2 percent), a much lower proportion searched
but did not move (10.6 percent), and only 28.1 percent neither searched
nor moved.
The old-old, over the age of 75, were most likely to not even look
for a new place; of the participants in that age category, 80 percent in
Pittsburgh, and nearly 70 percent in Phoenix, did not search, compared
to 33.7 percent and 17.6 percent, respectively, of young families in
those cities who did not look for new housing (Table 5.5). Similarly,
the oldest households were the least likely to have begun to look for a
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Table 5.5
HOW HOUSEHOLDS QUALIFIED FOR A FULL PAYMENT,
BY MOBILITY STATUS AND AGE
(ALL TREATMENT GROUPS COMBINED)
Total number of
full payment
Age Moved did not move households
W F #
Pittsburgh
18-54 316 42.8% 173 23.4% 738 100.0%
55-59 21 36.2 11 44.8 58 100.0
60-64 15 30.6 9 18.4 49 100.0
65-69 20 21.5 8 8.6 93 100.0
70-74 12 16.0 8 10.7 75 100.0
75 and over 7 14.0 3 6.0 50 100.0
Total 391 36.8 212 19.9 1063 100.0
Phoenix
18-54 444 71.2 70 11.2 624 100.0
55-59 12 48.0 4 16.0 25 100.0
60-64 9 23.1 5 12.8 39 100.0
65-69 23 39.0 7 11.9 59 100.0
70-74 16 34.8 2 4.3 46 100.0
75 and over 14 26.4 2 3.8 53 100.0
Total 518 61.2 90 10.6 846 100.0
Source: Central and Hades Files
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new home but, in the end, not to move. In Pittsburgh only 6 percent,
and in Phoenix, 3.8 percent, of people over the age of 75 searched for a
new home but did not move. In both cities, younger families were much
more likely to look around for new housing but decide, in the end, not
to move; the young-old were almost as active searchers as young fami-
lies, but were less likely, in either city, to move.
For families of all ages, moving helped them to qualify for a
housing allowance payment, if they were in a treatment group that re-
quired them to live in good housing. Table 5.6 shows that more families
who moved qualified for a payment (59.6 percent in Pittsburgh, 66.9 per-
cent in Phoenix), than families who did not move (42 percent in Pitts-
burgh, 38.5 percent in Phoenix). However, with the exception of one
household headed by someone over the age of 75 in Pittsburgh who moved,
among the very old moving did not increase the chances of qualifying for
the housing allowance subsidy.
Why did families have to move to qualify for the housing allowance
subsidy? Very high proportions of the elderly who did not move did not
qualify for a payment, because the housing they were living in did not
meet the earmarking requirement. Moving was not necessary for those li-
ving in good housing, but people in bad housing had to move to meet the
program's requirements. Most of the elderly qualified in their pre-pro-
gram housing, but many of those living in sub-standard housing could not
repair it up to standard, and lost the chance to receive the subisdy.
In Pittsburgh, 69 percent, and in Phoenix, 42.9 percent of those age 75
and over who did not move did not qualify for the housing allowance
payment (Table 5.6).
Table 5.6
PROPORTION OF PARTICIPANTS WHO MOVED AND MET THE REQUIREMENT
OF FAMILIES IN EITHER MINIMUM STANDARDS OR MINIMUM RENT TREATMENT GROUPS
Moved Did not move Total
Did not Did not Did not
Age Met earmark meet earmark Met earmark Meet earmark met earmark meet earmark
Pittsburgh
18-54 88 58.7% 62 41.3% 80 45.5% 96 54.5% 168 51.57 158 48.5%
55-59 2 66.7 1 33.3 6 37.5 10 62.5 8 42.1 11 57.9
60-64 5 83.3 1 16.7 8 47.1 9 52.9 13 56.5 10 43.5
65-69 4 66.7 2 33.3 10 29.4 24 70.6 14 35.0 26 65.0
70-74 2 40.0 3 60.0 10 47.6 11 52.4 12 46.2 14 53.8
75 and 1 100.0 0 - 9 31.0 20 69.0 10 33.3 20 66.7
over
Total 102 59.6 69 40.4 123 42.0 170 58.0 225 48.5 239 51.5
Phoenix
18-54 134 66.3 68 33.7 26 35.1 48 64.9 160 58.0 116 42.0
55-59 5 71.4 2 28.6 3 37.5 5 62.5 8 53.3 7 46.7
60-64 3 50.0 3 50.0 3 37.5 5 62.5 6 42.9 8 57.1
65-69 7 77.8 2 22.2 4 28.6 10 71.4 11 47.8 12 52.2
70-74 9 90.0 1 10.0 7 38.9 11 61.1 16 57.1 12 42.9
75 and 4 50.0 4 50.0 12 57.1 9 42.9 16 55.2 13 44.8
over
Total 162 66.9 80 33.1 55 38.5 88 61.5 217 56.4 168 43.6
Source: Central and Hades Files.
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Black families were more likely to have moved than were white fami-
lies, in both Pittsburgh and Phoenix, and were more likely in both pla-
ces to have searched for a new home but not moved into it (Table 5.7).
Hispanic families were no more likely to move than were white families
in Phoenix, but elderly hispanics were much more likely to move than
were elderly whites. Elderly blacks in Pittsburgh were much more likely
than were elderly whites in Pittsburgh to search and end up not moving;
among those age 75 or over, 18.2 percent of blacks, but only 5.8 percent
of whites, searched but did not move (Table 5.7).
5.3.2 Movers Had Fewer Social Ties Than Nonmovers
Chapter 4 described how in the early steps of qualifying for a hous-
ing allowance payment (Figure 4.2), the elderly with few social ties
such as the single (widowed, divorced or never married) and/or child-
less; short term residents of an area; and those without family or
friends living in their neighborhoods, participated in the experiment at
a higher rate than did the elderly with other sources of assistance than
the housing allowance program. However, the elderly without sources of
information or assistance would not be likely to have people to call on
if they needed help in qualifying for the housing allowance payment.
By the measure of eligibility, the single elderly need the program
more than do elderly with extensive social ties, but have fewer resour-
ces to help them hear about the program or qualify for a payment. We
would therefore expect the experience of the poorest, oldest, single el-
derly to be mixed; they would be more anxious, but less able, to qualify
for a housing allowance payment.
Table 5.7
MOBILITY BY RACE, ALL PARTICTPANTS
(IN PERCENTS)
White Black Hispanic
Searched, Did not Searched, Did not Searched, Did not
did not move or did not move or did not move or
Age Moved move search Moved move search Moved move search
% %
Pittsburgh
18-54 50.4% 21.2% 28.4% 50.7% 21.5% 27.8% NA*
55-59 35.2 22.2 42.6 31.6 21.1 47.4
60-64 31.3 22.2 50.0 27.3 27.3 45.5
65-69 25.0 12.0 63.0 27.3 27.3 45.5
70-74 21.1 10.5 68.4 23.5 11.8 64.7
75 and 21.7 5.8 72.5 18.2 18.2 63.6
over
Total 42.9 18.7 38.5 45.1 21.4 33.4
N=1126 N=350
Phoenix
18-54 81.6 7.7 10.7 82.2 10.0 7.8 75.2 8.7 16.0
55-59 43.5 13.0 43.5 50.0 16.7 33.3 60.0 - 40.0
60-64 36.4 6.8 56.8 75.0 25.0 - 36.4 9.1 54.5
65-69 39.3 14.3 46.4 62.5 - 37.5 23.5 5.9 70.6
70-74 34.6 5.8 59.6 100.0 - 50.0 60.0 - 40.0
75 and 30.3 4.5 65.2 50.0 - 50.0 60.0 - 40.0
over
Total 69.8 7.9 22.3 78.9 9.6 11.4 69.7 7.5 22.8
N=Q41 N=114 N=360
*There were only fourteen Hispanic in Pittsburgh; only five over age 55.
Source: Baseline Survey, Hades and Central Files.
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The thesis of this monograph is that observed decreases in mobility
rates associated with increasing age is the result of high attachment to
an area. This attachment is primarily social in nature, although fac-
tors of economics and accessibility provide the parameters within which
the social decision is made.
A network of social ties in an area is hypothesized to be a major
reason why the elderly will not move even to get the allowance payment;
the nonmonetized social system is valued even to the exclusion of some
potential monetary help.
The elderly who moved during the two year period of the demand
experiment would be expected to either have low social ties, so that
they would not be facing a decrease in their local assistance systems;
would move to a place where they could get more help; or would be able
to use their nonmonetary resources, that is, their family and friends,
in a way that enhanced the net resources available to them in their
homes. They used their social resources to enhance their monetary
resources, and receive a housing allowance.
An example of the first type of move would be found in evidence
that elderly families who moved had fewer social ties in their neighbor-
hoods; an example of the second type of move would be if many of the
aged moved to a place where they could have more help, with relatives in
the neighborhood or other nonmonetary help. An example of the third
kind of move is using friends and family to help the elderly qualify for
the housing allowance payment either in their current unit (by helping
them to repair it, or helping them to complete the paperwork) or by help-
ing them to move to a place where they could qualify for the housing al-
lowance subsidy.
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Evidence from the demand experiment supports the idea that the el-
derly who moved were less dependent on local assistance; they had, by
most measures, fewer local social ties. Movers were most likely to have
been shorter term residents of their previous units; the best predictor
of mobility in the demand experiment was past mobility (MacMillan,
1979). Table 5.8 shows that four out of five movers in Pittsburgh, and
over 9 out of ten movers in Phoenix, had been living in their home for
less than five years at the baseline survey; by comparison, we see from
Table 4.15 that only three out of five families in Pittsburgh, but
nearly nine out of ten households in Phoenix, had been very short term
residents of their current units. The movers were less attached to
their current homes because they had been living there for a shorter
period of time.
The elderly were making decisions that had much more to do with the
social ties available to them in their neighborhoods and in their pre-
sent units than were younger families. Elderly families who moved dur-
ing the experiment were less likely to have relatives living in the
neighborhood than were nonmovers, but the presence of relatives had al-
most no effect on the mobility of nonelderly families. Table 5.9 shows
that, in Pittsburgh, this was especially evident for households headed
by people age 75 or over; in that age category, 23.9 percent of those
without relatives, but 17.6 percent of those with relatives, moved du-
ring the two year experimental period. The big difference comes in the
proportion who searched for a new home but did not move; only 4.3 per-
cent of those in that age group in Pittsburgh without relatives searched
but ended up not moving, compared to 11.8 percent in the group with rela-
tives. Some very old people with relatives nearby do look for a new
Table 5.8
PROPORTION OF HOUSEHOLDS THAT MOVED DURING THE TWO YEAR EXPERIMENTAL PERIOD,
BY HOW LONG THEY WERE LIVING IN THEIR UNIT AT BASELINE
Less than Five to Ten to Over Total number
Age five years ten years twenty years twenty years of movers
~~~# % # % # % # 71 #
Pittsburgh
18-54 430 86.3% 53 10.6% 13 2.6% 2 0.4% 498 100.0%
55-59 16 64.0 5 20.0 3 12.0 1 4.0 25 100.0
60-64 10 55.6 3 16.7 4 22.2 1 5.6 18 100.0
65-69 18 62.1 6 20.7 4 13.8 1 3.4 29 100.0
70-74 11 57.9 3 15.8 4 21.1 1 5.3 19 100.0
75 and 9 64.3 2 14.3 3 21.4 0 - 14 100.0
over
Total 494 81.9 72 11.9 31 5.1 6 1.0 603 100.0
Phoenix
18-54 690 96.1 25 3.5 2 0.3 1 0.1 718 100.0
55-59 11 64.7 3 17.6 3 17.6 0 - 17 100.0
60-64 18 85.7 3 14.3 0 - 0 - 21 100.0
65-69 20 71.4 5 17.9 2 7.1 1 3.6 28 100.0
70-74 13 68.4 5 26.3 1 5.3 0 - 19 100.0
75 and 10 50.0 5 25.0 5 25.0 0 20 100.0
over
Total 762 92.6 46 5.6 13 1.6 2 0.2 823 100.0
Source: Baseline Survey, Hades and Central Files.
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Table 5.Q
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRESENCE OF
RELATIVES IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD AT BASELINE AND MOBILITY
without relatives with relatives
Searched Did not Total Searched, Did not Total
did not more or without did not move or without
Age Moved move search relatives Moved move search relatives
~~~~ # % # % # % # % # % # T # 1 #
Pittsburgh
18-54 262 50.1% 109 20.8% 152 29.1% 523 100% 271 50.7% 115 21.5% 148 27.7% 534 100.0%
55-59 13 33.3 10 25.6 16 41.0 39 100 13 37.1 6 17.1 16 45.7 35 100.0
60-64 13 31.0 10 23.8 19 45.2 42 100 6 33.3 2 11.1 10 55.6 18 100.0
65-69 21 28.0 13 17.3 41 54.7 75 100 10 20.4 5 10.2 34 69.4 49 100.0
70-74 10 18.9 8 15.1 35 66.0 53 100 10 24.4 2 4.9 29 70.7 41 100.0
75 and 11 23.9 2 4.3 33 71.7 46 100 6 17.6 4 11.8 24 70.6 34 100.0
over
Total 330 42.4 152 19.5 296 38.0 778 100 316 44.4 108 15.2 261 36.7 711 100.0
Phoenix
18-54 626 80.2 61 7.8 94 12.0 781 100 285 78.5 31 8.5 47 12.9 363 100.0
55-59 13 46.4 2 7.1 13 46.4 28 100 6 54.5 2 18.2 3 27.3 11 100.0
60-64 18 46.2 3 7.7 18 46.2 39 100 5 25 2 10.0 13 65.0 20 100.0
65-69 20 36.4 7 12.7 28 50.9 55 100 12 44.4 2 7.4 13 48.1 27 100.0
70-74 14 35.0 3 7.5 23 57.5 40 100 9 3q.1 0 - 14 60.9 23 100.0
75 and 16 34.8 3 6.5 27 58.7 46 100 8 29.6 0 - 19 70.4 27 100.0
over
Total 707 71.5 79 8.0 203 20.5 989 100 325 69.0 37 7.9 109 23.1 471 100.0
Source: Baseline Survey, Hades and Central Files.
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unit, but end up not leaving their pre-program housing.
In Phoenix, elderly families with relatives in the neighborhood
were more likely not to even search for a new home, and this is, again,
especially true of those whose households are headed by a person age 75
or over. Of that age group, 58.7 percent of those without relatives but
70.4 percent of those with relatives, did not even look for a new home.
The impact of having relatives in the neighborhood on moving and
search behavior was different for old than for the young families; the
young showed little effect. Table 5.9 shows that the big differences in
mobility rates were between cities; one of the major sources of the
difference is the proportion searching but not moving. In Pittsburgh
19.5 percent of those without relatives, and 15.2 percent of those with
relatives, searched but did not move; in Phoenix, only about 8 percent
of both groups searched but did not, in the end, move. A searcher was
twice as likely in Phoenix than in Pittsburgh to move, once the search
was initiated.
Families who were related to their landlord were less likely to
move than were families who were not related to their landlord. Table
5.10 indicates that, in Pittsburgh, 29 percent of those related to their
landlord moved, compared to 42.2 percent of those not related to the
landlord. In Phoenix the difference was even more dramatic; 39 percent
of those related, but 67.4 percent of those not related to their land-
lords, moved during the course of the experiment. The numbers are very
small, but a look at the age distribution of this variable is quite in-
structive. Only three families out of the 17 who were above the age of
70 and related to the landlord moved during the two year period, and all
three were in Phoenix where mobility rates were quite high. However, of
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Table 5.10
MOBILITY HISTORY OF PARTICIPANTS WHO WERE RELATED
TO THEIR LANDLORD AT BASELINE
Proportion of Total number of
Age families who moved families in the program
# 7#%
Pittsburgh
Related to landlord
18-54 25 30.5% 82 100.07
55-59 1 33.3 3 100.0
60-64 1 50.0 2 100.0
65-69 2 25.0 8 100.0
70-74 0 - 1 100.0
75 and over 0 - 4 100.0
Total 29 29.0 100 100.0
Not related to landlord
18-54 472 50.1 942 100.0
55-59 24 33.8 71 100.0
60-64 17 29.8 57 100.0
65-69 27 23.3 116 100.0
70-74 19 20.7 92 100.0
75 and over 14 19.2 73 100.0
Total 573 42.2 1351 100.0
Phoenix
Related to landlord
18-54 29 46.8 62 100.0
55-59 0 - 0 100.0
60-64 0 - 4 100.0
65-69 0 - 4 100.0
70-74 1 33.3 3 100.0
75 and over 2 22.2 9 100.0
Total 32 39.0 82 100.0
Not related to landlord
18-54 686 77.2 889 100.0
55-59 17 45.9 37 100.0
60-64 21 40.4 52 100.0
65-69 28 37.3 75 100.0
70-74 18 32.1 56 100.0
75 and over 18 30.0 60 100.0
Total 788 67.4 1169 100.0
Source: Baseline Survey, Hades and Central Files.
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these families who were related to their landlord at baseline, every one
of them moved to another place where they were also related to the land-
lord. Table 4.26 shows that 100 percent of those in Phoenix over the
age of 60 who were related to their landlord at baseline were still rela-
ted at the end of two years. They may have moved, but they found an-
other place to live that was also owned by a relative.
Looked at another way, Table 5.11 indicates that, in Pittsburgh,
nearly twice as many non-movers than movers (8.4 percent compared to 4.8
percent) were related to their landlord, and nearly three times as many
in Phoenix (11.6 percent of non-movers, and 3.9 percent of movers).
Families who moved to a place where the landlord lived nearby were
more likely to eventually qualify for a housing allowance subsidy than
were families who moved to places where the landlord was more distant.
In Pittsburgh, 79.2 percent of families who moved to places where the
landlord lived in the same neighborhood qualified for a housing al-
lowance payment, and in Phoenix nearly 9 out of 10 movers whose new land-
lord lived in the same building received a housing allowance subsidy
(See Table 5.12). In Pittsburgh, moving near but not immediately adja-
cent to the landlord increased the probability of receiving a payment,
but in Phoenix closer proximity to the landlord was more effective. Peo-
ple who moved to places where the landlord lived further away were less
likely to qualify for a payment.
5.3.3 Moving Meant Giving Up Social Ties
The theory of resource packaging proposes that one reason that the
elderly do not move is a reluctance to disrupt their nonmonetary support
system. This would occur if moving meant a loss of social ties. The
281
Table 5.11
PROPORTION OF MOVERS AND NON-MOVERS
RELATED TO THEIR LANDLORD, BY AGE
Proportion related Total number of
Age to landlord families in the program
Pittsburgh
Moved
18-54 25 5.0% 497 100.0%
55-59 1 4.0 25 100.0
60-64 1 5.6 18 100.0
65-69 2 6.9 29 100.0
70-74 0 - 19 100.0
75 and over 0 - 14 100.0
Total 29 4.8 602 100.0
Did Not Move
18-54 57 10.8 527 100.0
55-59 2 4.1 49 100.0
60-64 1 2.4 41 100.0
65-69 6 6.3 95 100.0
70-74 1 1.4 74 100.0
75 and over 4 6.3 63 100.0
Total 71 8.4 849 100.0
Phoenix
Moved
18-54 29 4.1 715 100.0
55-59 0 - 17 100.0
60-64 0 - 21 100.0
65-69 0 - 28 100.0
70-74 1 5.3 19 100.0
75 and over 2 10.0 20 100.0
Total 32 3.9 820 100.0
Did Not Move
18-54 33 14.0 236 100.0
55-59 0 - 20 100.0
60-64 4 11.4 35 100.0
65-69 4 7.8 51 100.0
70-74 2 5.0 40 100.0
75 and over 7 14.3 49 100.0
Total 50 11.6 431 100.0
Source: Baseline Survey, Hades and Central Files.
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Table 5.12
LOCATION OF LANDLORD'S RESIDENCE
FOR MOVERS AT THE END OF TWO YEARS
FOR THOSE WHO MET THE EARMARKING REQUIREMENT
Age Met the earmark
Pittsburgh
Same building 9 69.2%
Same neighborhood 19 79.2
Same area, locality 25 61.0
Outside area 3 50.0
Group of owners 0 -
Became a homeowner 1 100.0
Total 57 67.1
Phoenix
Same building 14 87.5
Same neighborhood 23 60.5
Same area, locality 32 72.7
Outside area 24 68.6
Group of owners 3 100.0
Became a homeowner 0 -
Total 96 70.6
Sources: Third Periodic Survey, and Hades and Central Files.
283
evidence of the demand experiment supports this theory. For many parti-
cipants, moving resulted in losing a personal relationship with the land-
lord that was a hallmark of the kind of housing bargains and deals that
the elderly had constructed over the years.
One measure of this is that many of those who moved gave up living
in the same building as the landlord. Although about 13 percent of poor
households at baseline lived under the same roof as the owner of that
building, Table 5.13 shows that in Pittsburgh only 8.2 percent, and in
Phoenix 6.5 percent, of all participants who moved ended up in that kind
of living arrangement. However, a much higher proportion of elderly
than of nonelderly movers found new homes with landlords living in the
same building. With respect to the presence of the landlord in the
neighborhood, no firm conclusions can be drawn because the numbers are
so small. For all movers, their new homes were more likely to be owned
by a landlord who lived completely outside the area (14.3 percent in
Pittsburgh and 18.1 percent in Phoenix, compared to 11.9 percent in
Pittsburgh and 12.4 percent in Phoenix at baseline). Movers had de-
creased social ties, and the physical and probably also the social dis-
tance between tenant and landlord increased.
When we compare the location of the landlord's residence at base-
line with proximity after a move (Table 5.14), we see that, in Pitts-
burgh, families who started off in units where the landlord lived in the
same building were more likely to move to a place where the landlord al-
so lived in the same building (20.6 percent, compared to 8.9 percent of
all movers) than were other participants, but this was still a minority
of participating families. In Pittsburgh, those who began with high so-
cial ties maintained these personal ties; those who did not, could not
Table 5.13
LOCATION OF LANDLORD'S RESIDENCE AFTER THE MOVE FOR PARTICIPANTS WHO MOVED
Same area,
Same outside
Age Same building neighborhood neighborhood Outside area Group Homeowner Total
# % # % # % # # % It % #
Pittsburgh
18-54 16 6.6% 57 23.7% 95 39.4% 36 14.9% 2 0.8% 35 14.5% 241 100.0%
55-59 1 9.1 5 45.5 4 36.4 1 9.1 0 - 0 - 11 100.0
60-64 1 20.0 1 20.0 2 40.0 1 20.0 0 - 0 - 5 100.0
65-69 1 9.1 2 18.2 5 45.5 1 9.1 1 9.1 1 9.1 11 100.0
70-74 2 28.6 1 14.3 3 42.9 1 14.3 0 - 0 - 7 100.0
75 and 2 50.0 1 25.0 1 25.0 0 - 0 - 0 - 4 100.0
over
Total 23 8.2 67 24.0 110 39.4 40 14.3 3 1.1 36 12.9 279 100.0
Phoenix
18-54 24 6.0 84 20.9 115 28.7 70 17.5 12 3.0 96 23.9 401 100.0
55-59 2 22.2 1 11.1 3 33.3 2 22.2 0 - 1 11.1 9 100.0
60-64 1 12.5 2 25.0 3 37.5 2 25.0 0 - 0 - 8 100.0
65-69 0 - 6 46.2 4 30.8 2 15.4 1 7.7 0 - 13 100.0
70-74 1 20.0 1 20.0 0 - 2 40.0 1 20.0 0 - 5 100.0
75 and 1 14.3 2 28.6 1 14.3 2 28.6 0 - 1 14.3 7 100.0
over
Total 29 6.5 96 21.7 126 28.4 80 18.1 14 3.2 98 22.1 443 100.0
Source: Third Periodic Survey
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Table 5.14
LOCATION OF LANDLORD'S RESIDENCE AT BASELINE COMPARED TO LANDLORD'S RESIDENCE
AFTER MOVE, FOR PARTICIPANTS WHO MOVED
Pittsburgh
Landlord's Landlord's residence at baseline, for movers only
residence
at two years, Same Same Same area, Group
movers only building neighborhood Locality Outside area of owners Total
# % # % # % # % # % # %
Pittsburgh
Same building
Same
neighborhood
Same area,
locality
Outside area
Group of
owners
Became a
homeowner
Total
7 20.6%
30.4
12 35.3
19.7
7 20.6
7.0
6 17.6
15.8
0 -
2 5.9
5.9
34 100.0
13.1
3 4.4%
13.0
15 22.1
24.6
25 36.8
25.0
11 16.2
28.9
1 1.5
33.3
13 19.1
38.2
68 100.0
26.3
9 7.7%
39.1
23 19.7
37.7
48 41.0
48.0
19 16.2
50.0
2 1.7
66.7
16 13.7
47.1
117 100.0
45.2
4 10.5%
17.4
10 26.3
16.4
19 50.0
19.0
2 5.3
53.0
0
3 7.9
8.8
38 100.0
14.7
0 -%
1 50.0
1.6
1 50.0
1.0
0
0
0
2 100.0
0.8
23 8.9%
100.0
61 23.6
100.0
100 38.6
100.0
38 14.7
100.0
3 1.2
100.0
34 13.1
100.0
259 100.0
100.0
K)
Table 5.14 (page 2)
LOCATION OF LANDLORD'S RESIDENCE AT BASELINE COMPARED TO
LANDLORD'S RESIDENCE AFTER MOVE, FOR PARTICIPANTS WHO MOVED
Phoenix
Landlord's Landlord's residence at baseline, for movers only
residence
at two years, Same Same Same area, Group
movers only building neighborhood Locality Outside area of owners Total
Phoenix
Same building 2 6.7% 7 6.4% 14 6.5% 3 6.5% 0 - % 26 6.4%
7.7 26.9 53.8 11.5 - 100.0
Same 10 33.3 26 23.6 42 19.6 8 17.4 1 14.3 87 21.4
neighborhood 11.5 29.9 48.3 9.2 1.1 100.0
Same area, 5 16.7 23 20.9 72 33.6 16 34.8 0 - 116 28.5
locality 4.3 19.8 62.1 13.8 - 100.0
Outside area 6 20.0 18 16.4 41 19.2 8 17.4 3 42.9 76 18.7
7.9 23.7 53.Q 10.5 3.9 100.0
Group of 1 3.3 1 0.9 10 4.7 1 2.2 0 - 13 3.2
owners 7.7 7.7 76.9 7.7 - 100.0
Became a 6 20.0 35 31.8 35 16.4 10 21.7 3 42.9 89 21.9
homeowner 6.7 39.3 39.3 11.2 3.4 100.0
Total 30 100.0 110 100.0 214 100.0 46 100.0 7 100.0 407 100.0
7.4 27.0 52.6 11.3 1.7 100.0
Source: Baseline and Third Periodic Surveys.
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effectively develop them. In Phoenix there was much less continuity; te-
nants who started out living in the same building as their landlord were
more likely to move to a place where the landlord lived in the same
neighborhood (21.4 percent of all movers, and 33.3 percent of those who
originally resided in the same building as the landlord).
5.3.4 Moving Helped Families Receive A Housing Allowance Payment
Previous sections showed that most of the elderly participants in
EHAP did not move, but for the small proportion of elderly who did move,
why did they, and what makes it possible for them to move when they wish
to do so? Why did any elderly headed households move? The reason is
relatively clear -- to qualify for the housing allowance. Many families
could augment their financial resources only by moving to a new home
that qualified for a subsidy, if their pre-program housing did not meet
the requirements.
Families who moved were more likely than were families who did not
move to qualify for the allowance payment. About two out of three mo-
vers in a treatment group with housing standards qualified for a housing
allowance payment (67.1 percent in Pittsburgh and 70.6 percent in Phoe-
nix), a higher proportion than the 47.8 percent (in Pittsburgh) and the
55.3 percent (in Phoenix) of all participants in those treatment groups
who qualified for the payment. (See Tables 4.5 and 5.12). The allowance
augmented their economic support system, and they were willing to move,
if that was necessary, to qualify for the payment, despite the increased
monetary cost associated with the move (See below).
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5.3.5 Moving Meant Higher Housing Costs
People who moved during the experiment ended up with higher housing
cost burdens than did non-movers, although they generally moved to bet-
ter housing than they had been living in prior to the experiment. Their
total resource system was enhanced because they lived in better housing,
but the economic cost was high. In the case of movers, the housing al-
lowance payment was used to supplement the total resource system. Movers
would be more likely to meet the program's requirements and receive a
housing allowance payment, because they somehow had to offset their high-
er monthly financial obligations, and used the housing allowance payment
to pay their higher monthly rental costs. Movers needed the housing al-
lowance subsidy more than did those who did not move.
Moving almost inevitably meant increased housing costs in the hous-
ing allowance experiment (Struyk and Bendick, 1980). In all cities, mo-
vers experienced an average rent increase of 45 percent, compared to a 4
percent average increase for nonmovers (Cronin and Rasmussen, 1981, pp.
116-117). Moving increased the housing cost burden (rent as a propor-
tion of income) of low-income families (Tables 5.15 and 5.16). In Pitts-
burgh, 31 percent of those over the age of 75 who did not move but 50
percent of those who did move were paying more than 35 percent of their
income for rent at the end of the experimental period. For those under
the age of 75 but over 60, the pattern is less clear, but overall, those
who moved ended up having higher housing cost burdens than those who did
not move during the two year experiment.
The monetary cost of participating could be decreased by using the
social support system, which by definition requires no monetary compensa-
tion for services rendered, to help the elderly participants fix up
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Table 5.15
RENT BURDEN AT TWO YEARS OF FAMILIES
THAT MOVED DURING THE PROGRAM
Between
Less than 25 and 35 Over
Age 25 percent percent 35 percent Total
#% # % # % 7
Pittsburgh
18-54 182 44.8% 130 32.0% 94 23.2% 406 100.0%
55-59 12 50.0 7 29.2 5 20.8 24 100.0
60-64 10 55.6 5 27.8 3 16.7 18 100.0
65-69 13 48.1 4 14.8 10 37.0 27 100.0
70-74 4 25.0 9 56.3 3 18.8 16 100.0
75 and 4 33.3 2 16.7 6 50.0 12 100.0
over
Total 225 44.7 157 31.2 121 24.1 503 100.0
Phoenix
18-54 208 44.5 121 25.9 138 29.6 467 100.0
55-59 5 38.5 2 15.4 6 46.2 13 100.0
60-64 9 56.3 3 18.8 4 25.0 16 100.0
65-69 8 36.4 6 27.3 8 36.4 22 100.0
70-74 5 29.4 5 29.4 7 41.2 17 100.0
75 and 4 26.7 3 20.0 8 53.3 15 100.0
over
Total 239 43.5 140 25.5 171 31.1 550 100.0
Source: Hades and Central files
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Table 5.16
RENT BURDEN AT TWO YEARS OF FAMILIES
THAT DID NOT MOVE DURING THE PROGRAM
Between
Less than 25 and 35 Over
Age 25 percent percent 35 percent Total
#% # % # Y % #%
Pittsburgh
18-54 293 61.3% 108 22.6% 77 16.1% 478 100.0%
55-59 28 58.3 11 22.9 9 18.8 48 100.0
60-64 15 42.9 9 25.7 11 31.4 35 100.0
65-69 33 38.4 21 24.4 32 37.2 86 100.0
70-74 26 37.7 21 30.4 22 31.9 69 100.0
75 and 23 37.7 19 31.1 19 31.1 61 100.0
over
Total 418 53.8 189 24.3 170 21.9 777 100.0
Phoenix
18-54 110 56.1 49 25.0 37 18.9 196 100.0
55-59 7 36.8 9 47.4 3 15.8 19 100.0
60-64 12 38.7 10 32.3 9 29.0 31 100.0
65-69 15 34.1 13 29.5 16 36.4 44 100.0
70-74 10 27.0 13 35.1 14 37.8 37 100.0
75 and 13 33.3 13 33.3 13 33.3 39 100.0
over
Total 167 45.6 107 29.2 92 25.1 366 100.0
Source: Hades and Central files
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their old home, locate a new place to live, and help them to move in.
Once a decision was made to move, the assistance of members of the so-
cial network was crucial in implementing that decision. The assistance
provided to the aged by the members of their social support systems,
through help in searching and in actually moving, was very important
when they had to take some action to meet the conditions of the experi-
ment.
5.4 The Effect of Social Networks on Mobility
Even though elderly-headed households overwhelmingly stay in their
long-term housing, if they want to move they draw on their social net-
works for help in finding and moving to a new home. Section 5.3.3 shows
that moving increases net housing costs. This section shows how the mo-
netary cost of participation was decreased by use of the social network
(which by definition required no monetary compensation for services ren-
dered) to help the elderly participants fix up their old home, locate a
new place to live, and help them to move in. Once a decision was made
to move, the assistance of members of the social network is crucial in
implementing that decision. Members of social networks helped the elder-
ly to search, repair, and move, Steps 5, 6 and 7 (Figure 4.2) of quali-
fying for a housing allowance payment.
What role do family and friends play, whether the decision is made
in order to qualify for a housing allowance, or to find a better quality
or more suitable or cheaper unit regardless of the availability of the
allowance? The evidence of the housing allowance experiment is that the
social network plays a major role in the moves of participating fami-
lies. Those households, especially the elderly, who had to either re-
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pair their homes or move in order to qualify for a payment, received in-
dispensible help from family and friends.
5.4.1 Friends and neighbors help with repairs (Step 7)
The elderly are more dependent on the help of their friends and
neighbors, in general, than are younger households. When something goes
wrong in their home, the young-old are more likely, but the old-old are
slightly less likely than the young, to fix it themselves (Tables 5.17
and 5.18). The old-old are slightly more likely than are younger people
to call on an agent of the landlord rather than on the landlord him/her-
self to make repairs; this may be related to fear of the landlord often
expressed by old people to their social workers in the administering
agencies (Author's field notes).
Of the 9 percent of all families in the supply experiment who quali-
fied for payments by repairing their homes, most did the repairs them-
selves (McDowell, 1979), but elderly households in both Green Bay and
South Bend were less likely to do the work themselves, and were more
likely to rely on help from others. Table 5.1Q shows that, for home-
owners, in Green Bay 48 percent of the elderly but 76 percent of the
nonelderly enrollees, and in South Bend 32 percent of the elderly and 59
percent of the nonelderly, did the required repairs with their own la-
bor. Owners in South Bend were slightly more likely to hire a contrac-
tor than were owners in Green Bay, but in both cities the elderly were
more likely to hire help (18 percent in Green Bay and 23 percent in
South Bend) than were the nonelderly (10 percent in Green Bay and 14
percent in South Bend), and also more likely to call on the help of a
friend. Elderly owners in the two cities called on friends
Table 5.17
WHO IS CONTACTED FIRST WHEN SOMETHING IS WRONG WITH YOUR UNIT?
(AT BASELINE)
Agent of land- Fix it
Age Landlord lord or other* Someone else ourselves Total
Pittsburgh
18-54 1,959 78.2% 156 6.2% 355 14.2% 35 1.4% 2,505 100.0%
55-59 173 80.5 14 6.5 23 10.7 5 2.3 215 100.0
60-64 220 86.3 8 3.1 26 10.2 1 0.4 255 100.0
65-69 295 75.8 36 9.3 54 13.9 4 1.0 389 100.0
70-74 199 78.1 30 7.8 52 13.6 2 0.5 383 100.0
75 and 373 76.0 47 9.6 71 14.5 0 - 41 100.0
over
Total 3,319 78.3 291 6.9 581 13.7 47 1.1 4,238 100.0
Phoenix
18-54 2,040 67.9 750 25.0 117 3.9 99 3.3 3,006 100.0
55-59 74 64.3 26 22.6 7 6.1 8 7.0 115 100.0
60-64 114 68.7 39 23.5 5 3.0 8 4.8 166 100.0
65-69 134 69.4 46 23.8 10 5.2 3 1.6 193 100.0
70-74 131 66.2 51 25.8 7 3.5 9 4.5 198 100.0
75 and 201 68.8 78 26.7 8 2.7 5 1.7 292 100.0
over
Total 2,694 67.9 990 24.9 154 3. 132 3.3 3,970 100.0
*An agent of the landlord can be a
Source: Third Periodic Survey
superintendent, a building manager, or a maintenance person.
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Table 5.18
WHO IS ASKED TO FIX THINGS IN UNIT WHEN THEY BREAK
(AT TWO YEARS)
Agent of land- Friends Fix it
Age Landlord lord or other* or relatives ourselves Total
# % # # % #
Pittsburgh
18-54 808 84.5% 108 11.3% 5 0.5% 35 3.7% 456 100.0%
55-59 59 81.9 12 16.6 0 - 1 1.4 72 100.0
60-64 52 89.7 6 10.3 0 - 0 - 58 100.0
65-69 97 80.2 10 15.6 1 0.8 4 3.3 121 100.0
70-74 73 82.0 15 16.9 0 - 1 1.1 89 100.0
75 and 61 79.2 15 19.5 0 - 1 1.3 77 100.0
over
Total 1,150 83.8 175 12.7 6 0.4 42 3.1 1,373 100.0
Phoenix
18-54 526 69.5 180 23.8 5 0.7 46 6.1 757 100.0
55-59 24 72.7 6 18.2 1 3.0 2 6.1 33 100.0
60-64 36 70.6 12 23.5 0 - 3 5.9 51 100.0
65-69 56 72.7 17 22.1 0 - 4 5.2 77 100.0
70-74 39 67.2 17 29.3 0 - 2 3.4 58 100.0
75 and 50 76.9 13 20.0 0 - 2 3.1 65 100.0
over
Total 731 70.2 245 23.6 6 0.6 59 5.7 1,041 100.0
*An agent of the landlord can be a superintendent, a building manager, or a maintenance person.
Source: Third Periodic Survey
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Table 5.19
SOURCE OF LABOR FOR INITIAL REPAIRS
BY ELDERLY AND NONELDERLY ENROLLEES
(in percents)
Enrollee Landlord Friend Contractor Other Total
#- %
Green Bay
Homeowners
elderly
nonelderly
Renters
elderly
nonelderly
South Bend
Homeowners
elderly
nonelderly
Renters
elderly
nonelderly
48
76
30
50
32
59
22
42
46
33
47
37
33
14
7
10
39
22
18
10
18
10
17
7
23
14
11
10
1 311 100
1 607 100
(a) 211
(a) 1,713
100
100
6 1,367 100
4 1,168 100
2 378
1 3,215
100
100
Source: McDowell (1979), p. 57, Table 4.1.
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approximately twice as often as did the nonelderly: 33 percent of the
elderly and 14 percent of the nonelderly in Green Bay, and 39 percent of
the elderly and 22 percent of the nonelderly in South Bend had friends
perform the repairs.
Table 5.19 also shows that elderly renters in Green Bay were more
likely (17 percent) than were renters in South Bend (11 percent) to have
repairs made by a contractor; in South Bend, the repair was more likely
to be done by a friend (18 percent in South Bend and 7 percent in Green
Bay). This may be due to the higher proportion of minorities in South
Bend, and the existence of exchange networks in minority communities
(Stack, 1973).
Renters were less likely than were owners to do their own repairs,
and elderly renters were more likely to call on their landlords (46 per-
cent in Green Bay, 47 percent in South Bend) than were the nonelderly
(33 percent in Green Bay, 37 percent in South Bend). This confirms the
ideas suggested in Chapter 4 on the importance of the relationship with
landlords. Nearly half of the elderly renters in the supply experiment
relied on their landlords to make the repairs that were necessary to
help them qualify for the allowance payment, compared to about a third
of the renters. By contrast, nearly half of the elderly homeowners in
Green Bay did the repairs themselves. In South Bend, the modal way that
elderly homeowners qualified was to have a friend make the necessary re-
pairs, again confirming the importance of social ties in meeting the
requirements of the program.
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5.4.2 Locating a New Place to Live (Steps 5 and 6)
Word of mouth and personal contacts seem to be the best way to find
a new place to live (Granovetter, 1973), and were more important for the
elderly than for the nonelderly. Table 5.20 shows that in Pittsburgh
over half of all those who moved in the three years preceeding the
baseline survey, and about two-thirds of those over the age of 70, found
their new units through information from friends or relatives; in
Phoenix, 38.9 percent of all participants, but over
the age of 70, found
The second best way to
and (in Phoenix only)
overwhelming majority
found their new homes
Families who had
survey in the demand
present unit, and the
half of those over
their present unit through a friend or relative.
find a new home was by looking in the newspapers,
scanning vacancy signs placed in windows, but the
of movers, both before and during the experiment,
through personal contacts.
moved in the three years preceeding the baseline
experiment were asked how they had located their
evidence shows that the modal method of finding a
new housing unit was through a friend or a relative. The same was true
of those who moved during the two year experimental period (Table 5.21);
the participants who searched during the course of the experiment used
virtually identical methods: 57.3 percent in Pittsburgh and 40.8 per-
cent in Phoenix (the smaller sample size makes the proportions unstable
for these age categories) found their new home through word of mouth,
but this way of finding a new home was more effective in Pittsburgh than
in Phoenix.
It is interesting that those who looked for a new place to live du-
ring the course of the experiment used many methods; they checked bulle-
tin boards, read newspapers, hired realtors, looked at vacancy signs,
Table 5.20
HOW RESPONDENTS WHO MOVED IN THE THREE YEARS PRECEDING THE BASELINE SURVEY
FOUND THEIR PRESENT UNIT
Age Friend or relative Newspaper Vacancy sign Realtor
# # % ##%
Pittsburgh
18-54 768 50.2% 342 22.4% 72 4.7% 154 10.1%
55-59 31 54.4 10 17.5 2 3.5 5 8.8
60-64 44 60.3 12 16.4 3 4.1 7 9.6
65-69 46 47.4 18 18.6 5 5.2 13 13.4
70-74 58 65.9 11 12.5 1 1.1 9 10.2
75 and 69 67.5 15 14.7 2 2.0 8 7.8
over
Total 1,016 52.2 408 21.0 85 4.4 196 10.1
Phoenix
18-54 988 37.4 600 22.7 621 23.5 82 3.1
55-59 15 25.0 13 21.7 13 21.7 3 5.0
60-64 42 41.6 19 18.8 21 20.8 0 -
65-69 43 46.2 18 19.4 16 17.2 1 1.1
70-74 51 57.3 14 15.7 13 14.6 0 -
75 and 75 54.7 13 9.5 21 15.3 3 2.2
over
Total 1,214 38.9 677 21.7 705 22.6 89 2.8
Table 5.20, continued
HOW RESPONDENTS WHO MOVED IN THE THREE YEARS PRECEDING THE BASELINE SURVEY
FOUND THEIR PRESENT UNIT
Knew Neighborhood
Age former tenant Social Worker Bulletin Board Total
# %# % # %7#
Pittsburgh
18-54 77 5.0% 6 0.4% 7 0.5% 1,530 100.0%
55-59 3 5.3 0 - 0 - 57 100.0
60-64 0 - 0 - 1 1.4 73 100.0
65-69 4 4.1 1 1.0 1 1.0 97 100.0
70-74 3 3.4 0 - 0 - 88 100.0
75 and 3 2.9 0 - 0 - 102 100.0
over
Total 90 4.6 7 0.4 9 0.5 1,947 100.0
Phoenix
18-54 70 2.6 11 0.4 12 0.5 2,644 100.0
55-59 2 3.3 0 - 1 1.7 60 100.0
60-64 4 4.0 0 - 0 - 101 100.0
65-69 3 3.2 0 - 0 - 93 100.0
70-74 0 - 1 1.1 0 - 89 100.0
75 and 5 3.6 0 - 0 - 137 100.0
over
Total 84 2.7 12 0.4 13 0.4 3,124 100.0
IQ
Table 5.21
HOW PARTICIPANTS WHO MOVED DURING THE FIRST TWO YEARS OF THE EXPERIMENT
FOUND THEIR PRESENT UNIT
Age Friend or relative Newspaper Vacancy sign Realtor
Pittsburgh
18-54 130 56.5% 30 17.0% 16 7.0% 37 16.1%
55-59 6 60.0 2 20.0 1 10.0 1 10.0
60-64 4 80.0 0 - 1 20.0 0 -
65-69 8 72.7 1 9.1 0 - 1 9.1
70-74 3 42.9 1 14.3 1 14.3 2 28.6
75 and 2 50.0 0 0 0 - 1 25.0
over
Total 153 57.3 43 16.1 19 7.1 42 15.7
Phoenix
18-54 159 38.9 86 21.0 108 26.4 44 10.8
55-59 6 60.0 0 - 2 20.0 1 10.0
60-64 5 62.5 1 12.5 2 25.0 0 -
65-69 7 58.3 2 16.7 1 8.3 1 8.3
70-74 4 80.0 0 - 0 - 1 20.0
75 and 2 50.0 1 25.0 1 25.0 0 -
over
Total 183 40.8 90 20.1 114 25.4 47 10.5
Source: Third Periodic Survey
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Table 5.21, (page 2)
HOW PARTICIPANTS WHO MOVED DURING THE FIRST TWO YEARS OF THE EXPERIMENT
FOUND THEIR PRESENT UNIT
Knew Neighborhood
Age former tenant Social Worker Bulletin Board Total
Pittsburgh
18-54 8 3.5% 0 - % 0 - % 230 100.0%
55-59 0 - 0 - 0 - 10 100.0
60-64 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 100.0
65-69 1 9.1 0 - 0 - 11 100.0
70-74 0 - 0 - 0 - 7 100.0
75 and 1 25.0 0 - 0 - 4 100.0
over
Total 10 3.7 0 - 0 - 267 100.0
Phoenix
18-54 7 1.7 1 0.2 4 1.0 409 100.0
55-59 0 - 0 - 1 10.0 10 100.0
60-64 0 - 0 - 0 - 8 100.0
65-69 1 8.3 0 - 0 - 12 100.0
70-74 0 - 0 - 0 - 5 100.0
75 and 0 - 0 - 0 - 4 100.0
over
Total 8 1.8 1 0.2 5 10.5 448 100.0
Source: Third Periodic Survey
LA)
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and asked friends and relatives, but the method that got results was the
"personal touch." Table 5.22 shows that 11 percent in both Pittsburgh
and Phoenix looked at bulletin boards, 59.5 percent in Pittsburgh and
50.8 percent in Phoenix looked at newspapers, 51.8 percent in Pittsburgh
and 24 percent in Phoenix used realtors, and 34.6 percent in Pittsburgh
and 52.1 percent in Phoenix checked vacancy signs, but those methods
were not as productive as using friends and relatives. Other ways of
looking for housing were used, but personal networks were the most
effective.
Did those using personal networks find housing that was less expen-
sive than those who found new homes using other methods? Table 5.23
shows that this was not necessarily the case. Most participants thought
that their new housing cost about the same as their previous housing,
but a greater proportion in Phoenix (69.5 percent) than in Pittsburgh
(54.9 percent) thought that their housing costs were unchanged even af-
ter moving. Families who found their new home through a newspaper (in
Pittsburgh) and through a realtor (in Phoenix) were most likely to think
that the cost had increased. Interestingly, 17.3 percent of movers in
Phoenix, but 11.9 percent in Pittsburgh, thought that their new home was
less expensive than the previous one, and those who found their units
through friends or relatives were not more likely to think that their
housing cost had gone down. So, lower cost is not the only reason to
use personal ties to find a new place; if the self-report of the par-
ticipants is to be trusted, finding a place through a realtor (in Pitts-
burgh) and a bulletin board (in Phoenix) is a better way to find a less
expensive place to live.
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Table 5.22
PERCENT OF ALL SEARCHERS USING VARIOUS SOURCES OF INFORMATION
TO FIND OUT ABOUT AVAILABLE UNITS
Bulletin Friends or Social Vacancy
Age boards relatives Newspapers Realtors workers signs
# % # % # % # T %
Pittsburgh
18-54 59 12.6% 307 65.3% 294 62.6% 259 55.1% 17 3.6% 172 36.6%
55-59 3 9.7 17 54.8 18 58.1 9 29.0 0 0.0 6 19.4
60-64 2 13.3 8 53.3 8 53.3 8 53.3 1 6.7 6 40.0
65-69 2 8.0 13 52.0 10 40.0 8 32.0 2 8.0 7 28.0
70-74 1 6.7 8 53.3 6 40.0 6 40.0 0 0.0 5 33.3
75 and 0 0.0 7 70.0 1 10.0 3 30.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
over
Total 67 11.8 360 63.6 337 59.5 293 51.8 20 3.5 196 34.6
Phoenix
18-54 64 11.0 275 47.1 309 52.9 145 24.8 15 2.6 311 53.3
55-59 2 15.4 6 46.2 4 30.8 1 7.7 0 0.0 6 46.2
60-64 3 27.3 6 54.5 6 54.5 2 18.2 2 18.2 5 45.5
65-69 2 8.7 8 34.8 6 26.1 4 17.4 1 4.3 10 43.5
70-74 2 25.0 6 75.0 2 25.0 2 25.0 0 0.0 3 37.5
75 and 0 0.0 3 30.0 3 30.0 2 20.0 0 0.0 3 30.0
over
Total 73 11.3 304 46.8 330 50.8 156 24.0 18 2.8 338 52.1
Adds to more than 100 because respondents could give more than one answer.
Source: Third Periodic Survey
Table 5.23
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HOW A NEW UNIT WAS FOUND, AND ITS COST
COMPARED TO THE PREVIUS UNIT, FOR MOVERS ONLY, AFTER TWO YEARS
This is more This is less Both were about
How unit was found expensive expensive the same Total
Pittsburgh
newspaper 18 41.9% 3 7.0% 22 51.2% 43 100.0%
realtor 16 38.1 7 16.7 19 45.2 42 100.0
bulletin board 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
vacancy sign 5 26.3 3 15.8 11 57.9 19 100.0
friend or relative 49 31.8 19 12.3 86 55.8 154 100.0
social worker 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
knew former tenant 1 10.0 0 - 9 90.0 10 100.0
Total 89 33.2 32 11.9 147 54.9 268 100.0
Phoenix
newspaper 10 10.9 16 17.4 66 71.7 92 100.0
realtor 10 21.7 4 8.7 32 69.6 46 100.0
bulletin board 0 - 2 40.0 3 60.0 5 100.0
vacancy sign 16 13.9 20 17.4 79 68.7 115 100.0
friend or relative 24 13.1 36 19.7 123 67.2 183 100.0
social worker 0 - 0 - 1 100.0 1 100.0
knew former tenant 0 - 0 - 10 100.0 10 100.0
Total 60 13.3 78 17.3 314 69.5 452 100.0
SOURCE: Hades and Central Files; Third Periodic Survey
(A
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5.4.3 Did the Elderly Need Special Help in Qualifying?
A survey of the elderly done for the administrative agency experi-
ment found that most of the elderly had no special problems, and were
able to get any assistance they needed from outside the administering
agency. The help offered by friends or relatives was much greater than
help offered by the agency, for searchers who either moved or stayed.
Assistance was provided by friends and relatives, and most often inclu-
ded notifying the participant of apartments that were available; friends
and relatives also provided transportation assistance, helped the elder-
ly to negotiate with landlords, and helped them in making housing deci-
sions (Wolfe, Hamilton, and Trend, 1977: p. 95).
There is no comparable data for the demand experiment except for
the data discussed above concerning searching for a new home, but there
is no compelling reason to think that the experience was different in
the Pittsburgh and Phoenix sites. Table 5.24 is the closest we can come
with the demand experiment data base, and it indicates that, although a
very small proportion of all families relied on somebody outside the
household to make the decision to move to the current unit, a higher pro-
portion of households whose heads were over 70 relied on outside help,
than of younger households. The numbers are very small and merely sug-
gestive, however. The role of people outside the household of the elder-
ly family/person has not been studied, and is worthy of further atten-
tion.
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Table 5.24
WHO DECIDED TO MOVE TO THIS UNIT,
FOR MOVERS ONLY, AT TWO YEARS
Spouse or other
Age Respondent household member Someone else Total
Pittsburgh
18-54 230 69.7% 95 28.8% 5 1.5% 330 100.0%
55-59 9 50.0 9 50.0 0 - 18 100.0
60-64 6 100.0 0 - 0 - 6 100.0
65-69 11 73.3 3 20.0 1 6.7 15 100.0
70-74 6 54.5 3 27.3 2 18.2 11 100.0
75 and 3 60.0 1 20.0 1 20.0 5 100.0
over
Total 265 68.8 111 28.8 9 2.3 385 100.0
Phoenix
18-54 388 62.8 228 36.9 1 0.2 617 100.0
55-59 9 69.2 4 30.8 0 - 13 100.0
60-64 9 64.3 5 35.7 0 - 14 100.0
65-69 14 87.5 2 12.5 0 16 100.0
70-74 5 62.5 1 12.5 2 25.0 8 100.0
75 and 5 55.6 3 33.3 1 11.1 9 100.0
over
Total 430 63.5 243 35.9 4 0.6 677 100.0
Source: Third Periodic Survey
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5.5 Conclusion
Social factors affect the mobility of low-income elderly families
in the housing allowance experiment in several ways. Although residen-
tial stability is the rule among the elderly of almost all ages and so-
cial classes, it is generally people with few social ties who move. A
minority of elderly headed households move either in the experiment or
in the population at large. In the experiment, moves were generally
local, and helped qualify for the housing allowance payment. High
social resources inhibited moves, as they inhibit participation in the
early stages of the experiment (Ch4pter 4), but when a decision to move
is made, the elderly call on their family and friends to help them out.
In the housing allowance experiment the availability of social
supports, particularly friends and relatives in a neighborhood, helped
the elderly qualify for the allowance payment. People who moved general-
ly faced higher housing costs, but in the experiment the elderly used
nonmonetized assistance from their friends and families to increase
their economic resources with an allowance payment. Friends and family
were used to help the elderly repair their pre-program units, search for
housing, and move into new housing.
The general conclusion of this chapter is that, although changing
residences is usually avoided by the elderly, when they do choose to
move, they need help from outside their own households to find a place
that is suitable for their economic, physical, and social status. The
help, however, is not strictly financial. They need more than just
money if they are to move to better housing. They need services.
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NOTES
This story is based on the author's unpublished field notes from the
Jacksonville site of the administrative agency experiment.
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION: HOUSING ALLOWANCES CONSIDERED
6.1 Introduction
This dissertation had two major goals. The first was to explore
the role of social factors in the housing behavior of the elderly in the
housing allowance experiment in light of a theory of resource packaging,
and the second was to evaluate the suitability of housing allowances for
solving the housing problems of the elderly. This evaluation was based
partially on the outcomes of the first part of the research and partial-
ly on consideration of a proper role for housing allowances in a nation-
al housing policy for the elderly.
To achieve the research goals described above, this study drew upon
the literature of the sociology of the family, the development of the
economic support system, and measures of the housing conditions of the
elderly. Attention then turned to analysis of a computerized data base
developed for the Experimental Housing Allowance Program (EHAP), to see
what light those data could shed on whether, and how, social factors
affected the behavior of the elderly in the experiment, and what these
influences meant for the success of housing allowances in solving the
housing problems of the elderly.
The national housing goal, as promulgated in 1949 and reiterated in
1968, is to provide a decent home in a suitable living environment to
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every American family. What are the housing needs of the elderly, do
housing allowances meet these needs, and who is well served by this kind
of income approach to the housing problems of older people? With what
mix of programs should housing allowances be combined to help house the
elderly, or can a national program of housing allowances alone, as
proposed by the Reagan Administration, achieve this goal?
Housing allowances combine features of both income and housing pro-
grams, imposing housing requirements on what is essentially an income
subsidy; they are analagous to the Food Stamp program administered by
the U. S. Department of Agriculture. This program requires that Food
Stamps recipients purchase only food produced in the United States,
making Food Stamps an income supplement earmarked for domestically pro-
duced food. Beyond that general requirement, foods of such varying
nutritional quality as steaks, soybeans, soft drinks and potato chips
can all be purchased by the needy families that use food stamps, al-
though such nonfood items as deodorant and facial tissue cannot be
purchased with the stamps.
The main question of this chapter is if the housing allowance
income program with a superimposed housing quality requirement meets the
needs of the elderly population. The logical next question to ask is,
if housing allowances as structured in the housing allowance experiment
do not adequately serve the needs of the elderly, what kind of restruc-
turing would better meet those needs?
The first step is to delineate the housing needs of the elderly,
incorporating the lessons of the research described in this monograph.
The second step is to evaluate whether housing allowances, as tested,
met those needs. And the third is to suggest revisions to national
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housing policy with respect to the elderly in a way that meets their spe-
cial needs, using on-going or suggested programs for the elderly as
models.
To date, housing policy for the elderly has been more indirect than
direct (Alonso, 1972), and more in the nature of a set of loosely rela-
ted programs than a coherent policy with clear objectives and a consis-
tent strategy. According to Neugarten (1982), national policies on
aging have two goals. The first is to enhance the lives of older men
and women, and the second is to facilitate the changes occurring in
society because of the changing age distribution. A defensible housing
goal for the elderly, then, would be a housing policy that can provide a
decent home and suitable living environment to the elderly population in
a way that can enhance their lives, yet is still flexible enough to
accommodate the changing age structure of society now and in the future.
The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section
(6.2) summarizes the housing needs of the elderly, and evaluates the evi-
dence offered in this report with respect to social factors in the hous-
ing allowance experiment. The second section (6.3) summarizes the evi-
dence offered as to whether housing allowances, as tested, met those
needs. The third section (6.4) suggests how the data presented in this
dissertation can help us revise national housing programs for the elder-
ly, with the goal of clarifying policy goals and achieving the national
housing objective.
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6.2 Major Findings
This dissertation posed a set of research questions to help us un-
derstand the behavior of the elderly in the housing allowance experiment
in conjunction with the social factors involved in the housing decision.
This analysis suggests that poor people's needs include but are not
limited to monetary assistance, since their decisions take account of
more than just the monetary component of their resource systems. Since
both income and social resources are unequally distributed within the
elderly population, analysis of the effect of these resources on housing
decisions uses a method that disaggregates this population along the
relevant dimensions. This section (6.2) first reviews the evidence
presented in this report on the housing conditions of the elderly. It
then turns to evidence from the housing allowance experiment to see how
social factors influenced the housing decisions of the elderly
6.2.1 The Housing Conditions of the Elderly
Despite a decrease over the past several decades in the proportion
of elderly headed households with incomes below the poverty level, many
elderly people, especially women and minorities, still have below pover-
ty level incomes. The economic support system described in Chapter 2
has only partially solved the major housing problem which (according to
Chapter 3) is excessive cost. While the housing problems of the el-
derly, along with those of the rest of the population (Frieden and Solo-
mon, 1977) have shifted from being primarily physical to being largely
financial in nature, some old people, especially those aged 75 and over,
continue to live in substandard housing conditions.
Although most of the elderly headed renter households eligible for
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housing allowances lived in housing that passed most of the criteria in
an independent baseline evaluation of housing conditions, in Pittsburgh
about 30 percent, and in Phoenix 20 to 25 percent of people aged 70 or
over lived in housing that failed some or all of these housing quality
standards (Table 3.5). While excess rent burden affected a larger
proportion of the families (Table 3.6 shows that more than half of the
enrolled elderly households in both cities paid more than 35 percent of
their incomes for housing), between a fourth and a third of the low-
income eligible elderly population lived in defective housing. Analysis
of Table 3.9 shows that in Pittsburgh 16 percent and in Phoenix 11
percent of the household heads over the age of 70 were both living in
housing that failed some or all of the baseline housing measures and
were paying more than 35 percent of their incomes for shelter.
There have been two kinds of programs for the aged: direct pro-
grams funded by and administered through HUD that have concentrated on
producing low cost housing units for both elderly and nonelderly poor
families (Table 6.1), and an indirect housing program embedded in the
income tax system. In addition, programs initiated by the 1965 Older
American's Act provide special services such as home care for the frail
that help them avoid institutionalization, and senior centers that
function as social centers and affect housing choices by cushioning the
impact of aging and isolation.
6.2.1.1 Most of the elderly are homeowners
Although in 1980 over 72 percent of households headed by someone
age 65 or over owned its own home, compared to 66 percent of families of
all ages (Table 3.5), housing allowances were only available to eligible
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owners in the supply experiment cities of Green Bay and South Bend. The
other ten cities limited participation to renters.
In the supply experiment, a higher proportion of eligible renters
than owners in both cities qualified for payments, but because there are
so many more owners than renters, the majority of both the eligible and
recipient population were homeowners. In Green Bay, there were 1,037
elderly eligible renter households and 2,094 eligible owner households;
in South Bend, there were 1,548 elderly eligible renter households, but
6,592 eligible owner households (Table 4.2).
The 1977 Annual Housing Survey showed that although high propor-
tions of elderly homeowners own their homes free and clear (91 percent
of single females and 87 percent of single males), lower proportions of
married couples (80.9 percent) and of female (81 percent) and male (84
percent) heads with others in the household have completed payments on
their mortgages.
Over a fourth (26.8 percent) of the elderly still paying off mort-
gages had a household income of less than $5000 in 1977 (Weisbrod, et.
al. 1982, p. 6-5), and about a fourth (25.6 percent) of households
headed by people age 65 or older who had mortgages were paying 35 per-
cent or more of their incomes for housing costs, compared to only 7.6
percent of families who have paid off their mortgages (Weisbrod et. al.
1982, p. 6-4). However, because of the large numbers of elderly home-
owners who have finished paying off their mortgages, of all elderly
households with a rent burden ratio of 35 percent or greater, 63 percent
own their homes free and clear (Weisbrod et. al. 1982, pp. 6-2). Home-
ownership does not guarantee that the budget of the elderly household is
not stressed by housing costs. Even though homeowners have an asset,
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Table 6.1: HUD-PRODUCED OR FINANCED HOUSING UNITS FOR THE
ELDERLY, CUMULATIVE THROUGH 1980
Name of Program
Low Income Public
Housing
Section 202
Section 231, mortgage
insurance
Sections 221(d)3 and
221(d)4, multifamily
rental housing
Section 235, low-
income ownership
Section 207,
multifamily rental
Section 236
rental and coop
assistance
Section 202/236
conversions
Section 232,nursing
homes and
intermediate care
Section 8
1. existing
2. new
construction
3. substantial
rehabilitation
Section 312
rehabilitation loans
Section 23
TOTAL
Total
Number of
Units
1,200,000
Percent of
Units for
Elderly
46%
136,991 95-100%
64,116
794,321
513,925
285,108
434,645
28,306
145,262
821,418
538,561
112,828
n/a
163,267
5,238,748
100
7
n/a
1.2
12
100
100
29
54
35
25
35
Number of
Elderly Reporting
Units Period
552,000 through
9/79
132,797 through
5/80
64,116 through
12/79
55,602 through
12/79
n/a through
5/80
3,421 through
12/79
53,799 through
12/78
28,306 through
12/78
145,262 through
12/79
240,742 5/31/80
290,447 5/31/80
40,107 5/31/80
na 9/79
54,000 12/75
32 1,660,599
Source: adapted from Special Committee on Aging, United States Senate,
Developments in Aging: 1980, Part 2 - Appendixes (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1981) p. 288).
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their home, it does not produce income and is therefore of no help when
monthly utility, tax, grocery, medical, and clothing bills must be paid.
In the housing allowance experiment, even though a greater number
of owners than of renters were eligible for the allowance, Table 4.2
shows that a much lower proportion of eligible elderly owners than of
eligible renters qualified for an allowance payment (48 percent of rent-
ers and 25 percent of owners in Green Bay, and 39 percent of renters and
27 percent of owners in South Bend).
The low participation rate of owners in the housing allowance expe-
riment does not, however, in any way help us to understand the high rate
of refusal of the elderly to enroll in the demand experiment, because
homeowners were not eligible to take part in the demand experiment.
Only eligible renters were asked to enroll in that experiment, and so
the high rate of refusal there has nothing to do with rates of home-
ownership.
Unless this substantial proportion of the elderly population is
allowed to participate in this program, a large proportion of the eli-
gible, needy elderly will be summarily excluded from benefitting from
this public subsidy. There is no obvious reason to exclude homeowners
from participation in a housing allowance program, since they are eligi-
ble for it by the criteria of income and household size. It is presumed
that homeownership provides advantages to people that means they do not
need an allowance, but the value of their homes as an asset is of little
use to them unless it is sold, at which time other housing has to be pro-
cured. Such programs as a reverse mortgage (e.g. Weisbrod et. al.,
1982) can help the elderly homeowner obtain a cash flow from their fixed
asset, their home, as can more traditional approaches such as renting
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surplus rooms to boarders. Reverse mortgage schemes are in their
infancy and merit further study to assess both the risks and potential
benefits to elderly homeowners (Weisbrod et. al., 1982).
Although homeowners in general enjoy one of the largest public sub-
sidies available in this country, a tax system which allows homeowners
to deduct mortgage interest and property tax payments from their taxable
income, because most of the elderly have already paid off their mort-
gages (Weisbrod, et. al. 1982) they have no interest payments to deduct
from their tax obligation. In addition, many states have property tax
exemptions for the elderly which reduce their effective tax deductions
as well as their property tax liabilities (Abt Associates, 1975). Taken
together with the generally lower incomes of the elderly, which make tax
breaks less valuable, the elderly do not disproportionately benefit from
tax breaks for homeowners.
6.2.1.2 The Elderly Have Low Mobility Rates
Most of the elderly age in place. In the demand experiment, the
mobility rates of people over the age of about 65 were, in Pittsburgh,
less than half that of young families. In that city, 48.4 percent of
families whose heads were between ages 18 and 54 moved during the two
years of the experiment, compared to 20.2 percent of those age 70 to 74,
and 17.9 percent of those age 75 and over. In Phoenix, the comparable
rates were 75.3 percent for young families, and 32.2 percent and 29.0
percent for households over the age of 70.
Although most of the elderly in all treatment groups who qualified
for the allowance payment did so in their pre-program housing, moving
helped people qualify for a housing allowance. More families would pro-
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bably have qualified for the subsidy if they had moved, but many, either
voluntarily or involuntarily, did not. Either they would rather refrain
from moving than receive the housing subsidy, or they could not find a
place to rent where their allowance voucher was accepted that they both
wanted to move to and could afford. In Pittsburgh, 59.6 percent of
families who moved receive the subsidy payment, compared to 42.0 percent
of families who did not move. In Phoenix, the comparable figures were
66.9 percent and 38.5 percent.
The lower mobility rates among the elderly in EHAP means that they
had been residents in their homes much longer than had younger people,
with families in Pittsburgh living in their homes much longer than
families in Phoenix. Being a long-term tenant decreased the proportion
who qualified for a payment. Families seemed reluctant to leave their
long-term homes in order to qualify for the payments, and apparently
their homes could not meet the housing requirements of the program, or
they would have met the program's standards without having to move.
Alternatively, homes that have been lived in longer might be older and
more run-down, and less likely to meet the standardness requirement
without major repairs.
The elderly who moved from their pre-program housing had fewer so-
cial ties in their former areas than did participants who did not move.
They were shorter-term residents of their areas; were less likely to
have relatives in their old areas; and were less likely to be related to
their landlords. In addition, movers whose new homes were near their
new landlords were more likely than were other families to eventually
qualify for the housing allowance payment.
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There are rational reasons why the elderly chose not to move from
their long-term homes. Moving could mean losing social ties, and almost
certainly meant paying more for housing than before the move. Many of
those who moved gave up living in the same building as their landlords,
and families that moved during the experiment had higher housing cost
burdens at the end of the two year period than did families that did not
move, although their housing was generally of better quality than it had
been before the experiment began.
In addition, the literature (see Chapter 5) suggests that unwanted
mobility among the elderly can lead to premature death. Even if the out-
comes are not dramatic, moving against one's will has been shown to have
negative consequences among families of all ages.
Therefore, policy for the elderly should discourage moving as a re-
quirement for receiving federal housing assistance. Of course, most of
the federal housing programs initiated to date, with the exception of
the Section 8 Existing Housing program and the housing allowance experi-
ment, have required families to move into newly built housing.
Only to the extent that pre-program housing was a threat to health
or safety, as measured by the housing evaluation (McDowell, 1079), would
a move have been a desirable outcome. If the housing unit was dange-
rous; too big; too small; or otherwise not suitable (for example, if
there were too many stairs for a frail person to negiotiate or if it
were in a dangerous neighborhood), then the housing allowance should
have helped the household move and improve its poor housing condition.
Unfortunately, however, there is no measure of the suitability of the
housing unit for the particular needs of the elderly over and above gene-
ral quality measures applied to all housing units in a baseline housing
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evaluation survey. But, if cost was the major problem, allowances
should be available regardless of where the participant lived. If qua-
lity is a major program, then some allotment for improving that quality,
either through repairs or moving assistance, should be included in a pro-
gram's design.
MacMillan (1979) attributed the lower mobility of elderly renters
to strong attachment, greater difficulty in search, difficulty in find-
ing units suitable for the elderly, and greater difficulty in physically
moving to a new unit. This list mixes reasons that keep the elderly vo-
luntarily attached to their homes, such as strong attachment, and those
that prevent moving, such as greater difficulty in carrying out the ne-
cessary steps for a move: searching, financing a move, and doing the
physical labor necessary in a move. The implications of these hypothe-
ses for policy are that policymakers must either accept or otherwise
deal with the strong attachment to place, or provide assistance in
searching, moving, or providing suitable units.
Low mobility among the elderly means that eligible families are
most likely to take advantage of programs only if they can do so in
their own homes. If their homes are of poor quality, not suitable for
their needs, or unrepairable, and moving help is not available, then a
strategy that requires moving in order to get help cannot meet the needs
of the elderly population.
6.2.2 Social Factors in Housing Decisions
What does this research effort teach us about how the elderly make
housing decisions? Following the work of Rein and Rainwater (1981),
this monograph used a model of resource packaging to examine the ex-
321
perience of the elderly in EHAP, a model that suggests the aged use both
monetary and nonmonetary resources in their economic support systems.
Data from the housing allowance demand experiment were used to provide
indicators of social networks, a little-studied aspect of these resource
packages. The effect of the allowance on these packages was then eval-
uated in the context of the housing choice decisions of the elderly when
participants were offered an allowance subsidy.
One major lesson of this dissertation is that although most of the
aged care for themselves through their own efforts, either in their own
long-term homes or in the homes of close kinspeople (95 percent live in
community housing, with a mere 5 percent institutionalized at any point
in time), social networks are important in providing instrumental and
emotional support both inside and outside the home. Recent strengthen-
ing of the economic support system, described in Chapter 2, has enabled
many more old people than ever before to live independently. This new
autonomy, discussed in Chapter 3, was a major factor in the behavior of
the elderly in the experiment, where continuing interdependence and
newly-achieved autonomy interacted with the offer of a housing allow-
ance.
6.2.2.1 Changing Urban Structures and Housing Allowances
Decentralization of American cities has profoundly affected the in-
ternal dynamics of family networks. The spatial distribution of family
networks, best characterized as "intimacy at a distance," is an arrange-
ment that parallels "community without propinquity" (Webber, 1963) in
the study of community life. Spatial dispersion of families is found
primarily in the middle class; the personal networks of poor families,
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especially minorities, are more localized. This spatial dispersion has
occurred in conjunction with the shift to independent living documented
in Chapter 3. An increased tendency for both the elderly and their
families to express a preference for living independently well into old
age, and even until death, while holding opinions against the notion of
coresidence is a normative shift which supports the "intimacy at a dis-
tance" concept (Shanas et. al. 1968; Crystal, 1981; Pampel, 1981).
This shift, taken together with low mobility rates, means that lit-
tle help is available to much of the elderly population in their homes.
If people are to remain in their own homes, they need programs like home
health care and meals delivered to them, but these do not solve the prob-
lems of isolation.
For the middle class, therefore, localized assistance will tend to
be from unrelated individuals, but among the poor, help is more likely
to come from relatives than from friends. The middle classes can better
afford to pay for the help they receive, but there must be large numbers
of poor elderly people without close relatives in their immediate neigh-
borhoods, who need daily assistance but cannot afford to pay for it.
This implies that, to the extent that poor elderly households live in
spatial arrangements that are dispersed rather than localized, they will
not have access to local, nonmonetized sources of assistance. It is pri-
marily those who live near their relatives, especially among minorities
and the working class, who are more likely to have significant assis-
tance from relatives in their neighborhoods.
Past trends towards autonomy are likely to continue largely because
the demographic trends that impelled the recent changes are, according
to the best projections available (Masnick and Bane, 1980), likely to
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increase or exacerbate the shift to living alone.
The changing structure of American families, the "population fac-
tor" (Alonso, 1981), means that the social networks available to people
who are elderly today differs from networks of the elderly of, say,
twenty years ago, and from networks that will be available to the aged
twenty years in the future. Since women outlive men, the elderly of the
future will have a high proportion of widows and single women. In the
near future the aging parents of the baby boom will have few peers and
siblings but many children to care for them, but when the baby boom
itself begins to reach old age in 2010, they will have many peers but
fewer children than any generation in the past.
Since family forms are changing, driven by demographic shifts,
mediating structures will be changing, too, as will the proportion of
the population with access to various kinds of mediating structures.
Mindel (1979) suggests that unnecessary institutionalization caused by
the lack of ability or capacity of family members to care for their
frail aged relatives might be prevented if programs were developed to
train family members or other workers to provide some medical care and
services within the home, whether the aged person is living independent-
ly or in a multigenerational household. "At a minimum, policies toward
the family which concern the elderly should visualize the elderly in the
larger context of family, friends and community. It is only by recog-
nizing the degree of integration between the elderly and their family
and other groups that coherent and socially useful policies can be de-
veloped" (Mindel, 1979, p. 462). The U. S. House of Representatives'
Select Committee on Aging (1980) set as its goal fostering independence
for all adults, wherever and for as long as possible, while empowering
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available natural support systems to provide the bulk of services at the
local level.
But in 1981, Dr. Elaine Brody presented testimony to the Select
Committee on Aging, U. S. House of Representatives, on the subject of
determining the appropriate mix between services and supports provided
by the public sector and by the "natural" or informal system of family
and friends. It is worth quoting from rather extensively:
"If. . . the evidence indicates that the family has the capacity and
willingness to care for older people who need long-term supports,
little would be needed in the way of a 'formal' system. If the
family has the capacity, but not the willingness, then our efforts
must be directed at encouraging the family's efforts -- telling it
to 'shape up,' rather than burdening the taxpayer with the cost of
health/social services. If, on the other hand, the evidence is
that the family is willing, but does not have the capacity to
provide all the services needed by its elderly members at all
times, a responsible society must move to develop the programs
needed to strengthen, buttress, and supplement family efforts.
(House Select Committee on Aging, 1981, p. 10).
Brody recommends changing the mix of family help and formal sup-
ports to increase the support services provided by the formal system to
the family, especially through family oriented services to help the
family keep its commitment to its older members.
Realization of this dispersion of social networks has encouraged
the growth of such programs as Home Care Corporations (Branch, Callahan
and Jette, 1981), meals-on-wheels, and other in-house programs available
from the "aging network" (Estes, 1979).
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6.2.2.2 Social Ties in the Housing Allowance Experiment
Indicators of social ties were examined to see if they had an
effect on the behavior of the elderly in the housing allowance experi-
ment. Chapter 4 analyzes how social factors mediated the response to
the offer of a housing allowance at different stages of participation in
the demand experiment, with an emphasis on the influence of social
factors qualifying for an allowance payment. The results confirm that
some social factors affected the outcomes of the experiment, but the
nature of the data base did not help us understand why observed housing
decisions were made. Although the elderly's behavior is consistent with
a line of reasoning that emphasizes the importance of social networks in
housing choices, and may be a fruitful line of inquiry in the future,
the evidence provided by the experiment itself is relatively thin.
Data analyzed in this monograph suggest that social factors operate
differently at various stages in the experiment's time frame. The model
of resource packaging proved to be a useful framework with which to
assess the outcomes of the experiment. However, it turns out that there
is no simple process that operates in a simple, additive way. Rather,
monetary and nonmonetary factors work differently for different kinds of
families and at different points of time.
At the earliest stages of participation, when the elderly had to
choose whether or not to join the program, people with strong social
ties tended to be less inclined to participate than did those with rela-
tively weaker social ties. This is shown, for example, by the fact that
in the supply experiment (Table 4.2), eligible single people, both ren-
ters and owners, enrolled at approxmately double the rate that eligible
married couples enrolled. Although both kinds of households were eligi-
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ble by virtue of income, married couples tended to have both higher in-
comes, and by definition the social resource of at least one other per-
son in the household.
But in those stages of participation when the elderly needed assis-
tance, such as to repair their homes or search for a new one, friends
and family provided them with help that was important in meeting the pro-
gram's requirements. In general, having a social support network made
it less necessary or less desirable for an aged household to join a fede-
ral program, but once a decision was made to participate, the social
system provided assistance that helped families qualify for the allow-
ance payment.
For participants in the experiment taken generally, proximity to
relatives had no effect on qualifying for a payment, but for the el-
derly, especially in Pittsburgh, having kin nearby made a big differ-
ence, and increased the proportion of the aged who qualified for an
allowance payment. Among those over the age of 75 in Pittsburgh, 20
percent of those without relatives around, and 50 percent of those with
kin nearby, qualified for a payment. In Phoenix, the comparable figures
are 46.7 percent and 55.7 percent.
What did the relatives in the neighborhood do to help their kinfolk
meet the program's requirements? For the minority of elderly who chose
to move during the housing allowance experiment, and for those who re-
paired their housing to qualify for the payment, friends and neighbors
provide important help with moving and repairs.
Both before and during the experiment, word of mouth and personal
contacts were the best way to find a new place to live, and was the
modal method of locating a new home in both Pittsburgh and Phoenix. In
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Pittsburgh, over half of all households and two-thirds of those over the
age of 70, and in Phoenix almost two out of five of all families and
over half of those over the age of 70 who had moved in the three years
before the experiment began found their new units through a friend or
relative. Although other methods were used to look for a new home, the
personal network was the most effective. Even though over half the
families in both cities looked at newspapers, over half the families in
Pittsburgh and nearly a quarter in Phoenix used realtors, and between a
third (in Pittsburgh) and half (in Phoenix) checked vacancy signs, the
method of locating new housing that really worked, in both cities, was
word of mouth from members of the social network.
The help of these friends and family is also important if a home is
to be repaired. The elderly in the supply experiment were more likely
to rely on others to make any repairs that were necessary to qualify for
the allowance payment in that program. Elderly owners were approxi-
mately twice as likely to call on friends to make repairs for them as
were the nonelderly: 33 percent of the elderly and 14 percent of the
nonelderly in Green Bay, and 39 percent of the elderly and 22 percent of
the nonelderly had friends make the necessary repairs on their homes.
Families who lived in housing owned by a relative were less likely
than other families to meet the earmarking requirements of the program
and receive a housing allowance payment. Why did this group have a
harder time meeting the program's requirements than families who were
living in market housing? If their housing was of good quality, it
would probably have met the program's standards. Although the evidence
available in the demand experiment was equivocal (the question of whe-
ther kinship provided lowered rents was a self-report, not a financial
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analysis), families in kinship relationships with their landlords gene-
rally receive lower than market rents or assistance with daily tasks, in
return for concessions in the form of lower housing standards. These
lower housing standards were an obstacle to meeting the requirements of
the program.
There may also be, especially for the elderly, a tacit agreement to
make few demands on the landlord. This means that unless there were
no repairs to be made to the housing unit, or the necessary repairs were
few, simple, or inexpensive, the non-market nature of the kinship rela-
tionship probably precluded a negotiation between landlord and tenant
typical of market relationships.
For another group, living near their landlords had increased their
chances of meeting the program's requirements. Families not necessarily
related to their landlords, but with landlords living in the same build-
ing, were more likely than were all families to receive the allowance
payment. In Pittsburgh, 52.6 percent, and in Phoenix 73 percent, of
those who lived in the same building as their landlords received the
allowance payment, compared to 47.8 percent and 55.3 percent respective-
ly, of all other families in the two cities.
The next section (6.2.2.3) discusses which groups are well-served,
and which are not as well served, by housing allowance.
6.2.2.3 Demographic Factors and Participation in the Experiment
This research project originated partially in the author's puzzle-
ment over an apparently low participation rate by the aged in the hous-
ing allowance experiment. Frieden (1980, Table 5, p. 23) shows that in
eleven of twelve EHAP cities, the elderly were a lower proportion of
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households receiving allowance payments than of families eligible for
payments. As of 1979, in South Bend the elderly constituted 26 percent
of the eligible population and 22 percent of the recipients; in Phoenix,
22 and 21 percent; and in Pittsburgh, 37 and 25 percent respectively.
The only exception to this was in Green Bay, where the elderly were 24
percent of the eligible population and 28 percent of the recipient
population.
However, analysis in this dissertation suggests that these low par-
ticipation rates for the elderly are more apparent than real, and more a
function of data aggregation by previous researchers than an indication
of little interest by the elderly in the housing allowance program. Par-
ticipation looks low largely because data on the elderly was reported in
the aggregate both in published reports on the experiment, as well as in
most housing literature except works written for a specifically geronto-
logical audience. Combined data on married and unmarried, homeowners
and renters, and females and males can bias results, and does not
accurately reflect the experiences of subgroups of the aged.
The evidence indicates that some of the aged participated in high
numbers, and others did not. Who among the elderly were well served by
this program? What are some possible explanations for variations in
participation rates? What are the implications of these variations for
a national housing policy for the elderly?
When data on the elderly were disaggregated not only by age within
the elderly category, following conventions of the field of gerontology,
but also by marital status, sex of head, race, relationship to land-
lords, and other aspects of the social network, it became clear that
different subgroups of the elderly participated at different rates, and
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in general, the neediest participated most. The major exception was
minorities, who had relatively low participation rates as compared to
whites. Married couples (i.e. male-headed households) and minorities
had lower participation rates than did whites, single person households,
and women.
The requirement that participants in the treatment groups analyzed
here live in housing that met a minimum standard or a minimum rent
placed significant obstacles in the way of receiving a payment for some
demographic groups, especially blacks and hispanics, largely because
their initial housing was quite bad, repairs were difficult or expensive
in the demand experiment, and moving was either voluntarily or involunta-
rily avoided. But less needy groups such as married couples, men,
whites, higher income groups, and homeowners, also showed low participa-
tion rates.
Aged single person households in both the demand and supply experi-
ments were more likely to qualify for the allowance than were married
couples. In Pittsburgh 38.7 percent of single people age 75 and over
but only 14.3 percent of couples, and in Phoenix 54.2 of the singles and
37.5 percent of the couples in that age bracket qualified for the allow-
ance payment. In Green Bay, 76 percent of eligible single renters but
33 percent of renter couples, and 47 percent of eligible unmarried
owners compared to just 19 percent of married owners qualified for a pay-
ment; in South Bend, 46 percent of single and 25 percent of married
renters, and 37 percent of eligible elderly singles owners and 25 per-
cent of eligible couples who owned their own homes, qualified for the
subsidy.
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The major difference between the participation rates of the married
and the unmarried came at the stage of enrollment. Table 4.2 shows that
more eligible singles enrolled than eligible couples (in Green Bay, 78
percent of eligible renter singles, and 36 percent of eligible married
renters; in South Bend, 50 percent and 26 percent respectively), support-
ing the idea that people with low resources were more anxious to partici-
pate in the program than were people with higher resources.
Single people have a smaller social network than the married elder-
ly because they are missing at least a spouse. The elderly living alone
have more trouble hearing about the program, but once they hear about it
they participate because they really need the help. Most of these sin-
gle person households are women, either widowed or never-married (the
proportion of divorced women among today's elderly is miniscule), living
independently.
Because so many of the single person households were women, their
high participation means that female-headed households were well served
by housing allowances; they were more likely to qualify for the payment
than were male-headed households. Table 4.29 shows that in Pittsburgh,
48.8 percent of all female headed households, but 36.4 percent of all
male headed households, qualified for ,the allowance payment. In
Phoenix, the proportions were 55.4 percent for women and 47.1 percent
for men. However, at the oldest ages the differences were quite dra-
matic. In Pittsburgh, 46.4 percent of women age 75 and over, but 14.3
percent of men of that age qualified; in Phoenix, 55 percent of women
and 33.3 percent of men aged 75 or over received the allowance subsidy.
Women tend to maintain their family's social relationships, and conse-
quently are more likely than old men to have significant social ties in
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their old age (Chapter 1). To the extent that having friends and fami-
lies nearby helped older people meet the requirements of the experiment
(Chapter 5), women were more likely to qualify for the payment.
But minorities, another group with high social but low monetary
resources, had a very difficult time meeting the program's housing
quality requirements and receiving and allowance payment. The propor-
tion of enrolled blacks and hispanics who met the requirements of the
program was much lower than the proportion of white families who quali-
fied for an allowance payment. In Pittsburgh, 44 percent of all fami-
lies in the treatment groups with earmarking requirements received a
payment, with 47.2 percent of whites and 35.1 percent of blacks qualify-
ing for the allowance. In Phoenix, where the largest minority group was
hispanics, 50.5 percent of all participants, but 56.1 percent of whites
and 39.1 percent of hispanics in treatment groups with housing require-
ments qualified for a payment (Table 4.3).
Why was this so? Poor minorities are more likely to want help in
their present housing, but are less likely, in a program such as this
one, to get it. Although minorities enroll in high numbers they are
much less likely than are whites to actually receive the allowance
payment (Wolfe and Hamilton, 1977). The case study of Jacksonville
(Wolfe and Hamilton, 1977), shows that discrimination on the basis of
race was pervasive and important to the outcomes of the experiment.
In addition, nonwhites faced discrimination more often than whites
did. In the demand experiment, 60 percent of blacks2 and 53 percent of
whites in Pittsburgh, and 39 percent of hispanics 3, 28 percent of
blacks, and 31 percent of whites in Phoneix, faced some kind of discri-
mination, according to self-reports, during the time of the housing
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allowance experiment.
The evidence with respect to the very old is more equivocal. With
lower incomes and very low mobility rates, it is more likely that the
very old would not be able to qualify for a housing allowance that re-
quired them to move, and would be best served by a program like housing
allowances that allowed them to stay in their own homes. They have
neither social nor economic resources to move, and are more likely to be
living in lower quality units because their incomes are lower. As peo-
ple age their social networks diminish as peers, both friends and fa-
mily, die or move away, so they have less access to nonmonetized sources
of assistance.
Although households headed by people over the age of 75 were living
in worse quality housing (Chapter 3); had different social networks
(Chapter 4), lower incomes (Chapter 2), and the lowest mobility rate of
any age group (Chapter 5), there is no clear pattern with respect to the
effect of age on meeting the program's requirements (Table 4.1). In
Pittsburgh, the old-old were less likely than were the young (35 percent
of those age 70 or over, and 46.6 percent of the 18-54 year olds), but
no less likely in Phoenix (45.7 percent of those age 75 and over, 54.3
percent of the 70-74 age group, and 52 percent of the 18-54 year olds)
to meet the earmarking requirement.
These differences between the cities, the sexes, the ages, the
races, and the married and unmarried, are evidence that preexisting con-
ditions have a large influence on programs when they are implemented.
Because the allowance program was not utilized equally by various
subgroups, if a goal of public policy is to serve most of those who are
eligible for government programs, it is important to try to tailor
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program to varying degrees of need and capacity.
Three questions were asked above: Who among the elderly were well
served by this program? What are some possible explanations for varia-
tions in participation rates? What are the implications of these
variations for a national housing policy for the elderly?
Because the single, the female, and whites were well served by this
program, as they have been well served by other federal housing programs
(U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1979), we can con-
clude that their housing needs, while real, are relatively amenable to
solution by current programs, both construction programs like the
Section 202 New Construction program for the elderly and handicapped,
and housing allowances. This is a group whose major housing problem is
indeed cost, and who can operate within the restrictions imposed by the
housing allowance experiment.
But the very-old and minorities are not as clearly well served by
housing allowances. Although members of minority groups applied to the
program in large numbers, the quality of their housing was neither good
enough to let them qualify for the allowance in their pre-program hous-
ing, nor easily repaired to the standards of the program. Because many
of the elderly are reluctant to move (Chapter 5), aged members of minori-
ty groups faced both pervasive housing market discriminiation and sub-
standard housing conditions. This double whammy made it difficult to
either qualify for the payment in their preprogram housing, or to move
to find housing that could qualify. Although older minorities have prob-
lems of cost, their main housing problem is one of bad quality. For peo-
ple whose main housing problem is quality not cost, housing allowances
must be supplemented so that they can improve their housing conditions,
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as well as their budgetary problems.
6.3 Do Housing Allowances Solve the Housing Problems of the Elderly?
What is implied by these research findings on the role of social
networks in the housing decisions of the elderly? Housing allowances
that permit families to choose their own housing in the private housing
market would, at face value, seem to be a quite suitable program for the
needs of the elderly. Previous housing subsidies have required the
elderly to move to new housing (e.g. HUD 1979), although evidence shows
that the elderly are reluctant to move. A program like housing allow-
ances which does not mandate that people move would seem to be almost
tailor-made to the needs of the elderly and to the normative goal of
helping them maintain their independence and autonomy. Although some of
the aged live in bad housing or in neighborhoods that have changed sig-
nificantly, and wish to move to better places, the vast majority "vote
with their feet," but the feet go nowhere.
Housing allowances are a hybrid program, providing an income solu-
tion to a housing problem. Although many families did improve the qua-
lity of their housing by repairing it or moving to new and better homes,
for the most part the elderly remained in their pre-program housing; the
evidence suggests that those homes that were repaired were quite close
to meeting the housing standards (HUD, 1980). The requirement that
subsidized families live in standard housing was part of the program
only because it was funded by the U. S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development, an agency devoted to improving the quality of housing for
the nation's poor families. The imposition of housing standards served
to satisfy the needs of HUD more than the needs of the families in-
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volved. If Ruby Jackson (Chapter 5) could have received a grant to
rehabilitate her home by installing plumbing and other minimal necessi-
ties, she would have needed no other subsidy.
For the elderly, it is not clear that just money will solve their
problems because they face problems of health and increasing frailty not
long after their incomes decrease at retirement. The single elderly,
whose major problem was cost, did participate; they do not face the kind
of pervasive low quality housing conditions that more permanently poor
people face, since many of the elderly with currently low incomes were
middle class during adulthood and have only recently joined the ranks of
the poor. Their social resources and their physical housing conditions
are therefore likely to be more similar to other middle class people
than they are to other poor people.
The question that remains to be answered is whether the poor need
new housing units produced for their use, or whether they can, with the
help of housing allowances, induce the private market to provide stan-
dard units at affordable cost. The weight of the evidence offered here
is that some segments of the elderly population, especially single (most-
ly widowed) women, are quite able to make this program work for them.
But others, especially minorities, cannot, for a variety of reasons par-
tially clarified by this data base, find the kind of housing that the
housing allowance program would find worthy of subsidizing.
Hartman (1982, pp. 56) believes that bad housing is still a problem
for some segements of the population, and that moving national housing
policy completely out of the business of providing housing units to poor
families would worsen their housing situation. He says that the inci-
dence of benefits in the allowance program falls disproportionately on
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the less needy, and "only when recipients were permitted to live in sub-
standard housing (and in effect spend their housing allowances else-
where) were participation rates high. Very poor people, minorities,
large families, and families living in substandard housing had the low-
est participation rates."
The implication of Hartman's viewpoint is that allowances fail to
serve demographic groups who have traditionally been left out of the
American dream. The evidence of this dissertation suggests that among
the elderly with high levels of monetary need, especially the single and
the female, the most needy participated in large numbers. These are
categories of participants whose poverty is probably recent, and related
to widowhood and the absence of a higher-income male in the household.
Except for minorities, the neediest elderly were relatively well served
in this program. In the supply experiment where housing quality stan-
dards were less strict than in the demand experiment (Valenza, 1977),
minorities were less successful than were whites in finding good housing
that would qualify. It seems that any standardness requirement is too
strict for the kinds of housing inhabited by poor minority families,
whether young or elderly, and that the incentives provided in the hous-
ing allowance experiment were not enough to make them able to improve
that housing quality to a level that would be considered acceptable by
HUD.
Hartman (1982) also says that "it should be clear that housing
allowances do not do the same thing that traditional government housing
programs for the poor have done: produce housing for them" (p. 58).
Evidence presented in Chapter 3 suggest that low quality housing is
still a problem for about 20 percent of the elderly, and especially for
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the very old. Hartman says that the failure of housing allowances to
serve people already living in substandard housing means that their
housing conditions will not be improved under this plan.
A logical solution to the problem framed in these terms is to pro-
vide, in addition to the housing allowance, an allotment to help the
poor families either bring their home up to the program's standard, or
to help them move to a better dwelling.
It is hardly startling to say that minorities have poor housing
conditions, and should have the same opportunity that other American fa-
milies have had to improve their overall housing conditions. But until
today there has been little political will to commit the country's re-
sources to this task, and recently that political will to improve bad
housing conditions has nearly vanished.
At the same time, vast sums of money are being spent each year ($38
billion in 1980) to subsidize the costs of homeownership through the tax
system, a benefit that is quite regressive and accrues primarily to
affluent homeowners (by nature, a tax deduction is more valuable to a
higher income than to a lower income family).
Although the housing budget of HUD has been cut recently (Khadduri
and Struyk, 1982), at the same time the amount of money lost to the
federal government through the deduction of mortgage interest and pro-
perty taxes from the tax liability of homeowners, a kind of loss known
as a tax expenditure, has never been greater. Proposals have been made
to cap the value of the homeownership deduction to reduce the regressi-
vity of that subsidy.
If we are to have a national housing policy for the elderly, rather
than a set of uncoordinated housing programs with perverse incentives
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and regressive outcomes, then the use of housing allowances cannot be
considered separately from other housing subsidies in general or apart
from other policies or programs that affect the elderly. The subsidy of
homeownership, although it has produced a system of incentives that have
made us just about the best housed population in the world, is an ana-
chronism in a time of fiscal retrenchment and drastic cuts in programs
that benefit the needy.
Money could be found in the federal budget for the purposes of hous-
ing rehabilitation or housing production programs for the segment of the
population still living in low quality housing by capping the homeowner-
ship deduction, and earmarking some of the money gained in this way for
programs which will continue to improve the quality of the housing of
the poor who cannot be well served by housing allowances.
Alternatively, an acknowledgement can be made that relieving rent
burden is the primary mission of a housing allowance program. Once that
mission has been achieved, no further steps should be taken to monitor
the kind of housing inhabited by participating families and the standard-
ness requirement from the program should be entirely removed.
Should families living in substandard housing, but paying high pro-
portions of their incomes for rent, be subsidized to live in inadequate
housing, or should efforts continue either to bring that housing up to a
pre-determined standard, or to help families move to higher quality hous-
ing? Unless a substandard unit were subjected to a rehabilitation pro-
gram when one family left it to join the housing allowance program, it
would simply then move to the hands of another family who will live in
it under substandard conditions, but who are not fortunate enough to be
enrolled in the housing allowance program. It should not be national
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policy to pass substandard housing along to families who cannot afford
to live in anything better, while subsidizing other poor families to
improve their lot. The issue of "horizontal equity" (Solomon, 1974)
comes into play here -- should some needy families be subsidized, while
other equally needy families are not?
Hartman says that structural conditions in the nation's housing
market makes low-quality housing the most rational choice for low income
families: "people avoid spending their housing allowance money on hous-
ing not because they don't value housing, but, in large part at least,
because they can't get good value for their dollar in the current hous-
ing market" (Hartman, 1982, p. 57). They can neither induce significant
improvement in their current quarters, nor find alternative quarters in
that market. Given the short-term commitment and relatively low payment
amounts, coupled with a lack of an extra allotment to cover what are
generally substantial moving costs, it is not really surprising that few
major improvements in housing quality occurred.
The case study of "Ruby Jackson" (Frieden, 1980, pp. 55-57) does
not support the idea that people living in bad housing like it that way.
On the contrary; Ms. Jackson said plaintively, "if I could just get my
house fixed, I'd be happy here." That is not a statement made by some-
body happy living in a substandard home (this case is also described in
Chapter 3). She wanted something better, but her financial situation,
even with the allowance, would not allow her to improve her housing
situation.
The issue is not that poor people prefer bad housing; the housing
they live in is both a positive and a negative choice. They cannot
afford anything better than their low quality homes; in addition, these
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homes can provide nonmonetary resources to them in the form of social
networks or the kind of substantive assistance from friends and rela-
tives discussed in Chapter 5. The high rent burdens paid by the elderly
both before and after the allowance was received (Tables 3.6 and 3.7)
show that there were financial constraints on the purchasing power of
the elderly's budgets, constraints that were decreased but not elimina-
ted by the housing allowance subsidy. In addition, the social factors
discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 show that social aspects were important in
the housing decisions made by the aged in the experiment, for both
movers and stayers.
We have already seen that for most but not all participants, pre-
program housing was not very bad and most of the aged were living in
satisfactory units but paying a very high proportion of income for rent.
The allowances permitted the elderly to act on their long-standing pre-
ference for independence and stability, and made staying in place
easier. Of course, that could only happen if the household qualified
for a payment in their pre-program unit, before or after repairs; if
that unit failed because the housing standards were very strict or the
quality was very low, and the family could neither convince the landlord
to fix it up nor find a better place to move to, then the availability
of the housing allowance was meaningless; it could not be used.
Housing requirements restricted access to the housing allowance sub-
sidy for people who lived in bad housing but did not wish to move,
perhaps because there were nonmonetary satisfactions in their preprogram
housing. In the treatment groups in the demand experiment that did not
require any action on the part of the low-income family other than agree-
ing to participate (the percent-of-rent and unconstrained housing gap
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treatment groups), Table 6.1 shows that in Pittsburgh, 88 percent of the
unconstrained treatment group, and 83.8 percent of the percent-of-rent
group, were active and receiving payments at the end of two years, com-
pared to 67.6 percent of the minimum standards treatment group and 74.2
percent of the minimum standards/high payment treatment group. In
Phoenix, 63.5 percent of the unconstrained, and 68.1 percent of the
percent-of-rent groups were receiving full payments after two years, com-
pared to 34.1 percent of those in the minimum standards design center
group, and 57.0 percent of the minimum standards-high payment group.
What can explain these results? Housing allowances are a hybrid be-
tween an income program and a housing program, embodying an inherent con-
flict between reducing the proportion of poor people's budgets allocated
to expenditures on shelter, and HUD's traditional mission to improve the
housing of poor people. Trying to achieve both income and housing goals
in one program leads to diverse viewpoints and several standards of
evaluation. Housing allowances provide too little money to constitute a
real income program, and not enough housing help to really be a housing
program.
This uneasy balance, built into the program, has allowed analysts
to focus on either the income or the housing goal, depending on their
viewpoint. This internal conflict will not resolve itself, and leads
reasonable people to disagree in their assessment of the merits of hous-
ing allowances. "Housers" such as Hartman will continue to emphasize
the program's failure to induce large improvements in housing, and will
conclude that it is inadequate to the needs of the poor.
Others such as Khadduri and Struyk (1982) who perceive that the
major housing problem today is cost, will conclude that since the pro-
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gram helps some families with the cost problem it is successful.
However, this analysis cannnot defend the imposition of a housing
quality requirement in what is, for them, an income program. Because
they argue that housing quality is no longer a problem, the failure of
housing allowances to improve the housing conditions of some of the dis-
advantaged is discounted in importance.
Because housing allowances are by and large a lower per unit cost
subsidy than other approaches (Rydell, 1980; Bendick and Struyk, 1980),
their political attractiveness in a time of budget strain make it easier
to downplay the fact that real housing needs in some groups of citizens
are unmet and still severe. The political benefits of an approach that
gives housing assistance to poor people at relatively low cost while uti-
lizing the "free market" are obvious, especially if participation rates
are looked at in the aggregate to support the notion that while most
Americans live in good housing, some poor people just need a small in-
come supplement to cover the gap between what their housing costs and
what they can afford. For example, Khadduri and Struyk (1982) proposed
that all housing assistance for the poor be in the form of housing
vouchers, to help them rent existing units rather than "diverting
resources" (p. 198) to new construction or rebuilding the existing
housing stock. They said that "public funds can be used more effectiv-
ely to enlarge the supply of housing available to the poor by improving
the ability of the poor to bid for such housing" (Khadduri and Struyk,
1982, pp. 198).
Aggregate numbers mask the inadequate distributive mechanism of the
free market, but disaggregation of the outcomes of the experiment in
this dissertation have shown that not all groups are equally well served
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by the housing allowance approach.
6.4 Policy Recommendations for a National Housing Policy for the
Elderly.
What has the housing allowance experiment taught us about the suit-
ability of housing allowances for the poor elderly? Do housing allow-
ances improve the housing conditions of the elderly? Can this program
be redesigned to better meet the housing needs of this segment of the
population, or should other approaches be considered as well?
First, we must recall the housing conditions of the elderly as dis-
cussed in Chapter 3. Over 70 percent of elderly households are living
as owner-occupants in their own homes, a higher proportion than of the
population at large. Second, the biggest housing problem of the elderly
is cost, not quality, although the elderly have more problems with
maintenance than do younger families (Struyk and Soldo, 1980) and about
one out of five elderly headed households in the experiment lived in
units that failed to meet minimum standards at the beginning of the
demand experiment. Third, the elderly have the lowest mobility rates in
the population (Rossi, 1980; Myers, 1982).
These three facts of owner-occupancy, problems of affordability and
housing quality, and low propensity to move, powerfully shape the possi-
bilities of any federal housing program to influence the housing condi-
tions of the elderly. In addition, the role of social factors in hous-
ing decisions, a role that this research project has explored, means
that any program that focuses merely on economic stimulus, is limited to
renters, and that requires moving as a condition of receiving the
benefit, is bound to be only reluctantly adopted by the elderly them-
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selves, and will not help many of the most needy.
6.4.1 Focus on Achievable Housing Goals
This country does not have a housing policy, but a set of programs
with a common goal, to provide a "decent home in a suitable living
environment" to every American family. How can allowances help us to
achieve that goal for the elderly? What kinds of housing problems are
best solved with allowances, and what kinds of housing problems need
other solutions?
Although it is possible for programs to have multiple goals, and
even goals that are inherently conflicting, (Levine, 1978), the confu-
sion of income and housing goals in the housing allowance approach has
led to widely divergent evaluations of this approach to the housing
needs of the poor people of this country.
If the program is primarily an income program, then the super-
imposed housing quality requirement should be dropped. If the major
housing problem of low income families is cost and not quality, then a
concern with housing standards is misplaced paternalism and inappropri-
ate to the needs of the target population. An income program adminis-
tered either by the Department of Health and Human Services, or a real
economic development program to provide adequate jobs or adequate income
to all of the nation's poor, including those who have retired from the
workforce, would be the logical solution to a problem of inadequate
income. A program in a housing department cannot by itself solve the
nation's problem of low and unequally distributed incomes.
But if substantial proportions of the low income population still
suffer from bad housing, and housing conditions need to be improved for
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some segments of the poor, housing allowances have not shown themselves
to be capable of achieving these large quality improvements, particu-
larly for the elderly.
Housing is improved for any given family either through repairs or
rehabilitation to their current home, or when they move to a better one.
Housing allowances, to be an effective housing program that can improve
housing conditions on a large scale, must either help families to repair
or rehabilitate their homes, or help them to move into an existing or
new unit. But the low level of subsidy tested in the housing allowance
experiment resulted only or help them to move into an existing or
new unit. But the low level of subsidy tested in the housing allowance
experiment resulted only in small housing quality improvements (Bendick
and Zais, 1978). To really be an effective housing improvement program,
the commitment of the federal government to improving the housing stock
available to the lowest income families, as demonstrated in the Section
8 Substantial Rehabilitation and New Construction programs (Abt Associ-
ates Inc., 1980) should be continued, as should the programs that build
new housing units that are appropriate for the elderly and handicapped,
such as Section 202 (HUD, 1979).
6.4.2 Housing allowances should be a universal entitlement
A distinction must be drawn between housing allowances as a concept
and current proposals by the Reagan administration to implement that con-
cept. Even those who argue that allowances can meet the housing needs
of the country would, I believe, agree that that would only occur if the
program were not limited to a small proportion of the eligible popula-
tion. One of the original impetuses for vouchers was partially to solve
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the problem of horizontal inequity (e.g. Solomon, 1974), yet without a
universal entitlement program where all eligible families can potential-
ly participate, the problem of horizontal inequity remains. Khadduri
and Struyk (1982) recommend that the target group of a housing voucher
program should be renters with incomes less than 50 percent of the local
median incomes, meaning that about 9 million households, or about 11 per-
cent of all U.S. households, would be eligible. Of these, between 20
and 25 percent would be elderly (1980 U. S. Statistical Abstract),
meaning that about 2 million households headed by the elderly would be
eligible for housing vouchers. But the administration of President
Reagan has recommended that only 200,000 eligible households be granted
vouchers in the next fiscal year.
A program that serves such a small proportion of the eligible popu-
lation can achieve neither the equity goals that prompted the change
from a supply to a demand approach to housing policy in the first place,
nor the housing goals of the federal government as stated and reiterated
since 1949. Even if housing allowances could achieve all that is pro-
mised for them by reducing the housing cost problem and causing marginal
improvements in the housing stock of poor families, these effects will
be negligible if only selected, small proportions of the population can
receive the subsidy. If the only result of the massive effort represen-
ted by the Experimental Housing Allowance Program is to validate a full-
scale retreat from often stated commitments to housing the nation's
poor, the outcome can only be called perverse. The idea of housing al-
lowances was born in an atmosphere of reform and improvement, and will
be implemented in an atmosphere of neglect and abandonment. That would
be a national tragedy.
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But if the program were a universal entitlement such as Food Stamps
or Social Security, available to all who meet the eligibility standards,
this cost-effective approach can be used to help large numbers of the
most needy elderly: single person households, older women, and those who
do not wish to leave their long-term homes. Other programs, such as
continued construction and rehabilitation programs like those in the
Section 8 program, could supplement or augment housing allowances, to
provide housing quality improvements to the poor people living in bad
housing, such as elderly minorities who are not well served by housing
allowances.
6.4.3 Homeowners Should Be Eligible for Housing Allowances
Keeping a home in good repair is a continuing problem (Struyk and
Soldo, 1980), and home maintenance is the biggest housing problem of the
elderly apart from high cost. An allowance available to homeowners
would enable elderly who only have to pay maintenance and operating
costs (most of then have paid off their mortgages), to keep their homes.
Or, programs geared specifically to home maintenance by the elderly,
such as the HUD demonstration project cited in Myers (l82) can help the
elderly stay in their long-term homes, but not be the victims of deterio-
ration and blight.
Although owners have been the beneficiaries of tax breaks for as
long as they have owned their homes, maintenance and operating costs
have rised substantially over the past decade. Because the elderly
represent one out of five households, elderly homeowners are the cus-
todians of a substantial proportion of the country's housing infrastruc-
ture. If this capital stock were permitted to deteriorate because the
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elderly could not keep it in adequate physical condition, a valuable
investment will be squandered. It is in the national interest to help
the aged keep their homes in good repair (Struyk and Soldo, 1980).
6.4.4 Special Needs of the Elderly
What should be the requirements of a housing allowance program to
make them accessible to the majority of the needy elderly? A major les-
son of this study is that no statement about "the elderly" can be taken
at face value. The experience of the elderly varied at different ages
and in different cities in the United States, and no one generalization
can cover all contingencies. The old-old, over age 75, are the fastest
growing population segment in the country, and have different social and
economic resources than do the young-old, in addition to being frailer.
Old people who are black or hispanic have different needs and resources
from elderly whites, and the single and female are quite different from
the married and male. A program that suits one sub-group will not neces-
sarily suit another; more targeting and tailoring of programs will be
necessary if equally needy groups are to be served equitably.
For example, if minorities have strong social networks because
these systems have been built up to cushion adverse economic conditions,
one goal of public policy should be to use these networks whenever possi-
ble to enhance the living conditions of the minority families, while con-
tinuing the national commitment to ameliorating the living conditions of
the needy. This can be done by providing housing allowances or an in-
come subsidy to help with the income problem while also providing for
housing improvement either by repairing for the current tenants, with
allowances helping tenants of revitalizing areas afford new, higher
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rents after rehabilitation.
Although the housing allowance experiment emphasized monetary re-
sources, the data show that as people age there is increasing reliance
on nonmonetary resources with nonmarket origins. The marketplace is
thought to distribute housing according to people's demand based on
their financial capacity, but people use instituions differently over
time. A shift towards resources obtained outside the market system
means that policy differentiation is necessary, because different seg-
ments of the population have different needs, and therefore differentia-
tion in housing policies for the young and for the old, and for various
groups within the elderly population itself, is necessary to target re-
sources to where they are most needed, and to where they will do the
most good.
If the preferred approach to housing subsidies is to help poor peo-
ple rent units on the open market rather than building new units, some
way must be found to help them locate these new units, or they will not
be able to manage to qualify, unless quality restrictions are lifted.
If a housing allowance program is initiated which requires homes to meet
a quality standard, people with sources of assistance from social net-
works are at an advantage as compared to those without those helpers.
Only if a program requires nothing more than proof of income and house-
hold size indicating eligibility, will recourse to assistance from peo-
ple not influence the ability of the poor elderly families to receive
the benefits to which they are entitled.
Although neighborhoods where the poor and minority elderly live are
likely to have "spatially referred sentiments," the neighborhoods them-
selves are in worse physical shape than the neighborhoods of whites and
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the middle class (Struyk and Soldo, 1980). Many of the poor elderly
would prefer to see their housing and neighborhoods improved, rather
than being displaced through the actions of private market reinvestment
(Phyllis Myers, 1982). Myers suggests strategies that can help the
elderly to remain in their long-term homes, strategies such as home
maintenance and repair services, energy conservation, home equity
conversions, and property tax abatements for homeowners; for renters,
she suggests rent controls, condominium conversion controls, and helping
the elderly tenants purchase their homes. However, she does not discuss
rent vouchers or housing allowances as a solution to excessive housing
costs in existing housing units, a major omission because cost is a
dominant housing problem (Chapter 3). Alternatively, new units can be
built in minority neighborhoods, or help can be offered to help minori-
ties move into units of their choice. This help can be in the form of
open housing enforcement, housing search assistance, and/or help with
the actual move itself.
If single people have a harder time hearing about the availability
of the program, as the supply and administrat tve agency expertments sug-
gest, but once they do hear of the program participate in great numbers
because they are in great need of the assistance, as the overall results
indicate, then attention should be paid to increasing the publicity
given the program so that the neediest but often most isolated people
would apply.
If programs require that participants move in order to qualify for
the subsidy, such as the Section 202 or the Section 8/New Construction
programs that build new housing units specifically for the elderly and
the handicapped, the elderly will need help. Many old people do not or
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cannot take advantage of those programs because they find moving too
difficult to accomplish alone, and have nobody to physically assist them
with completing the move.
The evidence presented in this monograph has indicated that fami-
lies and friends play important roles in the lives of the elderly. How-
ever, we have also examined evidence that the proportion of the elderly
population that will have access to these social networks are likely to
be changing over the next decades. Although the people performing
various functions will be changing, the elderly will still need people
in "mediating structures" to help them out.
In a housing progra-, services should be provided so that the
elderly without family or friends can find help. This help can be in
the areas of negotiating with present or future landloeds regarding
housing issues; help in finding a new home if they wish to move; h e 1 p
in the actual move to a new home if a move is necessary; help repairing
a current home if maintenance or repairs are necessary; help them ex-
ploring alternative options, such as how to qualify for programs that
help the elderly fix up their homes; how to repair affordably; how to go
about moving, and how to accomplish a move at lowest physical, economic,
and psychic cost to the elderly individual or family.
6.4.5 Peer communities can augment family structures
While non-monetized "mediating structures," such as the family, the
neighborhood, churches, and voluntary associations (see Chapter 1) can
help supplement governmental payments to the needy elderly, they can not
totally replace them since not all of the aged have access to these sour-
ces of assistance. There are a great many old people with both low in-
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comes and no families or other mediating structures to fall back on, and
all indications are that the proportion of the elderly population with-
out children will increase as a proportion of the aged. population as
time goes on (Soldo, 1980; Masnick and Bane, 1980).
Expectations of performance in a public program should be different
for the elderly than for the young, and different for those who have "na-
tural support systems" (Egan, Carr, Nott and Roos, 1981) and those who
do not. There should be more assistance provided, especially when the
"natural support system" does not exist. When those systems do not oc-
cur naturally, their functions must be provided by other sources. When
the support systems get in the' way of public policy objectives, such as
when elderly widows prefer to live in condemned dwellings rather than
move away from kin, creative solutions will have to be found.
The population that is most at risk in all of these vulnerable situ-
ations is primarily those over the age of 75, who are largely single
(widowed) women. This group should be targeted for special aid, since
they lack "natural support systems" and are poorer than the elderly
population as a whole.
Mediating structures can be strengthened either through support for
existing structures, such as tax breaks for families who care for their
elderly kin, or by reconstruction of these structures for the elderly
who lack them through new communities, institutions or relationships for
the elderly where they can replace social networks that they have lost
(see Section 1.5).
Many low-income elderly households have moved to peer communities,
which the literature shows can provide substitutes for families (Chapter
1), although the proportion of the aged living in housing specially
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constructed for them is only about ten percent of the eligible popula-
tion (Table 6.1; Khadduri and Struyk, 1982), and best fills the needs of
the young-old. The old-old need more supportive services to help with
deteriorating health conditions and the attrition of social networks due
to death and residential mobility of network members. For the young-
old, mediating structures can be assisted; for the old-old, there may
not be any structure to assist, and new solutions, such as nonresiden-
tial peer support from younger elderly people, can help fill the gap. A
"Foster Peer" or "New Friend" program can join "Foster Grandparents" to
help the elderly help each other, and themselves.
6.5 Where do we go from here?
Like much social policy research that is concerned with complicated
issues and complex social systems, this study has raised many questions
that cannot be answered. Housing allowances are an appropriate subsidy
for those who can use them to supplement their support systems, where
social factors do not work against participation. When the problem is
strictly economic, such as for single person households and for women,
social assistance is a boon. When the housing problem takes on social
dimensions, as in the case of racial discrimination, the housing solu-
tion must take account of the social dimension and address it directly.
How can it do that?
The notion that monetary and nonmonetary resources are considered
before families join a federal subsidy program such as housing allow-
ances is supported, but additional research on the question of the rela-
tive contribution of economic and social factors to housing choice beha-
vior should be continued, as should as further exploration of the way in
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which the social factors operate to influence behavioral outcomes. What
is clear is that different factors operate in different ways, and at
different times. The process of resource packaging is far from simple.
Participation in a public program such as EHAP has previously
unrecognized costs that must be overcome before it will become a widely
accepted alternative to existing publicly funded housing programs. The
allowance seems to be a good program for elderly families whose major
housing problem is excessive cost and who do not wish to move from their
long-term homes. This includes primarily women and other older people
who want to stay in their long-term housing until their physical capaci-
ty for independent living fails. However, some families, particularly
minorities, did want to qualify for the allowance but could not meet the
program's requirements. These families needed more than just money.
They needed both assistance in searching for new homes, and help in
making sure that the homes they found would both meet the quality re-
quirements of the program and be available to them despite their race or
ethnicity. Not only would aggressive open housing efforts have to
accompany a national housing allowance scheme to enable blacks and
hispanics to share equally with whites in this federal program, but
families of all races living in bad housing would need more assistance
to improve housing than was provided to participants in the housing
allowance experiment.
One of the major lessons of this monograph is that it is a great
mistake to treat all of the elderly as if they were an undifferentiated,
homogeneous group. While it is much easier to stereotype any group than
to think in a complicated way, we must keep in mind at all times that
the elderly are as different from each other as are all other age
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groups, in fact more so since people seem to increase their individuali-
ty as they age. The aged are a diverse group of women and men, blacks
and whites, widows and married people, city and country dwellers who
need programs, sometimes quite minimal, that can help them live out
their days with self respect, autonomy, and pride. Their housing situa-
tion strongly conditions the possibility that they can in fact achieve
that autonomy and independence; homeless men and women living in subway
cars and on park benches are a dramatic example of the failure of our
housing programs to provide an affordable home to all of our citizens.
In this time of austerity and budget cutting, too many believe that
all federal programs are handouts and boondoggles. But the elderly have
worked and contributed tax dollars to the economy their whole lives, and
still largely provide for their own welfare (Chapter 2). In old age
many of them face shrinking social worlds due to the death of family mem-
bers and friends; inability to take care of themselves because of fail-
ing health and vigor; and relatively fixed incomes which can no longer
cover the costs of their housing and still leave an amount adequate to
take care of nutrition, health, and other daily needs.
Many of these people need just a small boost to their income, which
they can use to decrease the bite that housing costs take from their bud-
gets. For these people, a simple housing allowance, even with a housing
quality requirement, will achieve modest improvements in housing quality
and reductions in housing cost burdens, at lower costs than most other
housing programs have ever achieved (Khadduri and Struyk, 1982). Inclu-
ding elderly homeowners in this program would not be unreasonable, since
a smaller proportion of the eligible homeowning population took part in
the supply experiment, and were relatively easy to serve.
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But how can the housing quality and cost problems of the elderly
who live in housing of very low quality, but who largely do not wish to
move from their long term residences, be solved? Construction of new
units, such as in the Section 202 program, while capable of providing
new and high quality housing, still means that the elderly must move,
and we have seen how their clear preference is to stay in place. In-
place rehabilitation is difficult and expensive, and usually results in
the rehabilitated unit being inhabited by a new resident such as happens
in areas that are revitalized (Clay, 1978; Myers, 1982). Housing allow-
ances can help residents in revitalizing areas pay the increased rents
and help them stay in their old neighborhoods, but the disruption and
trauma of living through a major renovation of one's home is not what
the elderly want.
The key to the question is choice. As Frieden (1980) states, "con-
ceivably public benefits may be involved that would justify overriding
the preferences of the poor themselves . . . fbut] federal officials
have a responsibility to present the case for setting aside the wishes
of the poor" (p. 51).
The elderly have shown through their behavior in both the housing
allowance experiment and in other assessments of mobility (Wiseman,
1980; Weisbrod et. al. 1982) that they wish to remain in their own, gene-
rally owner-occupied, homes, until forced to get assistance as they
become increasingly frail. This help can either be provided in the
current home by a spouse; by an unrelated individual with whom one
shares living arrangements; by a live-in housekeeper or nurse; by
regular visits from a home-care corporation helper; or through the
variety of programs that have arisen since 1965 to serve the elderly in
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their own homes, or to recreate a home-like atmosphere that combines the
autonomy of an independent living unit with the medical and social care
necessary for aging, frail individuals.
Solutions such as congregate housing, which entail moving seniors
into housing where, in general, they have private living quarters but
take meals and participate in social events with the other residents,
are appropriate for the small numbers of elderly who are willing to
move. The role of a housing allowance program in conjunction with con-
gregate housing would be to assist with the cost of the housing, and en-
sure that the elderly family had resources, either financial or perso-
nal, to assist with their move to their new quarters.
Other solutions, such as the home care corporation, would allow the
elderly person to remain in their long-term living unit. The hired per-
sonnel of the home care corporation replaces in function the role of the
former help provider, generally a child or spouse. With the increasing
dispersion of families through suburbanization, and the increasing pro-
pensity of the elderly to live alone discussed in Chapter 3, more of the
elderly are being left in isolation at at time when they need help be-
cause of failing health. But reluctance to move, and desire for indepen-
dence, has left a great many of the elderly living in unassisted isola-
tion. Those who have social networks available make use of them to pro-
vide the help they need in both daily activities and in life crises, but
as people age their social networks generally suffer attrition.
Housing allowances would help old folks pay for their long-term
homes, and decrease the financial necessity to move. But often moves in
later life are less related to income than to the health needs of older
individuals. No amount of income or assets can help if a person cannot
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dress themselves, or if they suffer from osteoporosis, a degenerative
bone disease which prevents broken bones from healing. These conditions
are most frequently found among those over the age of 75, the most
rapidly increasing segment of the elderly population. These old-old
people may wish to stay in their homes, but are physically unable to
remain independent, as much as they would like to be.
They need options. If these options are not available, and a move
to new quarters become necessary, housing allowances can help once the
home is chosen, but this allowance system has been shown to have very
little effect on the supply of housing, anA cannot assure that units
suitable to the special needs of the elderly, such as grab-bars and
ramps, are available. To date, only programs built specifically for the
use of the elderly and handicapped, generally with federal assistance,
have these features. Allowances are fine when the elderly stay in
place, but for the minority who must move, to accommodate either quality
considerations or specific health needs, the private market has shown
that it can accommodate primarily the affluent. The poor ellerly have a
much harder time. In new homes as well as old, they need pride, autono-
my, and help.
Only if the mission of housing allowances is clarified and focused
carefully on either its income or its housing goal, will either one of
those goals ever be realized. If the goals continue to be muddied and
confused, then it will be very difficult to assess if and when either
goal has been achieved. While poor people probably care less about hous-
ing programs than do housing professionals, real differences in the hous-
ing conditions of different classes of Americans must be acknowledged.
Bad housing, even when it is costly to the poor family, frees up resour-
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ces because it is probably less expensive than a better home, allowing
the family to cover its other needs like food and heat, and may be part
of a package of social resources that are important. Just as federal
officials cannot in conscience superimpose their preferences for housing
on slum dwellers, they also cannot assume that a choice made out of ne-
cessity is identical to a choice if it could be freely made.
The elderly want to live in good housing that they can afford and
that allows them to keep their dignity and independence. Sometimes that
will be found in a long-term owned home, sometimes in a newly built
elderly housing project, and sometimes in an SRO hotel. Federal policy
should be equally flexible, and not preclude new solutions because of
ideological rigidity or budgetary mismanagement.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 6
The housing literature looks at all households with heads aged 62 or
65 and over (the age defined as elderly was different in the three
sub-experiments) in one undifferentiated group, and seldom disag-
gregates the results by the social factors examined here.
Statistically significant from whites at the .10 level.
same as note 1
1
2
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APPENDIX
The following is a codebook of the data from the housing allowance demand
experiment that was used in the analysis in this dissertation.
Legend:
ms = missing
Name of Variable, coding info. At 2 years At At
enrollment baseline
Site, 1= Pittsburgh, 2= Phoenix
Age of head of household
0,99 = missing
18-97
98 = 98 or older
recode categories:
18-54
55-59
60-64
65-69
70-74
75 and over
Sex of head of household A662 A950 H26
0,9= missing
1=male
2=female
Occupation of census head of household D787 D855
0,9 = missing
1 = white collar
2 = blue collar
3 = not working
Race of main respondent H1588 H31
0 = no resp. or n.a. H752
I = white
2 = black
3 = asian
4 = native american
5 = other
Rent paid, gross A585 A873 H12
5 cols, uncategorized
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Name of Variable, coding info. At 2 years At At
enrollment baseline
Cost of food stamps A709 A997 H703
5 cols, uncategorized
Annual value of food stamps A715 A1003 H706
5 cols., uncategorized
Percent of gross hh income from
major source A700 A088 H50
001-035, 3 cols, uncategorized
999, 0 = missing
Rent burden, gross income; Burden = (r+hap)/Yg D297 D452
5 cols., uncategorized, 2 dec.
Did particip. in EHAP affect food stamp H64
benefits in any way?
0,8,9 = missing
1 = yes
2 = no
7 = don't know
Compared to where lived before, is H591
living here more or less
expensive, or about the same?
0,8,9 = ms
1 = this apt. is more expensive
2 = less expensive
3 = about the same
7 = don't know
All of these variables are uncategorized, 5 columns. The following recodes
were used in analysis:
$0-$999
lk-1999
2k=2999
3k-3999
4k-4999
5k-5999
6k-6999
7k-7999
8k-8999
9k-9999
lOk-10,999
11k and over
Wages of head of household A650 A938
Gross household annual income A663 A951 H44
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Name of Variable, coding info.
Imputed income from assets,
NIA definition
Imputed income from assets,
NIE definition
Business annual income
Income from pensions
Income from roomers
Income from Social Security
Income from SSI*
At 2 years
A736
A741
A763
A795
A800
A814
A814
At At
enrollment baseline
A1024
A1029
A1051
A1083
A1102
A1102
H629-
H642
H68 9
H692
H570-
H571
H582-
H545
* prior to 1973, was Old Age Assistance,
Disabled; combined into SSI in 1973.
Welfare annual income
Wages and salary income
Census household size
01-14
0, 99 = missing
Household size, excluding roomers
0,99 = missing
01-14
What would happen to payments if a
hh member moved away?
0,8,9 = missing
1 = increase
2 = decrease
3 = stay the same
5 = single person hh
7 = don't know
Number of people in hh
2 cols., uncategorized
Aid to the Blind and Aid to the
A849
A868
A660
A728
A1137
A1156
A948
A1016
H576,
H577
H24
H32
H38
H1574
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Name of Variable, coding info. At 2 years At At
enrollment baseline
Amount of rent reduction because hh
is related to landlord A805 A1093
0000-0200
9999 = missing
(4 cols., uncategorized)
In past 12 months have you H282
looked for a new unit?
0,8,9 = ms
1 = yes
2 = no
7 = don't know
How found out about available units?
0,7,8,9 = missing
1 = yes
2 = no
Newspapers H306
Real estate agencies H307
Neighborhood bulletin boards H308
Vacancy signs on buildings H1309
From friends or relatives H310
Social or family service workers H311
Somewhere else H312
Reasons for not looking:
0,8,9 = missing
7 = don't know
Didn't think would find one that H283
like as much as present unit
1 = yes
Didn't think EHAP pmt. enough
to get another unit H284
2 = yes
Lease on present unit prevented
moving H285
3 = yes
Expected moving expenses to be high H286
4 = yes
Present apt. close to schools H287
5 = yes
Present apt. close to work H288
6 = yes
Present unit close to relatives H289
1 = yes
Present unit close to friends H290
2 = yes
Didn't want to leave nbhd. H291
3 = yes
366
Didn't want to sign a lease
4 = yes
Expected some discrimination
5 = yes
Other reasons for not looking for a new
place to live
0,8,9 = missing
1 = personal
2 = present unit convenient location
3 = good rel. w. present landlord
4 = want waiting saving house
5 = length of program
6 = other
7 = financial reasons
How first found out that unit was
available?
0,97,98,99 = ms
01 = newspaper
02 = real estate agency
03 = nbhd. bulletin board
04 = vacancy sign on buiding
05 = friend or relative
06 = social or family service worker
07 = knew people in apartment
08 = other
How got around to look at units:
0,7,8,9 = missing
1 = yes
2 = no
Own car
Friend's or relative's car
Taxi service or jitney
Public transportation
Walk
Other way
Who in your household went out to
look at units?
0,7,8,9 = missing
1 = respondent
2 = spouse or other hh member
3 = someone else
4 = did not go out to look
H292
H2Q3
H294
H453
H615(movers)
H314
H315
H316
H317
H318
H319
H302
H303
H304
H305
H471
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Name of Variable, coding info. At 2 years At At
enrollment baseline
Who decided to move to new unit?
0 = no
7,8,9 = missing
respondent H403
1 = yes
spouse/other household member H404
2 = yes
someone else H405
3 = yes
Who decided on this unit?
0 = no resp.
7,8,9 = ms
respondent H537
1 = yes
spouse/other hh member H538
2 = yes
someone else H539
3 = yes
Where does your landlord live? H496 H257
0,8,9 = ms H668 (movers?)
1 = building
2 = neighborhood
3 = outside nbhd, but in
locality, area
4 = outside locality, area
5 = group individuals living in different
places
6 = home owner household no landlord
7 = don't know
(H257: 5 = don't know
6 = group)
Did someone outside hh pay any moving H625
expenses for you?
O,8,9 = ms
1 = yes
2 = no
7 = don't know
Is the landlord related to you or to H929 H08
anyone else who lives in this
household?
0,8,9 = ms
1 = yes
2 = no
7 = don't know
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Name of Variable, coding info. At 2 years At At
enrollment baseline
Because you are related to the 11 do you H930 H99
get reduced rent?
0,8,9 = ms
1 = yes
2 = no
7 = don't know
When there is something wrong with H1049 H181
your unit who do you usually contact H182
first? (codes
0,8,9 = ms differ)
1 = landlord
2 = super or manager
3 = maintenance people
4 = friends or relatives
5 = no one, do it ourselves
6 = other
7 = don't know
How many of your neighbors do you know H714 H369
well enough to stop and talk with?
0,8.9 = ms
1 = none
2 = some
3 = most
4 = all
7 = don't know
How friendly do you find most of the H715 H370
people in this neighborhood?
0,8,9 = ms
1 = friendly
2 = neither friendly nor unfriendly
3 = unfriendly
7 = don't know
How important is it to you to live in H716 H371
the same neighborhood as your
relatives?
0,8,9 = missing
1 = very important
2 = fairly important
3 = not important
7 = don't know
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Name of Variable, coding info. At 2 years At At
enrollment baseline
How many of your relatives now live in H717 H372
this neighborhood?
O,8,9 = ms
1 = none
2 = some
3 = many
7 = don't know
Recoded: 1=none
2=any
Summary housing standards measure H64
1 = passed low, medium, high
2 = passed low medium, fail high,
3 = passed low, fail medium high
4 = fail low, medium, high
9 = ms
Number of months at current unit D781 D848 H463
000-699
999 = missing
(3 cols., uncat),
Recoded to length in years by dividing number of months by 12
Did hh move or search betw. IHRF D871
and 2 years
0,9 = missing
1 = move
2 = search, no move
3 = no move or search
How long have you lived in this unit? H1197
2 cols., uncat
96 = less than one year
97 = don't know
98 = refused
99 = no answer
Have you actually moved to a different H243
apartment in the last 12 months?
0,7,8,9 = missing
1 = yes
2 = no
Main reasons wanted to move in past H271
twelve months? (same code as H273
H259-H263) H275
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Name of Variable, coding info. At 2 years At At
enrollment baseline
Did you move because:
0,7,8,q = missing
1 = yes
2 = no
Couldn't get as much money from EHAP H265
in previous place?
(wants to move because can't get H277
as much money from EHAP)
Previous house in bad condition? H266
(want to move because this house H278
in bad condition)
Previous house didn't have features H267
wanted?
(want to move because this house does
not have features wanted) H279
Wanted to live closer to job? H269
(wants to move because want to live H281
closer to job)
Did you have to pay for or buy anything H600
unexpected after moved?
0,8,9 = ms
1 = yes
2 = no
7 = don't know
How satisfied are you with:
0,819 = ms
1 = very satisfied
2 = somewhat satisfied
3 = somewhat dissatisfied
4 = very dissatisfied
7 = don't know
the unit you now live in? H685 H69
the neighborhood as a place to live? H712 H68
Current status D796 D873
0 = n.a.
1 = active, full pmt.
2 = active, minimum payment
3 = inactive, never reactivated
4 = terminated
5 = full payment, previously inactive
6 = minimum payment made, prev. inact.
7 = inactive, reactivated later
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Name of Variable, coding info. At 2 years At At
enrollment baseline
Did participant meet earmarking
requirement? D766 D833
0 = earmarking requirement met
1 = earmarking requirement not
2 = eligible, inspection not completed
3 = eligible, hh size increased
4 = requirement not met, still eligible
6 = ineligible, lag in reporting impr.
8 = not determined
9 = n.a../treatment group
Reasons for inactive status D779 D846
00 = active
1 = move out of county
2 = ineligible hh comp.
3 = institutionalized
4 = cannot locate
5,6,7 = refused eval or interview
8 = deceased
9 = don't like program
10 = personal reason
11 = ineligible split
12 = fraud
13,14,15,16 = refused some aspect of
particip.
77 = missing
Reason for minimum payment of $10 D784 D852
0 = hh active
1 = owns home
2 = subsidized housing
3 = no rent receipt
4 = hh terminated
5 = hh active no lv hm sbsdz
Treatment group D799 H10
0 = n.a.
2,12 = housing gap, design center
1,3 = 25% contrib,80% and 120% of C*
4-9 = minimum rent, housing gap formula
10,11 = 15% and 35% of income; c*
13-23 = percent of rent
24,25 = controls
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Name of Variable, coding info. At 2 years At At
enrollment baseline
How satisfied were you with the services H148
you actually received from EHAP?
0,8,9 = missing
1 = very satisfied
2 = somewhat satisfied
3 = somewhat dissatisfied
4 = very dissatisfied
5 = did not receive any services
7 = don't know
What services were you dissatisfied with? H144,
0,97,98,99 = missing H151
01 = inconsistent payments H153
02 = inappropriate paymetns
03 = not enough money
04 = complaints about housing evaluation
05 = st policy personnel inconsistent
06 = complaints about program requirements
07 = no help finding better housing
08 = general dissatisfaction
96 = other
Did you need help that program office H155
did not provide?
0,8,9 = missing
1 = yes
2 = no
What kind of help did you need? H158
0,97,98,99 = missing H160
01 = help me find housing
02 = larger payments
03 - legal help, lease
04 = payments time same amount
05 = help improve my place
06 = explain program requirements better
07 = forms, fewer, simplified
08 = transportation to look for housing
96 = other specific complaints
How difficult was it to meet
requirements? H213
0,7,8,9 = missing
1 = very difficult
2 = somewhat difficult
3 = not difficult at all
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